First tentative impementation of Kerberos 5 cryptos and keys for SSL/TLS. Implemente...

[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index e23ca20bd310eff7257f0858a2b8912f1ca11296..4704dfb59867a918d817e04d5cb51b8ca479912c 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
+#ifndef NO_KRB5
+#include "kssl.h"
+#endif /* NO_KRB5 */
+
 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
@@ -153,7 +157,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
                        if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
 
                        if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
-                               abort();
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                               return -1;
+                               }
                        s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
 
                        if (s->init_buf == NULL)
@@ -259,7 +266,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
                        /* clear this, it may get reset by
                         * send_server_key_exchange */
-                       if (s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+                       if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
+#ifndef NO_KRB5
+                               && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
+#endif /* NO_KRB5 */
+                               )
                                s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
                        else
                                s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
@@ -982,7 +993,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
                        if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
                                dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
-                                     !SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+                                     SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
                                      SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
                        if (dhp == NULL)
                                {
@@ -1254,12 +1265,15 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
        DH *dh_srvr;
 #endif
+#ifndef NO_KRB5
+        KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* NO_KRB5 */
 
        n=ssl3_get_message(s,
                SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
                SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
                SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
-               400, /* ???? */
+               2048, /* ??? */
                &ok);
 
        if (!ok) return((int)n);
@@ -1326,11 +1340,22 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        goto f_err;
                        }
 
-               if ((p[0] != (s->client_version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->client_version & 0xff)))
+               if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
                        {
-                       al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                       goto f_err;
+                       /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+                        * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+                        * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+                        * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
+                        * version instead if the server does not support the requested
+                        * protocol version.
+                        * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+                       if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+                               (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+                               {
+                               al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                               goto f_err;
+                               }
                        }
 
                s->session->master_key_length=
@@ -1403,6 +1428,53 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                }
        else
 #endif
+#ifndef NO_KRB5
+        if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
+                {
+                krb5_error_code        krb5rc;
+                KSSL_CTX       *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+
+                if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+                if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx,
+                        s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->length,
+                        &kssl_err)) != 0)
+                        {
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+                        printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+                        if (kssl_err.text)
+                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                kssl_err.reason);
+                        goto err;
+                        }
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+                kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+                /*     19991013 VRS -  3DES is kind of bogus here,
+                **     at least until Kerberos supports 3DES.  The only
+                **     real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
+                **     the other key material (client_random, server_random)
+                **     could be sniffed.  Nonces may help against replays though.
+                **
+                **     Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
+                **
+                **     memcpy(s->session->master_key,  kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
+                **     s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
+                */
+                s->session->master_key_length=
+                        s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                                s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
+                /*     Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for apache.
+                **     kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+                **     if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+                */
+                }
+       else
+#endif /* NO_KRB5 */
                {
                al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
@@ -1723,7 +1795,11 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
        if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
                {
                x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
-               if (x == NULL)
+               if (x == NULL &&
+                        /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+                        (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+                                & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+                        != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return(0);