* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
#endif
return(NULL);
}
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
- {
- static int init=1;
- static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
-
- if (init)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
-
- if (init)
- {
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
- sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
- SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
- init=0;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
- }
- return(&SSLv3_server_data);
- }
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_get_server_method)
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
+ unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
long num1;
int ret= -1;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
}
else
skip=1;
+
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
- /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
- * have not asked for it :-) */
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
* so permit appropriate message length */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
return 1;
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
- s->first_packet=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ s->first_packet=1;
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->first_packet=0;
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
- if (s->client_version < s->version)
+ if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+ (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
* might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
* an earlier library version)
*/
- if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
+ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
else
{
- i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
+ i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
if (i == 1)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
p+=j;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+ if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
+ {
+ /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
+ if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
+ {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ cookie_len > 0)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
+ {
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p += cookie_len;
+ }
+
n2s(p,i);
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
{
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
{
/* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
- s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
- 0);
+ s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
}
else
{
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+ {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
{ /* See if we have a match */
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
else
comp=NULL;
}
+#endif
/* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
if (!s->hit)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=s->s3->server_random;
- Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ return -1;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+ *
+ * We also have an additional case where stateless session
+ * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
+ * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
+ * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
+ * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
+ * is unaffected.
*/
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit)
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=0;
+#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
l2n3(l,d);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
}
if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
ecdh = ecdhp;
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
- if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->priv_key == NULL) ||
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
{
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
}
}
- if ((ecdh->group == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->priv_key == NULL))
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
- nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group)))
+ nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
- ecdh->pub_key,
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
}
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
- ecdh->pub_key,
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
- * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
+ * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
- n = 3 + encodedlen;
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
r[0]=NULL;
r[1]=NULL;
r[2]=NULL;
+ r[3]=NULL;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
{
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
- * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
* the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
s->init_num += 4;
#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return(-1);
}
-
-static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
-static void *KDF1_SHA1(void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t outlen)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- if (outlen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
- return NULL;
- return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
-#else
- return NULL;
-#endif
- }
-
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i,al,ok;
long n;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
- /* TLS */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
+ s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+ goto err;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
n2s(p,i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p,i);
authenticator.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p+=authenticator.length;
goto err;
}
- if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6)
+ if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
+ if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
+ * the protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
{
- int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
{
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
{
int ret = 1;
+ int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
if (l & SSL_kECDH)
{
/* use the certificate */
- srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
- pkey.eckey->group;
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
- pkey.eckey->priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
}
else
{
/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
* generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
- srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group;
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key;
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group))
- == NULL)
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
- EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
- clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key);
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
}
else
/* Get encoded point length */
i = *p;
p += 1;
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group,
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
- srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- }
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
/* Compute the master secret */
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
- srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- }
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
unsigned char *p;
int type=0,i,j;
X509 *peer;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
{
j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ const unsigned char *p,*q;
+ unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
+ * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
switch (nid) {
case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
return 1;
}
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ int len, slen;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ * too long
+ */
+ if (slen > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+ /* Skip message length for now */
+ p += 3;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+ * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+ * from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+ l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+ l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+ p += 4;
+ s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num= len;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ return -1;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+#endif