openssl_strerror_r: Fix handling of GNU strerror_r
[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_lib.c
index bbf49a205d955e406bef3e59c51c6747e30df3e0..99ae48199c2d32eb91255a76e6b9b9cbc53c325c 100644 (file)
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ static SSL_CIPHER tls13_ciphers[] = {
         TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
         TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
         TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
-        0, 0,
+        SSL_kANY,
+        SSL_aANY,
         SSL_AES128GCM,
         SSL_AEAD,
         TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
-        SSL_kANY,
-        SSL_aANY,
+        0, 0,
         SSL_HIGH,
         SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256,
         128,
@@ -3466,6 +3466,15 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         break;
 #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
     case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME:
+        /*
+         * TODO(OpenSSL1.2)
+         * This API is only used for a client to set what SNI it will request
+         * from the server, but we currently allow it to be used on servers
+         * as well, which is a programming error.  Currently we just clear
+         * the field in SSL_do_handshake() for server SSLs, but when we can
+         * make ABI-breaking changes, we may want to make use of this API
+         * an error on server SSLs.
+         */
         if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
             size_t len;
 
@@ -3672,9 +3681,15 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         *(int *)parg = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash;
         return 1;
 
-    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY:
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SIGNATURE_NID:
+        if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        *(int *)parg = s->s3->tmp.sigalg->hash;
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_TMP_KEY:
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
-        if (s->server || s->session == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
+        if (s->session == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
             return 0;
         } else {
             EVP_PKEY_up_ref(s->s3->peer_tmp);
@@ -3684,6 +3699,20 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
 #else
         return 0;
 #endif
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_TMP_KEY:
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
+        if (s->session == NULL || s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+            return 0;
+        } else {
+            EVP_PKEY_up_ref(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
+            *(EVP_PKEY **)parg = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
+            return 1;
+        }
+#else
+        return 0;
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     case SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS:
         {
@@ -3752,7 +3781,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
                                   EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
                 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
-                return 1;
+                return 0;
             }
             EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp);
             ctx->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh;
@@ -3798,8 +3827,8 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         {
             unsigned char *keys = parg;
             long tick_keylen = (sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name) +
-                                sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_hmac_key) +
-                                sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_aes_key));
+                                sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key) +
+                                sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key));
             if (keys == NULL)
                 return tick_keylen;
             if (larg != tick_keylen) {
@@ -3809,23 +3838,23 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
             if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) {
                 memcpy(ctx->ext.tick_key_name, keys,
                        sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name));
-                memcpy(ctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
+                memcpy(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
                        keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name),
-                       sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_hmac_key));
-                memcpy(ctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
+                       sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key));
+                memcpy(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
                        keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name) +
-                       sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
-                       sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_aes_key));
+                       sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+                       sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key));
             } else {
                 memcpy(keys, ctx->ext.tick_key_name,
                        sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name));
                 memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name),
-                       ctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
-                       sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_hmac_key));
+                       ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+                       sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key));
                 memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name) +
-                       sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
-                       ctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
-                       sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_aes_key));
+                       sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+                       ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
+                       sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key));
             }
             return 1;
         }
@@ -4108,8 +4137,9 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
 {
     const SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL;
     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
-    int i, ii, ok;
+    int i, ii, ok, prefer_sha256 = 0;
     unsigned long alg_k = 0, alg_a = 0, mask_k = 0, mask_a = 0;
+    const EVP_MD *mdsha256 = EVP_sha256();
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio_chacha = NULL;
 #endif
@@ -4190,7 +4220,26 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
         allow = srvr;
     }
 
-    if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+        int j;
+
+        /*
+         * If we allow "old" style PSK callbacks, and we have no certificate (so
+         * we're not going to succeed without a PSK anyway), and we're in
+         * TLSv1.3 then the default hash for a PSK is SHA-256 (as per the
+         * TLSv1.3 spec). Therefore we should prioritise ciphersuites using
+         * that.
+         */
+        if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) {
+            for (j = 0; j < SSL_PKEY_NUM && !ssl_has_cert(s, j); j++);
+            if (j == SSL_PKEY_NUM) {
+                /* There are no certificates */
+                prefer_sha256 = 1;
+            }
+        }
+#endif
+    } else {
         tls1_set_cert_validity(s);
         ssl_set_masks(s);
     }
@@ -4262,6 +4311,17 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
                 continue;
             }
 #endif
+            if (prefer_sha256) {
+                const SSL_CIPHER *tmp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
+
+                if (ssl_md(tmp->algorithm2) == mdsha256) {
+                    ret = tmp;
+                    break;
+                }
+                if (ret == NULL)
+                    ret = tmp;
+                continue;
+            }
             ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii);
             break;
         }
@@ -4528,7 +4588,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, size_t len,
     } else {
         ret = RAND_bytes(result, len);
     }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
+
     if (ret > 0) {
         if (!ossl_assert(sizeof(tls11downgrade) < len)
                 || !ossl_assert(sizeof(tls12downgrade) < len))
@@ -4540,7 +4600,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, size_t len,
             memcpy(result + len - sizeof(tls11downgrade), tls11downgrade,
                    sizeof(tls11downgrade));
     }
-#endif
+
     return ret;
 }
 
@@ -4581,6 +4641,7 @@ int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen,
         if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
                     s->session->master_key,pskpms, pskpmslen,
                     &s->session->master_key_length)) {
+            OPENSSL_clear_free(pskpms, pskpmslen);
             /* SSLfatal() already called */
             goto err;
         }