e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c: cleanse temporary copy of HMAC secret.

[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_enc.c

diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 13ebfc6996f48c968c81113abd14f668a60b3ebe..196f0739d5fea556fd024d1289fd75c7dbe92ae8 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -487,6 +487,15 @@ void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s)
        s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=0;
        }
 
+/* ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
+ *       occured.
+ */
 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
        {
        SSL3_RECORD *rec;
@@ -543,18 +552,12 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                if (!send)
                        {
                        if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                               {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-                               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                return 0;
-                               }
                        /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
                        }
                
                EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 
-               rec->orig_len = rec->length;
-
                if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
                        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
                if ((bs != 1) && !send)
@@ -727,7 +730,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
        EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
        const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
        unsigned char *p,rec_char;
-       size_t md_size;
+       size_t md_size, orig_len;
        int npad;
        int t;
 
@@ -752,6 +755,10 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
        md_size=t;
        npad=(48/md_size)*md_size;
 
+       /* kludge: ssl3_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
+       orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
+       rec->type &= 0xff;
+
        if (!send &&
            EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
            ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash))
@@ -783,7 +790,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
                        hash,
                        md, &md_size,
                        header, rec->input,
-                       rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+                       rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
                        mac_sec, md_size,
                        1 /* is SSLv3 */);
                }