-/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
-#endif
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
return(NULL);
}
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
- static int init=1;
- static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
+ int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
- if (init)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- if (init)
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
+ (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
+ {
+ if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
{
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
- sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
- SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
- init=0;
+ /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
+ we do so if There is no srp login name */
+ ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
}
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
}
- return(&SSLv3_server_data);
+ return ret;
}
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_get_server_method)
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
+ unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
- long num1;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
return(-1);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+ * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+ * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+ {
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ }
+#endif
+
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->new_session=1;
+ s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
}
s->init_num=0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
+ else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
+ * client that doesn't support secure
+ * renegotiation.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
- s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->new_session = 2;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
+ {
+ int al;
+ if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
+ {
+ /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
+ s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ /* This is not really an error but the only means to
+ for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
+ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->renegotiate = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
else
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- s->init_num=0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
+#else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
+ ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
break;
+#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+ /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
}
else
skip=1;
+
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
+ * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
+ *
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
- * server certificate contains the server's
+ * server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
- || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
- || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
- || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
+ /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+ * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+#endif
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
- /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
+ /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+ * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
}
else
{
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
- /* number of bytes to be flushed */
- num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
- if (num1 > 0)
+
+ /* This code originally checked to see if
+ * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
+ * and then flushed. This caused problems
+ * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
+ * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+ * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
+ * still exist. So instead we just flush
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+
+ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
- s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
- num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
- if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+ ret= -1;
+ goto end;
}
+ s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
+ ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+#endif
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (ret == 3)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
+#endif
else {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
+ if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
+ * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
+ * the client uses its key from the certificate
+ * for key exchange.
*/
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
s->init_num = 0;
}
- else
+ else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ if (!s->session->peer)
+ break;
+ /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
+ * at this point and digest cached records.
+ */
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
{
+ int offset=0;
+ int dgst_num;
+
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
- */
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
+ * should be generalized. But it is next step
+ */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
+ {
+ int dgst_size;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
+ dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ if (dgst_size < 0)
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ offset+=dgst_size;
+ }
}
break;
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+#endif
+
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
+ {
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ }
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
s->init_num=0;
- if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
- /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
-
+ s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
{
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
-
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num=4;
- s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
+ return 3;
+#endif
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
{
+ /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
+ * negotiation. */
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
+ return -1;
+ }
/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
- * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
- * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
- * when a handshake is not completed ... */
+ * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
return 2;
}
return 1;
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
- int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
- int cookie_len;
+ int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C)
+ goto retry_cert;
+
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
* If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
* This down switching should be handled by a different method.
* If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
* TLSv1.
*/
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
+ )
{
- s->first_packet=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
+ s->first_packet=1;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->first_packet=0;
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
- if (s->client_version < s->version)
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
+ s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ : (s->client_version < s->version))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
+ !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
{
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version;
goto f_err;
}
+ /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
+ * contain one, just return since we do not want to
+ * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
+ {
+ unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
+
+ session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
+
+ if (cookie_length == 0)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
j= *(p++);
s->hit=0;
- /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
- * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
- * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
- * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
- * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
- * an earlier library version)
+ /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
+ * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
+ * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+ * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
+ * won't even compile against older library versions).
+ *
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
+ * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
+ * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ * setting will be ignored.
*/
- if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
+ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
else
{
- i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
+ i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
if (i == 1)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
p+=j;
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
/* cookie stuff */
cookie_len = *(p++);
- if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
- s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
- {
- /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
- if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
cookie_len > 0)
{
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+ /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
+ ret = -2;
}
p += cookie_len;
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* Select version to use */
+ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
+ {
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
+ }
+ else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
+ {
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+ }
}
n2s(p,i);
break;
}
}
- if (j == 0)
- {
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
- {
- /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
- s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
- }
- else
+/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
+ * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
+ */
+#if 0
+ if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
+ {
+ /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
+ * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
+ * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
+ * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
+ * enabled, though. */
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
{
- /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
- * list if we are asked to reuse it */
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
+ s->session->cipher = c;
+ j = 1;
}
}
+#endif
+ if (j == 0)
+ {
+ /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
+ * list if we are asked to reuse it */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
/* compression */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
q=p;
+#endif
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
{
if (p[j] == 0) break;
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
+ * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
+ * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
+ * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
+ {
+ unsigned char *pos;
+ pos=s->s3->server_random;
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+ {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
+ ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+ {
+ s->hit=1;
+ s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+ s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+ ciphers=NULL;
+
+ /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+ pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
+
+ if (s->cipher_list)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
- if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+ {
+ int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+ /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
+ /* Can't disable compression */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed compression method */
+ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
+ {
+ comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
+ if (comp_id == comp->id)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
+ for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
+ {
+ if (q[m] == comp_id)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (m >= i)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (s->hit)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
{ /* See if we have a match */
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
else
comp=NULL;
}
-
- /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
-#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
- * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
- * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+#else
+ /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
{
- if (p < (d+n))
- {
- /* wrong number of bytes,
- * there could be more to follow */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
}
#endif
if (!s->hit)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
goto f_err;
}
ciphers=NULL;
+ /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
+ retry_cert:
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb)
+ {
+ int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
+ /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
+ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
+ ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
+ if (s->session->not_resumable)
+ /* do not send a session ticket */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
}
else
{
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
- if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
+ if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc=c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec=c;
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
}
+
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
+ {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto f_err;
+ }
/* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
- ret=1;
- if (0)
+ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
+ if (0)
+ {
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- return(ret);
+ return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
}
int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,sl;
- unsigned long l,Time;
+ unsigned long l;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
p=s->s3->server_random;
- Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
- l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4);
+ if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+#endif
/* Do the message type and length last */
- d=p= &(buf[4]);
+ d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
- * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
- * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
- * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
- * session-id if we want it to be single use.
- * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
- * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+ /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
+ * back in the server hello:
+ * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+ * we send back the old session ID.
+ * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+ * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+ * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+ * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+ * session ID.
+ * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+ * we send back a 0-length session ID.
+ * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+ * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+ * to send back.
*/
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ if (s->session->not_resumable ||
+ (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit))
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=0;
+#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
- d=buf;
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
- l2n3(l,d);
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num=p-buf;
- s->init_off=0;
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
{
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
-
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num=4;
- s->init_off=0;
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
}
int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int al,i;
unsigned long type;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
- type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
+ type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert=s->cert;
buf=s->init_buf;
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (type & SSL_kEDH)
+ if (type & SSL_kDHE)
{
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
- DH_free(dh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
+ {
+ /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+ int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
+ if (nid != NID_undef)
+ ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ }
+ else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
{
ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
{
- EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
+ ecdh = ecdhp;
+ else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- ecdh = ecdhp;
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
- if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->priv_key == NULL) ||
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
{
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
}
}
- if ((ecdh->group == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->priv_key == NULL))
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
- nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group)))
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
- ecdh->pub_key,
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
}
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
- ecdh->pub_key,
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
- * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
+ * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
- n = 3 + encodedlen;
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
r[0]=NULL;
r[1]=NULL;
r[2]=NULL;
+ r[3]=NULL;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+ n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (type & SSL_kSRP)
+ {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
+ r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
+ r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
+ r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
{
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+ n+=1+nr[i];
+ else
+#endif
n+=2+nr[i];
}
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
- if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
== NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
kn=0;
}
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
}
- d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p= &(d[4]);
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
+ for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+ {
+ *p = nr[i];
+ p++;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
s2n(nr[i],p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
p+=nr[i];
{
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
- * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
* the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ encodedPoint = NULL;
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+#endif
+
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
* and p points to the space at the end. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
q=md_buf;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
}
else
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+ if (md)
{
- /* lets do DSS */
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ /* send signature algorithm */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
- goto err;
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
+ {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p+=2;
}
- s2n(i,p);
- n+=i+2;
- }
- else
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
+ EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- /* let's do ECDSA */
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ n+= 2;
}
else
-#endif
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
}
}
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
- l2n3(n,d);
-
- /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
- * it off */
- s->init_num=n+4;
- s->init_off=0;
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
{
buf=s->init_buf;
- d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
+ d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
p+=n;
n++;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ {
+ const unsigned char *psigs;
+ nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+ s2n(nl, p);
+ memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
+ p += nl;
+ n += nl + 2;
+ }
+
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
}
}
/* else no CA names */
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
s2n(nl,p);
- d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
- l2n3(n,d);
-
- /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
- * it off */
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
- s->init_num=n+4;
- s->init_off=0;
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- *(p++)=0;
- s->init_num += 4;
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ *(p++)=0;
+ s->init_num += 4;
+ }
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
return(-1);
}
-
-static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
-static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
- return NULL;
- else
- *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
-#else
- return NULL;
-#endif
- }
-
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i,al,ok;
long n;
- unsigned long l;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
- DH *dh_srvr;
+ DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (!ok) return((int)n);
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
+ unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
+ unsigned char version_good;
+
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
{
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
- /* TLS */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
n=i;
}
- i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
-
- al = -1;
-
- if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
- }
-
- if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
- {
- /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
- * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
- * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
- * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
- * version instead if the server does not support the requested
- * protocol version.
- * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
- if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
- (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+ /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
+ * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
+ * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
+ * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
+ * case that the decrypt fails. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
- /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
- * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
- * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
- * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
- * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
- * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
- * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
- }
+ /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
+ * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
+ decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+
+ /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
+ * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
+ * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+ * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
+ * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
+ * decryption error. */
+ version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
+ version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
+
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
+ * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
+ * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
+ * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
+ * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
+ * support the requested protocol version. If
+ * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
+ {
+ unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
+ unsigned char workaround;
+
+ /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
+ * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
+ * it'll be 0x00. */
+ workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
+ workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
+ workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
+ workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
+
+ workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
+ workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
+
+ /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
+ * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
+ * version_good. */
+ version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
+ (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
+ }
+
+ /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
+ * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
+ * used. */
+ decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
+
+ /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
+ * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
+ * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
+ * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
+ * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
+ decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
+ decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
+ decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
+ decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
+ decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
+ /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
+ * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
+ * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
+ * zeros. */
+ decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
+ decrypt_good_mask--;
+
+ /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
+ * decrypt_good_mask. */
+ for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
+ {
+ p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
+ (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
}
- if (al != -1)
- {
- /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
- * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
- ERR_clear_error();
- i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
- }
-
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
- n2s(p,i);
- if (n != i+2)
+ int idx = -1;
+ EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
+ if (n)
+ n2s(p,i);
+ else
+ i = 0;
+ if (n && n != i+2)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
{
i=(int)n;
}
}
-
- if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+ if (idx >= 0)
+ {
+ skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
+ if ((skey == NULL) ||
+ (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
+ (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
+ }
+ else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
else
+ dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
+
+ if (n == 0L)
{
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
+ /* Get pubkey from cert */
+ EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (clkey)
+ {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
+ dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
+ }
+ if (dh_clnt == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
- else
- dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
+ pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
}
-
- pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
+ else
+ pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
if (pub == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
goto err;
}
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
-
- BN_clear_free(pub);
+ if (dh_clnt)
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ else
+ BN_clear_free(pub);
pub=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
+ if (dh_clnt)
+ return 2;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
- {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
+ + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
- if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+ if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p,i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p,i);
authenticator.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p+=authenticator.length;
goto err;
}
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0)
- {
+ {
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
/* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
** but will return authtime == 0.
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
- goto err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
+ if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
+ * the protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
- {
- int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
- {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
- }
- }
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+ {
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
+ {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
+ }
+ }
- /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
** but it caused problems for apache.
- ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
- }
+ ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+ }
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ goto err;
}
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
- if (l & SSL_kECDH)
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
- /* use the certificate */
- srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
- pkey.eckey->group;
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
- pkey.eckey->priv_key;
+ /* use the certificate */
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
}
else
{
/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
* generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
- srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group;
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key;
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group))
- == NULL)
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (n == 0L)
- {
+ if (n == 0L)
+ {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
- if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
- if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) ||
(clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
- {
+ {
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates
* so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
* the two ECDH shares are for the same
* group.
*/
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
- clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key);
- ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
- }
- else
- {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ }
+ else
+ {
/* Get client's public key from encoded point
* in the ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
goto err;
}
- /* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
p += 1;
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group,
+ if (n != 1 + i)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
- * currently, so set it to the start
- */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- }
+ /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+ * currently, so set it to the start
+ */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_ecdh->group);
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
- * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
- * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
- */
- if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
- else
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
- srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- }
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
/* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- return (ret);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ return (ret);
}
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+ char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (n != i+2)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
+ * string for the callback */
+ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
+ memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+ psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
+
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ else if (psk_len == 0)
+ {
+ /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t+=psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
+ {
+ int param_len;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ param_len=i+2;
+ if (param_len > n)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p+=i;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
+ size_t outlen=32, inlen;
+ unsigned long alg_a;
+
+ /* Get our certificate private key*/
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+ /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
+ * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
+ * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
+ * a client certificate for authorization only. */
+ client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (client_pub_pkey)
+ {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ /* Decrypt session key */
+ if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ if (p[1] == 0x81)
+ {
+ start = p+3;
+ inlen = p[2];
+ }
+ else if (p[1] < 0x80)
+ {
+ start = p+2;
+ inlen = p[1];
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
+
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto gerr;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
+ /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
+ ret = 2;
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ gerr:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ else
+ goto err;
+ }
+ else
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
- srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- }
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
return(-1);
long n;
int type=0,i,j;
X509 *peer;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
- 514, /* 514? */
+ 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
- if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
+ if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- n2s(p,i);
- n-=2;
- if (i > n)
+ /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+ /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
+ * signature without length field */
+ if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+ pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
+ i=64;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ {
+ int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
+ if (rv == -1)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else if (rv == 0)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ p += 2;
+ n -= 2;
+ }
+ n2s(p,i);
+ n-=2;
+ if (i > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
goto f_err;
}
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ {
+ long hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
+ EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
{
j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
}
else
#endif
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
+ { unsigned char signature[64];
+ int idx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+ if (i!=64) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
+ }
+ for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
+ signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
+ }
+ j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (j<=0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
end:
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(ret);
}
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
+ /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
else
{
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if (!i)
+ if (i <= 0)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
}
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned long l;
- X509 *x;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
- x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
- if (x == NULL &&
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
- & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
+ cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ if (cpk == NULL)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return(0);
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
}
- l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
+ ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
- s->init_num=(int)l;
- s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ const unsigned char *const_p;
+ int len, slen_full, slen;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ * too long
+ */
+ if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
+ const_p = senc;
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+ if (sess == NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+ if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows handshake_header_length +
+ * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+ * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+ * from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+
+ /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
+ * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
+ * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
+ * as their sessions. */
+ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
+ /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
+ s2n(len - 6, p);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ return -1;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
+ * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
+int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ int proto_len, padding_len;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
-static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
-{
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
- * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
- return 1;
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
- return 2;
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
- return 3;
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
- return 4;
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
- return 5;
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
- return 6;
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
- return 7;
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
- return 8;
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
- return 9;
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
- return 10;
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
- return 11;
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
- return 12;
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
- return 13;
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
- return 14;
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
- return 15;
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
- return 16;
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
- return 17;
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
- return 18;
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
- return 19;
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
- return 20;
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
- return 21;
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
- return 22;
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
- return 23;
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
- return 24;
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
- return 25;
- default:
+ /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
+ * extension in their ClientHello */
+ if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
+ SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
+ 514, /* See the payload format below */
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return((int)n);
+
+ /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
+ * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
+ * by ssl3_get_finished). */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (n < 2)
+ return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ /* The payload looks like:
+ * uint8 proto_len;
+ * uint8 proto[proto_len];
+ * uint8 padding_len;
+ * uint8 padding[padding_len];
+ */
+ proto_len = p[0];
+ if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
+ return 0;
+ padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
+ if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
return 0;
+
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
+ if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+# endif
+
+int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
+ {
+ if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
+ srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
+ size_t length = 0;
+ size_t i = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *out = NULL;
+ unsigned short outlen = 0;
+ int cb_retval = 0;
+ record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
+
+ /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
+ if (!record->fn1)
+ continue;
+ cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
+ &out, &outlen,
+ record->arg);
+ if (cb_retval == -1)
+ continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
+ if (cb_retval == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* write supp data entry...
+ * if first entry, write handshake message type
+ * jump back to write length at end */
+ if (length == 0)
+ {
+ /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
+ * message length */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
+ /* hold on to length field to update later */
+ size_loc = p;
+ /* skip over handshake length field (3
+ * bytes) and supp_data length field
+ * (3 bytes) */
+ p += 3 + 3;
+ length += 1 +3 +3;
+ }
+ /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
+ s2n(outlen, p);
+ memcpy(p, out, outlen);
+ /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
+ * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
+ length += (outlen + 4);
+ p += outlen;
+ }
+ if (length > 0)
+ {
+ /* write handshake length */
+ l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
+ /* supp_data length */
+ l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
+ s->init_num = length;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* no supp data message sent */
+ *skip = 1;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int al = 0;
+ int cb_retval = 0;
+ int ok;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p, *d;
+ unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
+ unsigned long supp_data_entry_len = 0;
+ unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
+ size_t i = 0;
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
+ SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
+ /* use default limit */
+ TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
+ &ok);
+
+ if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ d = p;
+
+ /* The message cannot be empty */
+ if (n < 3)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
+ while (p<d+supp_data_len)
+ {
+ n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
+ n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
+ /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
+ for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
+ {
+ if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
+ {
+ cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
+ if (cb_retval == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ p+=supp_data_entry_len;
+ }
+ return 1;
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ return -1;
}
-}
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff