Add support for application defined signature algorithms for use with
[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
index 8cf1e1f..6ae2c4d 100644 (file)
@@ -179,6 +179,32 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
                return(NULL);
        }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
+       {
+       int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+       *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+       if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+           (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
+               {
+               if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
+                       {
+                       /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, 
+                          we do so if There is no srp login name */
+                       ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+                       *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+                       }
+               else
+                       {
+                       ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
+                       }
+               }
+       return ret;
+       }
+#endif
+
 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
                        ssl3_accept,
                        ssl_undefined_function,
@@ -189,7 +215,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
        BUF_MEM *buf;
        unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
        void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-       long num1;
        int ret= -1;
        int new_state,state,skip=0;
 
@@ -212,6 +237,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                return(-1);
                }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+       /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+        * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+        * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
+        */
+       if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+               {
+               s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+               s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+               }
+#endif
+
        for (;;)
                {
                state=s->state;
@@ -219,7 +256,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                switch (s->state)
                        {
                case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
-                       s->new_session=1;
+                       s->renegotiate=1;
                        /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
 
                case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
@@ -259,6 +296,8 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                }
 
                        s->init_num=0;
+                       s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+                       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
 
                        if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
                                {
@@ -271,6 +310,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
                                s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
                                }
+                       else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+                               !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+                               {
+                               /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
+                                * client that doesn't support secure
+                                * renegotiation.
+                                */
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+                               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                               ret = -1;
+                               goto end;
+                               }
                        else
                                {
                                /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
@@ -301,11 +352,35 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
 
-                       s->shutdown=0;
-                       ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
-                       if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                       if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
+                       {
+                               ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
+                               if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                       }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                       {
+                       int al;
+                       if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al))  < 0)
+                                       {
+                                       /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
+                                       s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+                                       goto end;
+                                       }
+                       if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
+                               {
+                               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);    
+                               /* This is not really an error but the only means to
+                                   for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
+                                  if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)      
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);                     
+                               ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;                       
+                               ret= -1;
+                               goto end;       
+                               }
+                       }
+#endif         
                        
-                       s->new_session = 2;
+                       s->renegotiate = 2;
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
                        s->init_num=0;
                        break;
@@ -327,14 +402,35 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
 #endif
                        else
-                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
-                       s->init_num=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                               s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
+#else
+                       s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+#endif
+                       s->init_num = 0;
                        break;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+               case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
+               case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
+                       /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
+                       if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
+                               {
+                               ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
+                               if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                               }
+                       else
+                               skip = 1;
+
+                       s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+                       s->init_num = 0;
+                       break;
+#endif
+
                case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
                        /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
-                       /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
+                       /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
                        if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
                                && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
                                && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
@@ -399,7 +495,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
                            || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
 #endif
-                           || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                           /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+                           || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
+                           || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
                            || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
                            || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
                                && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
@@ -445,6 +545,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                skip=1;
                                s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+                               if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+                                       if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                                               return -1;
                                }
                        else
                                {
@@ -471,15 +574,24 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        break;
                
                case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-                       /* number of bytes to be flushed */
-                       num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
-                       if (num1 > 0)
+
+                       /* This code originally checked to see if
+                        * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
+                        * and then flushed. This caused problems
+                        * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
+                        * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+                        * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
+                        * still exist. So instead we just flush
+                        * unconditionally.
+                        */
+
+                       s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+                       if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
                                {
-                               s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-                               num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-                               if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-                               s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+                               ret= -1;
+                               goto end;
                                }
+                       s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 
                        s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
                        break;
@@ -514,14 +626,43 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
                                 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
                                 * message is not sent.
+                                * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
+                                * the client uses its key from the certificate
+                                * for key exchange.
                                 */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+                               if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+                               else
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
                                s->init_num = 0;
                                }
+                       else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                               {
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+                               s->init_num=0;
+                               if (!s->session->peer)
+                                       break;
+                               /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
+                                * at this point and digest cached records.
+                                */
+                               if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+                                       {
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                                       return -1;
+                                       }
+                               s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+                               if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                                       return -1;
+                               }
                        else
                                {
                                int offset=0;
                                int dgst_num;
+
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
                                s->init_num=0;
 
@@ -531,12 +672,21 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                                 * should be generalized. But it is next step
                                 */
                                if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
-                                       ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
+                                       if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                                               return -1;
                                for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)    
                                        if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) 
                                                {
+                                               int dgst_size;
+
                                                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
-                                               offset+=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+                                               dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+                                               if (dgst_size < 0)
+                                                       {
+                                                       ret = -1;
+                                                       goto end;
+                                                       }
+                                               offset+=dgst_size;
                                                }               
                                }
                        break;
@@ -548,23 +698,37 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+                       if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+                       else
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
                        s->init_num=0;
                        break;
 
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+               case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+               case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+                       ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+                       if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+                       s->init_num = 0;
+                       s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+                       break;
+#endif
+
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
                case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
                        ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
                                SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-                       if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
-                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-                       else if (s->hit)
-                               s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
-#else
                        if (s->hit)
                                s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                       else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+                               s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
 #endif
                        else
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
@@ -622,7 +786,16 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
                        if (s->hit)
+                               {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
                                s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+                               if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+                                       s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+                               else
+                                       s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+                               }
                        else
                                s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
                        s->init_num=0;
@@ -640,11 +813,9 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
                        s->init_num=0;
 
-                       if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+                       if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
                                {
-                               /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
-                                * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
-                               
+                               s->renegotiate=0;
                                s->new_session=0;
                                
                                ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
@@ -734,10 +905,15 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
        s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
        if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
                {
+               /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+                * negotiation. */
+               if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+                       return -1;
+                       }
                /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
-                * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
-                * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
-                * when a handshake is not completed ... */
+                * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
                if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                        {
@@ -745,6 +921,14 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
                        s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
                        }
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+               if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+                       {
+                       EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+                       s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+                       }
+#endif
+               s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
                return 2;
                }
        return 1;
@@ -752,7 +936,7 @@ int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
        {
-       int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
+       int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
        unsigned int cookie_len;
        long n;
        unsigned long id;
@@ -769,7 +953,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
         * TLSv1.
         */
-       if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+       if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
+               )
                {
                s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
                }
@@ -803,6 +988,21 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                goto f_err;
                }
 
+       /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
+        * contain one, just return since we do not want to
+        * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
+        */
+       if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
+               {
+               unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+               
+               session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+               cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+
+               if (cookie_length == 0)
+                       return 1;
+               }
+
        /* load the client random */
        memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
        p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
@@ -811,13 +1011,16 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
        j= *(p++);
 
        s->hit=0;
-       /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
-        * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
-        * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
-        * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
-        * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
-        * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
-        * an earlier library version)
+       /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
+        * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
+        * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+        * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
+        * won't even compile against older library versions).
+        *
+        * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
+        * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
+        * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+        * setting will be ignored.
         */
        if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
                {
@@ -842,23 +1045,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
        p+=j;
 
-       if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                {
                /* cookie stuff */
                cookie_len = *(p++);
 
-               if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
-                       s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
-                       {
-                       /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
-                       if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
-                               {
-                               al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
-                               goto f_err;
-                               }
-                       }
-
                /* 
                 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
                 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
@@ -873,7 +1064,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                        }
 
                /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
-               if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+               if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
                        cookie_len > 0)
                        {
                        memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
@@ -898,6 +1089,8 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                                SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
                                        goto f_err;
                                }
+
+                       ret = 2;
                        }
 
                p += cookie_len;
@@ -947,22 +1140,33 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                break;
                                }
                        }
-               if (j == 0)
+/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
+               if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
                        {
-                       if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
+                       /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
+                        * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
+                        * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
+                        * preferences.  We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
+                        * enabled, though. */
+                       c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+                       if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
                                {
-                               /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
-                               s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
-                               }
-                       else
-                               {
-                               /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
-                                * list if we are asked to reuse it */
-                               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
-                               goto f_err;
+                               s->session->cipher = c;
+                               j = 1;
                                }
                        }
+#endif
+               if (j == 0)
+                       {
+                       /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
+                        * list if we are asked to reuse it */
+                       al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
                }
 
        /* compression */
@@ -991,18 +1195,65 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
        /* TLS extensions*/
-       if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+       if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
                {
-               if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+               if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
                        {
-                       /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
-                       goto f_err;
+                       goto err;
                        }
                }
-               if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
-                       goto err;
+
+       /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
+        * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
+        * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
+        * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
+       {
+               unsigned long Time;
+               unsigned char *pos;
+               Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
+               pos=s->s3->server_random;
+               l2n(Time,pos);
+               if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+                       {
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+       }
+
+       if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+               {
+               SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+
+               s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+               if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
+                       ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+                       {
+                       s->hit=1;
+                       s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+                       s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+                       ciphers=NULL;
+
+                       /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+                       pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+                       if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+                               {
+                               al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+
+                       s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
+
+                       if (s->cipher_list)
+                               sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+                       if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+                               sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+                       s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+                       s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+                       }
                }
 #endif
 
@@ -1011,7 +1262,48 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
        s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
-       if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
+       /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+       if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+               {
+               int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+               /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+               /* Can't disable compression */
+               if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+               /* Look for resumed compression method */
+               for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
+                       {
+                       comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+                       if (comp_id == comp->id)
+                               {
+                               s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+                               break;
+                               }
+                       }
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+               /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+               for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
+                       {
+                       if (q[m] == comp_id)
+                               break;
+                       }
+               if (m >= i)
+                       {
+                       al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+               }
+       else if (s->hit)
+               comp = NULL;
+       else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
                { /* See if we have a match */
                int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
 
@@ -1035,6 +1327,15 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                else
                        comp=NULL;
                }
+#else
+       /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+        * using compression.
+        */
+       if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
 #endif
 
        /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
@@ -1067,6 +1368,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
+               /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
+               if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
+                       s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
+                               ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
+               if (s->session->not_resumable)
+                       /* do not send a session ticket */
+                       s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
                }
        else
                {
@@ -1099,7 +1407,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
                s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
                }
 
-       ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
+               {
+               if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                       goto f_err;
+               }
        
        /* we now have the following setup. 
         * client_random
@@ -1112,7 +1424,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         * s->tmp.new_cipher    - the new cipher to use.
         */
 
-       ret=1;
+       if (ret < 0) ret=1;
        if (0)
                {
 f_err:
@@ -1128,16 +1440,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
        unsigned char *buf;
        unsigned char *p,*d;
        int i,sl;
-       unsigned long l,Time;
+       unsigned long l;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+       unsigned long Time;
+#endif
 
        if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
                {
                buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
                p=s->s3->server_random;
+               /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
                Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);                 /* Time */
                l2n(Time,p);
                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
                        return -1;
+#endif
                /* Do the message type and length last */
                d=p= &(buf[4]);
 
@@ -1148,23 +1466,24 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
                memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
-               /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
-                * session id.  If it is a re-use, we send back the
-                * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
-                * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
-                * session-id if we want it to be single use.
-                * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
-                * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
-                *
-                * We also have an additional case where stateless session
-                * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
-                * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
-                * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
-                * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
-                * is unaffected.
+               /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
+                * back in the server hello:
+                * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+                *   we send back the old session ID.
+                * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+                *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+                *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+                * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+                *   session ID.
+                * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+                *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
+                * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+                * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+                * to send back.
                 */
-               if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
-                       && !s->hit)
+               if (s->session->not_resumable ||
+                       (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+                               && !s->hit))
                        s->session->session_id_length=0;
 
                sl=s->session->session_id_length;
@@ -1262,6 +1581,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; 
 #endif
        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+       const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
        unsigned char *p,*d;
        int al,i;
        unsigned long type;
@@ -1329,7 +1649,6 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
                        if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
                                {
-                               DH_free(dh);
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                                goto err;
                                }
@@ -1375,7 +1694,14 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        const EC_GROUP *group;
 
                        ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
-                       if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+                       if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
+                               {
+                               /* Get NID of first shared curve */
+                               int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, 0);
+                               if (nid != NID_undef)
+                                       ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+                               }
+                       else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
                                {
                                ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
                                      SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
@@ -1390,7 +1716,6 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
                        if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
                                {
-                               EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); 
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                                goto err;
                                }
@@ -1401,12 +1726,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                                goto err;
                                }
-                       if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
+                       if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
+                               ecdh = ecdhp;
+                       else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
                                {
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
                                goto err;
                                }
-                       ecdh = ecdhp;
 
                        s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
                        if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
@@ -1505,21 +1831,44 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                }
                        else
 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+               if (type & SSL_kSRP)
+                       {
+                       if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+                               (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+                               (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
+                               (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                       r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
+                       r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
+                       r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
+                       r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
+                       }
+               else 
+#endif
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
                        goto f_err;
                        }
-               for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+               for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
                        {
                        nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                       if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+                               n+=1+nr[i];
+                       else
+#endif
                        n+=2+nr[i];
                        }
 
                if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
                        && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
                        {
-                       if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+                       if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
                                == NULL)
                                {
                                al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -1541,8 +1890,16 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
                p= &(d[4]);
 
-               for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+               for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
                        {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+                       if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+                               {
+                               *p = nr[i];
+                               p++;
+                               }
+                       else
+#endif
                        s2n(nr[i],p);
                        BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
                        p+=nr[i];
@@ -1569,6 +1926,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                            (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, 
                            encodedlen);
                        OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+                       encodedPoint = NULL;
                        p += encodedlen;
                        }
 #endif
@@ -1589,12 +1947,15 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
                         * and p points to the space at the end. */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-                       if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+                       if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
+                                       && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
                                {
                                q=md_buf;
                                j=0;
                                for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
                                        {
+                                       EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+                                               EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
                                        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
                                                ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
                                        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
@@ -1616,44 +1977,41 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                }
                        else
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
-                               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+                       if (md)
                                {
-                               /* lets do DSS */
-                               EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
-                               EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                               EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-                               EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
-                               if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
-                                       (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+                               /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
+                                * algorithm */
+                               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
                                        {
-                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
-                                       goto err;
+                                       if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
+                                               {
+                                               /* Should never happen */
+                                               al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                                               goto f_err;
+                                               }
+                                       p+=2;
                                        }
-                               s2n(i,p);
-                               n+=i+2;
-                               }
-                       else
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+                               fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
+                                                       EVP_MD_name(md));
 #endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
-                               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-                               {
-                               /* let's do ECDSA */
-                               EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+                               EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
                                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
                                EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
                                if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
                                        (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
                                        {
-                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
                                        goto err;
                                        }
                                s2n(i,p);
                                n+=i+2;
+                               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                                       n+= 2;
                                }
                        else
-#endif
                                {
                                /* Is this error check actually needed? */
                                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
@@ -1706,6 +2064,14 @@ int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
                p+=n;
                n++;
 
+               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                       {
+                       nl = tls12_get_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
+                       s2n(nl, p);
+                       p += nl + 2;
+                       n += nl + 2;
+                       }
+
                off=n;
                p+=2;
                n+=2;
@@ -1786,7 +2152,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
        BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
-       DH *dh_srvr;
+       DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
        KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
@@ -1844,7 +2210,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        }
 
                /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
-               if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+               if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                        {
                        n2s(p,i);
                        if (n != i+2)
@@ -1920,8 +2286,13 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
                if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
                {
-               n2s(p,i);
-               if (n != i+2)
+               int idx = -1;
+               EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
+               if (n)
+                       n2s(p,i);
+               else
+                       i = 0;
+               if (n && n != i+2)
                        {
                        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
                                {
@@ -1934,26 +2305,52 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                i=(int)n;
                                }
                        }
-
-               if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
+               if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
+                       idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+               else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
+                       idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+               if (idx >= 0)
+                       {
+                       skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
+                       if ((skey == NULL) ||
+                               (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
+                               (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
+                               {
+                               al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+                       dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
+                       }
+               else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
                        goto f_err;
                        }
                else
+                       dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
+
+               if (n == 0L)
                        {
-                       if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
+                       /* Get pubkey from cert */
+                       EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+                       if (clkey)
+                               {
+                               if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
+                                       dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
+                               }
+                       if (dh_clnt == NULL)
                                {
                                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
                                goto f_err;
                                }
-                       else
-                               dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
+                       EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
+                       pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
                        }
-
-               pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
+               else
+                       pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
                if (pub == NULL)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
@@ -1965,18 +2362,23 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                if (i <= 0)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                       BN_clear_free(pub);
                        goto err;
                        }
 
                DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
                s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
-
-               BN_clear_free(pub);
+               if (dh_clnt)
+                       DH_free(dh_clnt);
+               else
+                       BN_clear_free(pub);
                pub=NULL;
                s->session->master_key_length=
                        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                s->session->master_key,p,i);
                OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+               if (dh_clnt)
+                       return 2;
                }
        else
 #endif
@@ -1989,7 +2391,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                krb5_data               enc_pms;
                KSSL_CTX                *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
                EVP_CIPHER_CTX          ciph_ctx;
-               EVP_CIPHER              *enc = NULL;
+               const EVP_CIPHER        *enc = NULL;
                unsigned char           iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
                unsigned char           pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
                                               + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
@@ -2004,7 +2406,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                n2s(p,i);
                enc_ticket.length = i;
 
-               if (n < enc_ticket.length + 6)
+               if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
@@ -2017,7 +2419,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                n2s(p,i);
                authenticator.length = i;
 
-               if (n < enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)
+               if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                                SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
@@ -2129,7 +2531,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                                SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                        goto err;
                        }
-               if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+               if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
                    {
                    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
                     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
@@ -2139,8 +2541,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
                     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
                     */
-                   if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
-                          (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+                   if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
                               SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
@@ -2279,6 +2680,12 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        /* Get encoded point length */
                        i = *p; 
                        p += 1;
+                       if (n != 1 + i)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                   ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
                        if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, 
                            clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
                                {
@@ -2310,9 +2717,10 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
                EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
                EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
-               if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) 
-                       EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+               EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
                BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+               EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+               s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; 
 
                /* Compute the master secret */
                s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
@@ -2418,34 +2826,116 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        }
                else
 #endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+               if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+                       {
+                       int param_len;
+
+                       n2s(p,i);
+                       param_len=i+2;
+                       if (param_len > n)
+                               {
+                               al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+                       if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+                       if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+                               OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+                       s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+                       if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                       ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                               goto err;
+                               }
+
+                       p+=i;
+                       }
+               else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
                if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 
-               {
+                       {
+                       int ret = 0;
                        EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
-                       unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
-                       size_t outlen;                  
-
-                       /* Get our certificate privatec key*/
-                       pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);     
+                       EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+                       unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+                       size_t outlen=32, inlen;
+                       unsigned long alg_a;
+
+                       /* Get our certificate private key*/
+                       alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+                       if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+                               pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
+                       else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+                               pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+                       pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
                        EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+                       /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+                        * use it for key exchange.  Don't mind errors from
+                        * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
+                        * a client certificate for authorization only. */
+                       client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+                       if (client_pub_pkey)
+                               {
+                               if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+                                       ERR_clear_error();
+                               }
                        /* Decrypt session key */
-                       if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) || p[1]!=0x81 
+                       if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED))) 
                                {
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-                               goto err;
-                               }       
-                       if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,p+3,p[2]) <0) 
+                               goto gerr;
+                               }
+                       if (p[1] == 0x81)
+                               {
+                               start = p+3;
+                               inlen = p[2];
+                               }
+                       else if (p[1] < 0x80)
+                               {
+                               start = p+2;
+                               inlen = p[1];
+                               }
+                       else
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+                               goto gerr;
+                               }
+                       if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0) 
 
                                {
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
-                               goto err;
+                               goto gerr;
                                }
                        /* Generate master secret */
-                       EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
                        s->session->master_key_length=
                                s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                                        s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
-
-               }
+                       /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+                       if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+                               ret = 2;
+                       else
+                               ret = 1;
+               gerr:
+                       EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+                       EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+                       if (ret)
+                               return ret;
+                       else
+                               goto err;
+                       }
                else
                {
                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
@@ -2457,7 +2947,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        return(1);
 f_err:
        ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
 err:
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
@@ -2478,12 +2968,15 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
        long n;
        int type=0,i,j;
        X509 *peer;
+       const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+       EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+       EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
 
        n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
                SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
                -1,
-               514, /* 514? */
+               516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
                &ok);
 
        if (!ok) return((int)n);
@@ -2503,7 +2996,7 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
        if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
                {
                s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
-               if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+               if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
                        {
                        al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
@@ -2546,6 +3039,36 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
                } 
        else 
                {       
+               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                       {
+                       int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+                       /* Should never happen */
+                       if (sigalg == -1)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                               al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+                       /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+                       if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+                               al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+                       md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
+                       if (md == NULL)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+                               al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+                       p += 2;
+                       n -= 2;
+                       }
                n2s(p,i);
                n-=2;
                if (i > n)
@@ -2563,6 +3086,37 @@ int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
                goto f_err;
                }
 
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               {
+               long hdatalen = 0;
+               void *hdata;
+               hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+               if (hdatalen <= 0)
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                       al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+               fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
+                                                       EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+               if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+                       || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                       al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+
+               if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
+                       {
+                       al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
+               }
+       else
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 
        if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
                {
@@ -2653,6 +3207,13 @@ f_err:
                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
                }
 end:
+       if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+               {
+               BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+               s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+               s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+               }
+       EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
        return(ret);
        }
@@ -2765,11 +3326,17 @@ int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
                        al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        goto f_err;
                        }
+               /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+               if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+                       {
+                       al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
                }
        else
                {
                i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
-               if (!i)
+               if (i <= 0)
                        {
                        al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
@@ -2816,12 +3383,12 @@ err:
 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
        {
        unsigned long l;
-       X509 *x;
+       CERT_PKEY *cpk;
 
        if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
                {
-               x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
-               if (x == NULL)
+               cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+               if (cpk == NULL)
                        {
                        /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
                        if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
@@ -2832,7 +3399,7 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
                                }
                        }
 
-               l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+               l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
                s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
                s->init_num=(int)l;
                s->init_off=0;
@@ -2841,26 +3408,57 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
        /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
        return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
        }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
        {
        if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
                {
                unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
-               int len, slen;
+               const unsigned char *const_p;
+               int len, slen_full, slen;
+               SSL_SESSION *sess;
                unsigned int hlen;
                EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
                HMAC_CTX hctx;
+               SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
                unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
                unsigned char key_name[16];
 
                /* get session encoding length */
-               slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+               slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
                /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
                 * too long
                 */
-               if (slen > 0xFF00)
+               if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
+                       return -1;
+               senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+               if (!senc)
+                       return -1;
+               p = senc;
+               i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+               /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
+               const_p = senc;
+               sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+               if (sess == NULL)
+                       {
+                       OPENSSL_free(senc);
+                       return -1;
+                       }
+               sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+
+               slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+               if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
+                       {
+                       OPENSSL_free(senc);
                        return -1;
+                       }
+               p = senc;
+               i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
+               SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
                /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
                 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
                 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
@@ -2872,11 +3470,6 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
                        26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
                        EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
                        return -1;
-               senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
-               if (!senc)
-                       return -1;
-               p = senc;
-               i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
 
                p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
                /* do the header */
@@ -2889,9 +3482,9 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
                 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
                 * from parent ctx.
                 */
-               if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+               if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
                        {
-                       if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+                       if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
                                                         &hctx, 1) < 0)
                                {
                                OPENSSL_free(senc);
@@ -2902,12 +3495,18 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
                        {
                        RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
                        EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-                                       s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
-                       HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+                                       tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+                       HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
                                        tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
-                       memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+                       memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
                        }
-               l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+
+               /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
+                * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
+                * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
+                * as their sessions. */
+               l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
                /* Skip ticket length for now */
                p += 2;
                /* Output key name */
@@ -2982,4 +3581,167 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
        /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
        return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
        }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
+       {
+       int ok;
+       int proto_len, padding_len;
+       long n;
+       const unsigned char *p;
+
+       /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+        * extension in their ClientHello */
+       if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+               return -1;
+               }
+
+       n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+               SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+               SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
+               SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+               514,  /* See the payload format below */
+               &ok);
+
+       if (!ok)
+               return((int)n);
+
+       /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+        * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+        * by ssl3_get_finished). */
+       if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+               return -1;
+               }
+
+       if (n < 2)
+               return 0;  /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+
+       p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+       /* The payload looks like:
+        *   uint8 proto_len;
+        *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+        *   uint8 padding_len;
+        *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
+        */
+       proto_len = p[0];
+       if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+               return 0;
+       padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
+       if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
+               return 0;
+
+       s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
+       if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
+       s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
+
+       return 1;
+       }
+# endif
+
+int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
+       {
+       size_t length = 0;
+       const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
+       unsigned char *p;
+       size_t authz_length, i;
+
+       if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
+               return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+       orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
+       if (authz == NULL)
+               {
+               /* This should never occur. */
+               return 0;
+               }
+
+       /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
+        * message will be. */
+       for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
+               {
+               unsigned short len;
+               unsigned char type;
+
+               type = *(authz++);
+               n2s(authz, len);
+               /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
+               i += 2;
+
+               if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
+                          type,
+                          s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
+                       length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
+
+               authz += len;
+               i += len;
+               }
+
+       length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
+                 3 /* handshake length */ +
+                 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
+                 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
+                 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
+
+       if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+               return 0;
+               }
+
+       p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+       *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
+       /* Handshake length */
+       l2n3(length - 4, p);
+       /* Length of supplemental data */
+       l2n3(length - 7, p);
+       /* Supplemental data type */
+       s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
+       /* Its length */
+       s2n(length - 11, p);
+
+       authz = orig_authz;
+
+       /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
+       for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
+               {
+               unsigned short len;
+               unsigned char type;
+
+               type = *(authz++);
+               n2s(authz, len);
+               /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
+               i += 2;
+
+               if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
+                          type,
+                          s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
+                       {
+                       *(p++) = type;
+                       s2n(len, p);
+                       memcpy(p, authz, len);
+                       p += len;
+                       }
+
+               authz += len;
+               i += len;
+               }
+
+       s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
+       s->init_num = length;
+       s->init_off = 0;
+
+       return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+       }
 #endif