* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define USE_SOCKETS
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
+ !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
+ defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
+ defined(__INTEL__) ) \
+ )
+# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
+#endif
+
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
- {
- /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
- * packet by another n bytes.
- * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
- * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
- * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
- * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
- */
- int i,len,left;
- long align=0;
- unsigned char *pkt;
- SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
-
- if (n <= 0) return n;
-
- rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
- if (rb->buf == NULL)
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
- return -1;
-
- left = rb->left;
+{
+ /*
+ * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
+ * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
+ * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
+ * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
+ * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
+ */
+ int i, len, left;
+ long align = 0;
+ unsigned char *pkt;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return n;
+
+ rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+ if (rb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ left = rb->left;
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
- align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+ align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
#endif
- if (!extend)
- {
- /* start with empty packet ... */
- if (left == 0)
- rb->offset = align;
- else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
- {
- /* check if next packet length is large
- * enough to justify payload alignment... */
- pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
- && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
- {
- /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
- * and its length field is insane, we can
- * only be led to wrong decision about
- * whether memmove will occur or not.
- * Header values has no effect on memmove
- * arguments and therefore no buffer
- * overrun can be triggered. */
- memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
- rb->offset = align;
- }
- }
- s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- s->packet_length = 0;
- /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
- }
-
- /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
- * because the read operation returns the whole packet
- * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- if (left > 0 && n > left)
- n = left;
- }
-
- /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
- if (left >= n)
- {
- s->packet_length+=n;
- rb->left=left-n;
- rb->offset+=n;
- return(n);
- }
-
- /* else we need to read more data */
-
- len = s->packet_length;
- pkt = rb->buf+align;
- /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
- * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
- * 'left' extra ones at the end */
- if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
- {
- memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
- s->packet = pkt;
- rb->offset = len + align;
- }
-
- if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!s->read_ahead)
- /* ignore max parameter */
- max = n;
- else
- {
- if (max < n)
- max = n;
- if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
- max = rb->len - rb->offset;
- }
-
- while (left < n)
- {
- /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
- * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
- * len+max if possible) */
-
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->rbio != NULL)
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
- }
- else
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
- i = -1;
- }
-
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- rb->left = left;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
- SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- if (len+left == 0)
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- return(i);
- }
- left+=i;
- /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
- * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
- * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
- if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- {
- if (n > left)
- n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
- }
- }
-
- /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
- rb->offset += n;
- rb->left = left - n;
- s->packet_length += n;
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- return(n);
- }
-
-/* Call this to get a new input record.
+ if (!extend) {
+ /* start with empty packet ... */
+ if (left == 0)
+ rb->offset = align;
+ else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /*
+ * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
+ * alignment...
+ */
+ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
+ /*
+ * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
+ * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
+ * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
+ * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
+ * overrun can be triggered.
+ */
+ memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
+ rb->offset = align;
+ }
+ }
+ s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
+ * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
+ * the buffer).
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (left == 0 && extend)
+ return 0;
+ if (left > 0 && n > left)
+ n = left;
+ }
+
+ /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+ if (left >= n) {
+ s->packet_length += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
+ rb->offset += n;
+ return (n);
+ }
+
+ /* else we need to read more data */
+
+ len = s->packet_length;
+ pkt = rb->buf + align;
+ /*
+ * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
+ * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
+ */
+ if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
+ memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
+ s->packet = pkt;
+ rb->offset = len + align;
+ }
+
+ if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
+ if (!RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer) && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ /* ignore max parameter */
+ max = n;
+ else {
+ if (max < n)
+ max = n;
+ if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
+ max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+ }
+
+ while (left < n) {
+ /*
+ * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
+ * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
+ * possible)
+ */
+
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ rb->left = left;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ if (len + left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ return (i);
+ }
+ left += i;
+ /*
+ * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
+ * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
+ * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (n > left)
+ n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+ rb->offset += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
+ s->packet_length += n;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return (n);
+}
+
+/*
+ * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
+ * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
+ * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
+ * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
+ */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
+/*-
+ * Call this to get a new input record.
* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
* or non-blocking IO.
* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
* ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
* ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
*/
/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
- {
- int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
- int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- short version;
- int mac_size;
- int clear=0;
- size_t extra;
- int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
- unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-
- rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
- sess=s->session;
-
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
- extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
- else
- extra=0;
- if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
- {
- /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
- * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
-again:
- /* check if we have the header */
- if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
- (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
- {
- n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
-
- p=s->packet;
-
- /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
- rr->type= *(p++);
- ssl_major= *(p++);
- ssl_minor= *(p++);
- version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
- n2s(p,rr->length);
-#if 0
-fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
-#endif
-
- /* Lets check version */
- if (!s->first_packet)
- {
- if (version != s->version)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
- /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
- s->version = (unsigned short)version;
- al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
- }
-
- /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
-
- if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
- {
- /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
- i=rr->length;
- n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
- /* now n == rr->length,
- * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
- }
-
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
-
- /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
- * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
- */
- rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-
- /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
- * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
- * need to be copied into rr->data by either
- * the decryption or by the decompression
- * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
- * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
-
- /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
- * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
-
- /* check is not needed I believe */
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
- rr->data=rr->input;
-
- enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
- if (enc_err <= 0)
- {
- if (enc_err == 0)
- /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
- goto err;
-
- /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
- * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
- * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
- * the MAC computation anyway. */
- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
- }
-
+{
+ int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
+ int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ short version;
+ unsigned mac_size;
+ size_t extra;
+ unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
+
+ rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+ extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ else
+ extra = 0;
+ if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
+ /*
+ * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
+ * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p = s->packet;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+ rr->type = *(p++);
+ ssl_major = *(p++);
+ ssl_minor = *(p++);
+ version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+ n2s(p, rr->length);
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet) {
+ if (version != s->version) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
+ && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+ /*
+ * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
+ */
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length >
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))
+ - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i = rr->length;
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ /*
+ * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ * + rr->length
+ */
+ }
+
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /*
+ * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+ * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+ * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+ * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+ */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data = rr->input;
+ rr->orig_len = rr->length;
+ /*
+ * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
+ * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
+ */
+ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
+ unsigned char *mac;
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (rr->length < mac_size) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = rr->data + rr->length;
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+ /*-
+ * enc_err is:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding is valid
+ * -1: if the padding is invalid
+ */
+ if (enc_err == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
-{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
-printf("\n");
-#endif
-
- /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
- if ( (sess == NULL) ||
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
- (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
- clear=1;
-
- if (!clear)
- {
- /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
- mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
- {
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
-#else
- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif
- }
- /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
- if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
- {
- rr->length -= mac_size;
- mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
- }
- else
- {
- /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
-#else
- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
- rr->length = 0;
-#endif
- }
- i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
- {
- decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
- {
- /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
- * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
- * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
- * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
- * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
- al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* r->length is now just compressed */
- if (s->expand != NULL)
- {
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- rr->off=0;
- /* So at this point the following is true
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
- * after use :-).
- */
-
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
- s->packet_length=0;
-
- /* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
-
-#if 0
-fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+ printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\n");
#endif
- return(1);
-
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
- return(ret);
- }
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ((sess != NULL) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) {
+ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+ * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+ */
+ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+ * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+ * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+ * contents of the padding bytes.
+ */
+ mac = mac_tmp;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+ * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+ * |mac_size| above.
+ */
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc_err < 0) {
+ /*
+ * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
+ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
+ * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
+ * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off = 0;
+ /*-
+ * So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0) {
+ empty_record_count++;
+ if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- int i;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-
- rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
- if (i < 0)
- return(0);
- else
- rr->length=i;
- rr->data=rr->comp;
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+
+ rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+ i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
+ (int)rr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ rr->length = i;
+ rr->data = rr->comp;
#endif
- return(1);
- }
+ return (1);
+}
int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- int i;
- SSL3_RECORD *wr;
-
- wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
- wr->input,(int)wr->length);
- if (i < 0)
- return(0);
- else
- wr->length=i;
-
- wr->input=wr->data;
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+
+ wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+ i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+ wr->input, (int)wr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ wr->length = i;
+
+ wr->input = wr->data;
#endif
- return(1);
- }
+ return (1);
+}
-/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
- * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+/*
+ * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
+ * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
*/
int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
- {
- const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
- unsigned int tot,n,nw;
- int i;
-
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- tot=s->s3->wnum;
- s->s3->wnum=0;
-
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
- {
- i=s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) return(i);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- n=(len-tot);
- for (;;)
- {
- if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
- nw=s->max_send_fragment;
- else
- nw=n;
-
- i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- s->s3->wnum=tot;
- return i;
- }
-
- if ((i == (int)n) ||
- (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
- {
- /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
- * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
-
- return tot+i;
- }
-
- n-=i;
- tot+=i;
- }
- }
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
+ int tot;
+ unsigned int n, nw;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+ unsigned int max_send_fragment;
+#endif
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
+ int i;
+ unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
+
+ if (len < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
+ tot = s->s3->wnum;
+ s->s3->wnum = 0;
+
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (i);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
+ * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
+ * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
+ * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
+ * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
+ * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
+ * report the error in a way the user will notice
+ */
+ if (len < tot) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
+ * will happen with non blocking IO
+ */
+ if (wb->left != 0) {
+ i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
+ s->s3->wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+ tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
+ }
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
+ /*
+ * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
+ * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
+ * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
+ * compromise is considered worthy.
+ */
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
+ s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
+ !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
+ unsigned char aad[13];
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
+ int packlen;
+
+ /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
+ if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
+ max_send_fragment -= 512;
+
+ if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+ packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
+ max_send_fragment, NULL);
+
+ if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
+ packlen *= 8;
+ else
+ packlen *= 4;
+
+ wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
+ if(!wb->buf) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wb->len = packlen;
+ } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
+ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
+ wb->buf = NULL;
+ return tot;
+ }
+
+ n = (len - tot);
+ for (;;) {
+ if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
+ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
+ wb->buf = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ s->s3->wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
+ nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
+ else
+ nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
+
+ memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
+ aad[8] = type;
+ aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+ aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+ aad[11] = 0;
+ aad[12] = 0;
+ mb_param.out = NULL;
+ mb_param.inp = aad;
+ mb_param.len = nw;
+
+ packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
+ sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
+
+ if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
+ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
+ wb->buf = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mb_param.out = wb->buf;
+ mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
+ mb_param.len = nw;
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
+ EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
+ sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
+ if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
+ int j = 6;
+ while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
+ }
+
+ wb->offset = 0;
+ wb->left = packlen;
+
+ s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
+ s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
+ s->s3->wpend_type = type;
+ s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
+
+ i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
+ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
+ wb->buf = NULL;
+ }
+ s->s3->wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+ if (i == (int)n) {
+ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
+ wb->buf = NULL;
+ return tot + i;
+ }
+ n -= i;
+ tot += i;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (tot == len) { /* done? */
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+ return tot;
+ }
+
+ n = (len - tot);
+ for (;;) {
+ if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
+ nw = s->max_send_fragment;
+ else
+ nw = n;
+
+ i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
+ s->s3->wnum = tot;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ if ((i == (int)n) ||
+ (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
+ /*
+ * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
+ * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
+ */
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+
+ if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+
+ return tot + i;
+ }
+
+ n -= i;
+ tot += i;
+ }
+}
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
- {
- unsigned char *p,*plen;
- int i,mac_size,clear=0;
- int prefix_len=0;
- int eivlen;
- long align=0;
- SSL3_RECORD *wr;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
-
- if (wb->buf == NULL)
- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
- return -1;
-
- /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
- * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
- if (wb->left != 0)
- return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
-
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
- {
- i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0)
- return(i);
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
- }
-
- if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
- return 0;
-
- wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
- sess=s->session;
-
- if ( (sess == NULL) ||
- (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
- (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
- clear=1;
-
- if (clear)
- mac_size=0;
- else
- {
- mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- if (mac_size < 0)
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
- if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
- {
- /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-
- if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
- {
- /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
- * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
- * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
- * together with the actual payload) */
- prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
- if (prefix_len <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (prefix_len >
- (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
- {
- /* insufficient space */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
- }
-
- if (create_empty_fragment)
- {
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *plen;
+ int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
+ int prefix_len = 0;
+ int eivlen;
+ long align = 0;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+
+ /*
+ * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
+ * will happen with non blocking IO
+ */
+ if (wb->left != 0)
+ return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
+
+ /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return (i);
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
+ if (wb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
+
+ wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ if ((sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
+ clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
+ mac_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
+ */
+ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
+ /*
+ * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
+ * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
+ */
+
+ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ /*
+ * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
+ * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
+ * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
+ * payload)
+ */
+ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
+ if (prefix_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (prefix_len >
+ (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
+ {
+ /* insufficient space */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment) {
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
- /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
- * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
- * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
- * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
- align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+ /*
+ * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
+ * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
+ * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
+ */
+ align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
#endif
- p = wb->buf + align;
- wb->offset = align;
- }
- else if (prefix_len)
- {
- p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
- }
- else
- {
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ } else if (prefix_len) {
+ p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
+ } else {
#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
- align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+ align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
#endif
- p = wb->buf + align;
- wb->offset = align;
- }
-
- /* write the header */
-
- *(p++)=type&0xff;
- wr->type=type;
-
- *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
- *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
-
- /* field where we are to write out packet length */
- plen=p;
- p+=2;
- /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
- if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
- && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- {
- eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
- if (eivlen <= 1)
- eivlen = 0;
- }
- else
- eivlen = 0;
-
- /* lets setup the record stuff. */
- wr->data=p + eivlen;
- wr->length=(int)len;
- wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
-
- /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
- * wr->data */
-
- /* first we compress */
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- {
- if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
- wr->input=wr->data;
- }
-
- /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
- * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
- * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
-
- if (mac_size != 0)
- {
- if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
- goto err;
- wr->length+=mac_size;
- }
-
- wr->input=p;
- wr->data=p;
-
- if (eivlen)
- {
- /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
- goto err; */
- wr->length += eivlen;
- }
-
- /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
- s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
-
- /* record length after mac and block padding */
- s2n(wr->length,plen);
-
- /* we should now have
- * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
- * wr->length long */
- wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
- wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- if (create_empty_fragment)
- {
- /* we are in a recursive call;
- * just return the length, don't write out anything here
- */
- return wr->length;
- }
-
- /* now let's set up wb */
- wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
-
- /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
- s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
- s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
- s->s3->wpend_type=type;
- s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
-
- /* we now just need to write the buffer */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
-err:
- return -1;
- }
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
+
+ /* write the header */
+
+ *(p++) = type & 0xff;
+ wr->type = type;
+
+ *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
+ * and record version number > TLS 1.0
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
+ && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+ *(p++) = 0x1;
+ else
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+
+ /* field where we are to write out packet length */
+ plen = p;
+ p += 2;
+ /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
+ int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (eivlen <= 1)
+ eivlen = 0;
+ }
+ /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ eivlen = 0;
+ } else
+ eivlen = 0;
+
+ /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+ wr->data = p + eivlen;
+ wr->length = (int)len;
+ wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
+
+ /*
+ * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
+ */
+
+ /* first we compress */
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
+ wr->input = wr->data;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
+ * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
+ * wb->buf
+ */
+
+ if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ wr->length += mac_size;
+ }
+
+ wr->input = p;
+ wr->data = p;
+
+ if (eivlen) {
+ /*
+ * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
+ */
+ wr->length += eivlen;
+ }
+
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ wr->length += mac_size;
+ }
+
+ /* record length after mac and block padding */
+ s2n(wr->length, plen);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+ * wr->length long
+ */
+ wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+ wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment) {
+ /*
+ * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
+ * out anything here
+ */
+ return wr->length;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+
+ /*
+ * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
+ * retries later
+ */
+ s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
+ s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
+ s->s3->wpend_type = type;
+ s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
+
+ /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len)
- {
- int i;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ int i;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
/* XXXX */
- if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
- || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
- !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
- || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- for (;;)
- {
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->wbio != NULL)
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
- i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
- (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
- (unsigned int)wb->left);
- }
- else
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
- i= -1;
- }
- if (i == wb->left)
- {
- wb->left=0;
- wb->offset+=i;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
- SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
- }
- else if (i <= 0) {
- if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
- s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
- point in using a datagram service */
- wb->left = 0;
- }
- return(i);
- }
- wb->offset+=i;
- wb->left-=i;
- }
- }
-
-/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
+ || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
+ !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
+ || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ clear_sys_error();
+ if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
+ (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
+ (unsigned int)wb->left);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ i = -1;
+ }
+ if (i == wb->left) {
+ wb->left = 0;
+ wb->offset += i;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
+ } else if (i <= 0) {
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /*
+ * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
+ * using a datagram service
+ */
+ wb->left = 0;
+ }
+ return (i);
+ }
+ wb->offset += i;
+ wb->left -= i;
+ }
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
* 'type' is one of the following:
*
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
* none of our business
*/
int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
- {
- int al,i,j,ret;
- unsigned int n;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
-
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
- return(-1);
-
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
- (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
- /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
- {
- unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
- unsigned char *dst = buf;
- unsigned int k;
-
- /* peek == 0 */
- n = 0;
- while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
- {
- *dst++ = *src++;
- len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
- n++;
- }
- /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
- for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
- s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
- return n;
- }
-
- /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
-
- if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
- {
- /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
- i=s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) return(i);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return(-1);
- }
- }
-start:
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
-
- /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
- * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
- * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
- * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
- rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
-
- /* get new packet if necessary */
- if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
- {
- ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
- if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
- }
-
- /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
-
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
- && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
- * (even in 'peek' mode) */
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
- {
- rr->length=0;
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- return(0);
- }
-
-
- if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
- {
- /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
- * are doing a handshake for the first time */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (len <= 0) return(len);
-
- if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
- n = rr->length;
- else
- n = (unsigned int)len;
-
- memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
- if (!peek)
- {
- rr->length-=n;
- rr->off+=n;
- if (rr->length == 0)
- {
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- rr->off=0;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- }
- }
- return(n);
- }
-
-
- /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
- * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
-
- /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
- * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
- */
- {
- unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
- unsigned char *dest = NULL;
- unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
-
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
- dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
- dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
- }
- else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
- {
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
- dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
- dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
- }
-
- if (dest_maxlen > 0)
- {
- n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
- if (rr->length < n)
- n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
-
- /* now move 'n' bytes: */
- while (n-- > 0)
- {
- dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
- rr->length--;
- }
-
- if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
- goto start; /* fragment was too small */
- }
- }
-
- /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
- * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
-
- /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
- if ((!s->server) &&
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
- {
- s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
-
- if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
- !s->s3->renegotiate)
- {
- ssl3_renegotiate(s);
- if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
- {
- i=s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) return(i);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
- {
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
- {
- BIO *bio;
- /* In the case where we try to read application data,
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return(-1);
- }
- }
- }
- }
- /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
- * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
- goto start;
- }
- /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
- * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
- * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
- */
- if (s->server &&
- SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
- !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
- (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
- !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-
- {
- /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
- rr->length = 0;
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- goto start;
- }
- if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
- {
- int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
- int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
-
- s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- {
- j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
- }
-
- if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
- {
- s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
- if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
- {
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- return(0);
- }
- /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
- * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
- * a fatal alert because if application tried to
- * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
- * expects it to succeed.
- *
- * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
- * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
- */
- else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
- {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
- goto f_err;
- }
-#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
- else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
- return(0);
+{
+ int al, i, j, ret;
+ unsigned int n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
+
+ if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))) {
+ /* Not initialized yet */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
+ && (type !=
+ SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+ {
+ unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ unsigned char *dst = buf;
+ unsigned int k;
+
+ /* peek == 0 */
+ n = 0;
+ while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ len--;
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
+ n++;
+ }
+ /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
+ */
+
+ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (i);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ start:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /*-
+ * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
+ * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
+ */
+ rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+
+ /* get new packet if necessary */
+ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return (ret);
+ }
+
+ /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+ * 'peek' mode)
+ */
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
+ * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
+ /*
+ * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
+ * doing a handshake for the first time
+ */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return (len);
+
+ if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
+ n = rr->length;
+ else
+ n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+ memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
+ if (!peek) {
+ rr->length -= n;
+ rr->off += n;
+ if (rr->length == 0) {
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->off = 0;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
+ RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ }
+ }
+ return (n);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
+ * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
+ * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+ unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+ } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
+ /* We can ignore 0 return values */
+ if(tls1_process_heartbeat(s) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Exit and notify application to read again */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ return (-1);
+ }
#endif
- }
- else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
- {
- char tmp[16];
-
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
- ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
- s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
- return(0);
- }
- else
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- goto start;
- }
-
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
- rr->length=0;
- return(0);
- }
-
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- {
- /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
- * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
- if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
- (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- rr->length=0;
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
- if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
- goto err;
- else
- goto start;
- }
-
- /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
- if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
- {
- if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
- {
-#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
- * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
- * protocol violations): */
- s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
- ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
- :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-#else
- s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
-#endif
- s->renegotiate=1;
- s->new_session=1;
- }
- i=s->handshake_func(s);
- if (i < 0) return(i);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return(-1);
- }
-
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
- {
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
- {
- BIO *bio;
- /* In the case where we try to read application data,
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
- return(-1);
- }
- }
- goto start;
- }
-
- switch (rr->type)
- {
- default:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
- /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
- * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
- */
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
- {
- rr->length = 0;
- goto start;
- }
+
+ if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
+ n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+ if (rr->length < n)
+ n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ while (n-- > 0) {
+ dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
+ rr->length--;
+ }
+
+ if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
+ goto start; /* fragment was too small */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+ */
+
+ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+ if ((!s->server) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+ !s->s3->renegotiate) {
+ ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (i);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
+ RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
+ /* no read-ahead left? */
+ BIO *bio;
+ /*
+ * In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
+ * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
+ */
+ goto start;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+ * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
+ * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
+ */
+ if (s->server &&
+ SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
+ !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ /*
+ * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+ */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto start;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
+ int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
+ int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
+
+ s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
+ s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
+
+ if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+ if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+ * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
+ * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
+ * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
+ * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
+ * the peer refused it where we carry on.
+ */
+ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
+ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
+ return (0);
#endif
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
- /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
- * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
- * should not happen when type != rr->type */
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
- /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
- * but have application data. If the library was
- * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
- * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
- * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
- * we will indulge it.
- */
- if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
- (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
- ((
- (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
- ) || (
- (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
- )
- ))
- {
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
- return(-1);
- }
- else
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
- /* not reached */
-
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
- return(-1);
- }
+ } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+ char tmp[16];
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
+ * shutdown */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ rr->length = 0;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /*
+ * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
+ * what the record payload has to look like
+ */
+ if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
+ (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ rr->length = 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
+ if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+ goto err;
+ else
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
+ */
+ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
+ if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
+ s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->new_session = 1;
+ }
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (i);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
+ /* no read-ahead left? */
+ BIO *bio;
+ /*
+ * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
+ * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
+ * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
+ * problems in the blocking world
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ switch (rr->type) {
+ default:
+ /*
+ * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
+ * an unexpected message alert.
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ /*
+ * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
+ * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
+ * happen when type != rr->type
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ /*
+ * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
+ * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
+ * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
+ * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
+ * started), we will indulge it.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+ (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+ (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+ ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
+ (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
+ (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ )
+ )) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ return (-1);
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ /* not reached */
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (-1);
+}
int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
- {
- int i;
- const char *sender;
- int slen;
-
- if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
- i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
- else
- i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
- {
- if (s->session == NULL)
- {
- /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
- return (0);
- }
-
- s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
- }
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
- return(0);
-
- /* we have to record the message digest at
- * this point so we can get it before we read
- * the finished message */
- if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
- {
- sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
- slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
- }
- else
- {
- sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
- slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
-
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ int i;
+ const char *sender;
+ int slen;
+
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+ i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+ else
+ i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
+ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
+ return (0);
+
+ /*
+ * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
+ * before we read the finished message
+ */
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+ sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+ } else {
+ sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender, slen,
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
+
+ return (1);
+}
int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
- {
- /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
- desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
- desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
- if (desc < 0) return -1;
- /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
- if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
-
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
- s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
- s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
- return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
- * some time in the future */
- return -1;
- }
+{
+ /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
+ desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+ desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
+ * protocol_version alerts */
+ if (desc < 0)
+ return -1;
+ /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+ if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL))
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
+
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+ s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
+ s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
+ /* data still being written out? */
+ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ }
+ /*
+ * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
+ * the future
+ */
+ return -1;
+}
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
- {
- int i,j;
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
- i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
- * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
- * we will not worry too much. */
- if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
- (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- {
- j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
- cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
- }
- }
- return(i);
- }
+{
+ int i, j;
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
+ i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
+ * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
+ * worry too much.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
+ (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
+ 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
+ }
+ }
+ return (i);
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff