* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
-
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
+#endif
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
return(NULL);
}
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
- {
- static int init=1;
- static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
-
- if (init)
- {
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
- sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
- SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
- init=0;
- }
- return(&SSLv3_server_data);
- }
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_get_server_method)
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
+ unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
long num1;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
- ret=1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
+ break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->new_session = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
}
else
skip=1;
+
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
+
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
- * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
+ * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
+ *
+ * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
+ * message only if the cipher suite is either
+ * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
+ * server certificate contains the server's
+ * public key for key exchange.
+ */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
+ || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
|| (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
|| ((l & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
- /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
- * have not asked for it :-) */
- ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
+ {
+ ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ }
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0) goto end;
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num=0;
-
- /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
- * a client cert, it can be verified */
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 2)
+ {
+ /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
+ * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
+ * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
+ * message is not sent.
+ */
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
+ * a client cert, it can be verified
+ */
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ }
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
- if (s->new_session == 2)
- s->new_session=0;
- /* if s->new_session is still 1, we have only sent a HelloRequest */
s->init_num=0;
- ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
- ret=1;
-
- if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+ if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
+ {
+ /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
+
+ s->new_session=0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
+ /* s->server=1; */
+ s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
+ if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
+ s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
- s->in_handshake--;
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
* so permit appropriate message length */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
return 1;
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
- s->first_packet=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ s->first_packet=1;
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ s->first_packet=0;
+ d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
* (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
+ if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+ (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ {
+ /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
* might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
* an earlier library version)
*/
- if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
+ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
else
{
- i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
+ i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
if (i == 1)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
}
- if (s->new_session)
- /* actually not necessarily a 'new' section unless
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
- s->new_session = 2;
-
p+=j;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+ if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
+ {
+ /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
+ if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
+ {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ cookie_len > 0)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
+ {
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p += cookie_len;
+ }
+
n2s(p,i);
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((i+p) > (d+n))
+ if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
{
/* not enough data */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
{
/* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
- s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
- 0);
+ s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
}
else
{
/* compression */
i= *(p++);
+ if ((p+i) > (d+n))
+ {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
q=p;
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
{
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+ {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
{ /* See if we have a match */
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
else
comp=NULL;
}
+#endif
/* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
+#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
+ * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
+ * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
- if (p > (d+n))
+ if (p < (d+n))
{
/* wrong number of bytes,
* there could be more to follow */
goto f_err;
}
}
+#endif
/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
* pick a cipher */
if (!s->hit)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=s->s3->server_random;
- Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ return -1;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+ *
+ * We also have an additional case where stateless session
+ * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
+ * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
+ * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
+ * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
+ * is unaffected.
*/
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit)
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
*(p++)=sl;
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
p+=sl;
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=0;
+#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
l2n3(l,d);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encodedlen = 0;
+ int curve_id = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *p,*d;
}
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ {
+ ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ecdh = ecdhp;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
+ {
+ if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
+ * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
+ * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key.
+ * First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+
+ if (encodedlen == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
+
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
+ * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
+ * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
+ * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0]=NULL;
+ r[1]=NULL;
+ r[2]=NULL;
+ r[3]=NULL;
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
kn=0;
}
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,n+4+kn))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
p+=nr[i];
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
+ * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
+ * the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
+ (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
+ encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
+#endif
+
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
- EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
- ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
+ ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx,q,
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
- EVP_SignInit(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1());
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
n+=i+2;
}
else
+#endif
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(i,p);
+ n+=i+2;
+ }
+ else
#endif
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
s->init_num += 4;
#endif
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i,al,ok;
long n;
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
- /* TLS */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
+ s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
}
if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto f_err;
+ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
+
+ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
+ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
+ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
+ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
+ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
+ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
+ * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
}
}
if (al != -1)
{
-#if 0
- goto f_err;
-#else
/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
* against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
- * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
- */
+ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
ERR_clear_error();
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
-#endif
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+ goto err;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p,i);
- memset(p,0,i);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
}
else
#endif
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,i);
- memset(p,0,i);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
}
else
#endif
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + 1];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(pms);
+ + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p,i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
- enc_ticket.data = p;
+
+ if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p,i);
authenticator.length = i;
- authenticator.data = p;
+
+ if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p+=authenticator.length;
n2s(p,i);
enc_pms.length = i;
- enc_pms.data = p;
+ enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_pms.length;
- if ((unsigned long)n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6)
+ /* Note that the length is checked again below,
+ ** after decryption
+ */
+ if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
- memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
- enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
+ (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
+ if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
+ * the protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
{
- int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
{
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
}
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get server private key and group information */
+ if (l & SSL_kECDH)
+ {
+ /* use the certificate */
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
+ * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
+ */
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Let's get client's public key */
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0L)
+ {
+ /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
+
+ if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ == NULL) ||
+ (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates
+ * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
+ * never executed. When that support is
+ * added, we ought to ensure the key
+ * received in the certificate is
+ * authorized for key agreement.
+ * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
+ * the two ECDH shares are for the same
+ * group.
+ */
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Get client's public key from encoded point
+ * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
+ */
+ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
+ p += 1;
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
+ clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+ * currently, so set it to the start
+ */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+
+ /* Compute the master secret */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+ generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ return (ret);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
err:
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
+ EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
+ if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
unsigned char *p;
int type=0,i,j;
X509 *peer;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
- 512, /* 512? */
+ 514, /* 514? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
}
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
if (i > n)
}
}
else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
+ &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
+ if (j <= 0)
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ const unsigned char *p,*q;
+ unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
+static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
+{
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
+ * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ return 1;
+ case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ return 2;
+ case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ return 3;
+ case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ return 4;
+ case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ return 5;
+ case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ return 6;
+ case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ return 7;
+ case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ return 8;
+ case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ return 9;
+ case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ return 10;
+ case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ return 11;
+ case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ return 12;
+ case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ return 13;
+ case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ return 14;
+ case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ return 15;
+ case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ return 16;
+ case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ return 17;
+ case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ return 18;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ return 19;
+ case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ return 20;
+ case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ return 21;
+ case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ return 22;
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ return 23;
+ case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ return 24;
+ case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ return 25;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ int len, slen;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ * too long
+ */
+ if (slen > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+ /* Skip message length for now */
+ p += 3;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+ * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+ * from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+ l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+ l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+ p += 4;
+ s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num= len;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ return -1;
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+#endif