Use enc_flags when deciding protocol variations.

[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_clnt.c

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 1bbe99401fb644a115acae7e6714202f3dcea9c1..dbf790c3136806ea08ce6b5274cd8c52dcfe187a 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -1030,10 +1030,10 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                        }
                }
        s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
-       /* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
+       /* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for
         * client authentication.
         */
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+       if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
                goto f_err;
        /* lets get the compression algorithm */
        /* COMPRESSION */
@@ -1785,7 +1785,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        /* if it was signed, check the signature */
        if (pkey != NULL)
                {
-               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                        {
                        int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
                        if (rv == -1)
@@ -1817,7 +1817,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
                        }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                        {
                        int num;
 
@@ -1991,7 +1991,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
        for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
                s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
        p+=p[-1];
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                {
                n2s(p, llen);
                /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
@@ -3051,7 +3051,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
                if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
                        {
-                       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                       if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                                                NID_sha1,
                                                &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
@@ -3063,7 +3063,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
                 * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
                 */
-               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                        {
                        long hdatalen = 0;
                        void *hdata;
@@ -3193,7 +3193,7 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
        if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
                return 0;
        /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && !s->cert->key->digest)
+       if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
                return 0;
        /* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it.
         * This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary.