* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len);
-static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len);
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
-static int do_compress(SSL *ssl);
-static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl);
-static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
-/* used only by ssl3_get_record */
-static int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
{
/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
* packet by another n bytes.
* (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
* [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
*/
- int i,off,newb;
+ int i,len,left;
+ long align=0;
+ unsigned char *pkt;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+ if (n <= 0) return n;
+
+ rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
+ if (rb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ left = rb->left;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
if (!extend)
{
/* start with empty packet ... */
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
- s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
- s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset;
+ if (left == 0)
+ rb->offset = align;
+ else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* check if next packet length is large
+ * enough to justify payload alignment... */
+ pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+ if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
+ {
+ /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
+ * and its length field is insane, we can
+ * only be led to wrong decision about
+ * whether memmove will occur or not.
+ * Header values has no effect on memmove
+ * arguments and therefore no buffer
+ * overrun can be triggered. */
+ memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
+ rb->offset = align;
+ }
+ }
+ s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
s->packet_length = 0;
/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
}
+ /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
+ * because the read operation returns the whole packet
+ * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (left > 0 && n > left)
+ n = left;
+ }
+
/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n)
+ if (left >= n)
{
s->packet_length+=n;
- s->s3->rbuf.left-=n;
- s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n;
+ rb->left=left-n;
+ rb->offset+=n;
return(n);
}
/* else we need to read more data */
- if (!s->read_ahead)
- max=n;
- {
- /* avoid buffer overflow */
- int max_max = SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE - s->packet_length;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
- max_max += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
- if (max > max_max)
- max = max_max;
- }
- if (n > max) /* does not happen */
+ len = s->packet_length;
+ pkt = rb->buf+align;
+ /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
+ * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
+ * 'left' extra ones at the end */
+ if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
+ {
+ memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
+ s->packet = pkt;
+ rb->offset = len + align;
+ }
+
+ if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
- off = s->packet_length;
- newb = s->s3->rbuf.left;
- /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
- * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
- * 'newb' extra ones at the end */
- if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf)
+ if (!s->read_ahead)
+ /* ignore max parameter */
+ max = n;
+ else
{
- /* off > 0 */
- memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb);
- s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf;
+ if (max < n)
+ max = n;
+ if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
+ max = rb->len - rb->offset;
}
- while (newb < n)
+ while (left < n)
{
- /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need
- * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */
+ /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
+ * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
+ * len+max if possible) */
clear_sys_error();
if (s->rbio != NULL)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb);
+ i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
}
else
{
if (i <= 0)
{
- s->s3->rbuf.left = newb;
+ rb->left = left;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ if (len+left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
return(i);
}
- newb+=i;
+ left+=i;
+ /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
+ * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
+ * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ if (n > left)
+ n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+ }
}
/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
- s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n;
- s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n;
+ rb->offset += n;
+ rb->left = left - n;
s->packet_length += n;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(n);
static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
- int n,i,ret= -1;
+ int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
- unsigned int mac_size;
- int clear=0,extra;
+ int mac_size;
+ int clear=0;
+ size_t extra;
+ int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
sess=s->session;
extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
else
extra=0;
+ if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
+ {
+ /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+ * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
- n=ssl3_read_n(s,SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE,0);
+ n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
n2s(p,rr->length);
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
/* Lets check version */
- if (s->first_packet)
- {
- s->first_packet=0;
- }
- else
+ if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- /* Send back error using their
- * version number :-) */
- s->version=version;
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
+ /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
goto err;
}
- if (rr->length >
- (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
+ if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
- if (rr->length > (s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
* rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
/* check is not needed I believe */
- if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0))
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+ if (enc_err <= 0)
{
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
+ if (enc_err == 0)
+ /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
+ * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
+ * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
+ * the MAC computation anyway. */
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
+
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
printf("\n");
#endif
+
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
- (s->read_hash == NULL))
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
clear=1;
if (!clear)
{
- mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+ /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
{
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
+#else
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+#endif
}
/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
- if (rr->length < mac_size)
+ if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
+ {
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+ else
{
+ /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
+#else
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+ rr->length = 0;
+#endif
}
- rr->length-=mac_size;
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
- if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
{
- al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE);
- ret= -1;
- goto f_err;
+ decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
}
}
+ if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+ {
+ /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
+ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
+ * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
+ * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
+ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL)
{
- if (rr->length >
- (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!do_uncompress(s))
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
}
}
- if (rr->length > (unsigned int)SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
{
al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
return(1);
+
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
return(ret);
}
-static int do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
else
rr->length=i;
rr->data=rr->comp;
-
+#endif
return(1);
}
-static int do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
wr->length=i;
wr->input=wr->data;
+#endif
return(1);
}
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- return(-1);
+ return -1;
}
}
n=(len-tot);
for (;;)
{
- if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
- nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
+ nw=s->max_send_fragment;
else
nw=n;
- i=do_ssl3_write(s,type,&(buf[tot]),nw);
+ i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->s3->wnum=tot;
- return(i);
+ return i;
}
if ((i == (int)n) ||
(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
{
- return(tot+i);
+ /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
+ * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+
+ return tot+i;
}
n-=i;
}
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len)
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *p,*plen;
int i,mac_size,clear=0;
+ int prefix_len=0;
+ int eivlen;
+ long align=0;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
SSL_SESSION *sess;
- /* first check is there is a SSL3_RECORD still being written
+ if (wb->buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
+ if (wb->left != 0)
return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
{
- i=ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
+ i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return(i);
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
- if (len == 0) return(len);
+ if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
- wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
sess=s->session;
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
- (s->write_hash == NULL))
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
clear=1;
if (clear)
mac_size=0;
else
- mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash);
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
+ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
+ {
+ /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
+ * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+
+ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
+ * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
+ * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
+ * together with the actual payload) */
+ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
+ if (prefix_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (prefix_len >
+ (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
+ {
+ /* insufficient space */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+ }
- p=wb->buf;
+ if (create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
+ * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
+ * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
+ * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
+ align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
+ else if (prefix_len)
+ {
+ p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+ p = wb->buf + align;
+ wb->offset = align;
+ }
/* write the header */
+
*(p++)=type&0xff;
wr->type=type;
*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
- /* record where we are to write out packet length */
+ /* field where we are to write out packet length */
plen=p;
p+=2;
+ /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+ && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ {
+ eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (eivlen <= 1)
+ eivlen = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ eivlen = 0;
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
- wr->data=p;
+ wr->data=p + eivlen;
wr->length=(int)len;
wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
- if (!do_compress(s))
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
if (mac_size != 0)
{
- s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
+ goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
- wr->input=p;
- wr->data=p;
+ }
+
+ wr->input=p;
+ wr->data=p;
+
+ if (eivlen)
+ {
+ /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
+ goto err; */
+ wr->length += eivlen;
}
/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- /* Now lets setup wb */
- wb->left=wr->length;
- wb->offset=0;
+ if (create_empty_fragment)
+ {
+ /* we are in a recursive call;
+ * just return the length, don't write out anything here
+ */
+ return wr->length;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+ /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
s->s3->wpend_type=type;
s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
- return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
err:
- return(-1);
+ return -1;
}
/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
-static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned int len)
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len)
{
int i;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
/* XXXX */
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
{
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
- (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]),
- (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left);
+ (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
+ (unsigned int)wb->left);
}
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
i= -1;
}
- if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left)
+ if (i == wb->left)
{
- s->s3->wbuf.left=0;
+ wb->left=0;
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+ SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
}
- else if (i <= 0)
+ else if (i <= 0) {
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+ s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
+ point in using a datagram service */
+ wb->left = 0;
+ }
return(i);
- s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i;
- s->s3->wbuf.left-=i;
+ }
+ wb->offset+=i;
+ wb->left-=i;
}
}
int al,i,j,ret;
unsigned int n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
-
- if (peek)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_FIXME); /* proper implementation not yet completed */
- return -1;
- }
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
return(-1);
- if ((type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type)
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+ (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
unsigned char *dst = buf;
unsigned int k;
+ /* peek == 0 */
n = 0;
while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
{
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
- /* get new packet */
+ /* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
{
ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
- /* If the other end has shutdown, throw anything we read away */
+ /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
+ * (even in 'peek' mode) */
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
{
rr->length=0;
n = (unsigned int)len;
memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
- rr->length-=n;
- rr->off+=n;
- if (rr->length == 0)
+ if (!peek)
{
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- rr->off=0;
+ rr->length-=n;
+ rr->off+=n;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->off=0;
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ }
}
return(n);
}
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
!s->s3->renegotiate)
* now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
goto start;
}
-
+ /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+ * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+ * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
+ */
+ if (s->server &&
+ SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+ (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+ (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
+ !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+
+ {
+ /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
+ rr->length = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto start;
+ }
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
{
int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return(0);
}
+ /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+ * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
+ * a fatal alert because if application tried to
+ * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
+ * expects it to succeed.
+ *
+ * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
+ * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
+ */
+ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
+ if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
+ return(0);
+#endif
}
else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
{
if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
{
- i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ goto f_err;
}
rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
- if (!do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+ if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
goto err;
else
goto start;
#else
s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
#endif
+ s->renegotiate=1;
s->new_session=1;
}
i=s->handshake_func(s);
switch (rr->type)
{
default:
-#ifndef NO_TLS
- /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
+ /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
+ * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
{
+ rr->length = 0;
goto start;
}
#endif
* of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
* should not happen when type != rr->type */
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
)
))
{
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
return(-1);
}
else
return(-1);
}
-static int do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
{
int i;
const char *sender;
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
{
+ if (s->session == NULL)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
}
}
s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
return(1);
}
-void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
{
/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
- if (desc < 0) return;
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+ desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
+ if (desc < 0) return -1;
/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out */
- ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
+ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
/* else data is still being written out, we will get written
* some time in the future */
+ return -1;
}
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
{
int i,j;
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
- i=do_ssl3_write(s,SSL3_RT_ALERT,&s->s3->send_alert[0],2);
+ i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
if (i <= 0)
{
s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
}
else
{
- /* If it is important, send it now. If the message
- * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will
- * not worry too much. */
+ /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
+ * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
+ * we will not worry too much. */
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff