* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
-static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
+int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs);
+#endif
+
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
if (init)
{
- init=0;
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_client_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
- sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv3_client_data.ssl_connect=ssl3_connect;
- SSLv3_client_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_client_method;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
+
+ if (init)
+ {
+ memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_client_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
+ sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
+ SSLv3_client_data.ssl_connect=ssl3_connect;
+ SSLv3_client_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_client_method;
+ init=0;
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
}
return(&SSLv3_client_data);
}
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
- BUF_MEM *buf;
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
unsigned long Time=time(NULL),l;
long num1;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH */
+ /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
{
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
* sent back */
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
+ * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
+ * We need to skip the certificate verify
+ * message when client's ECDH public key is sent
+ * inside the client certificate.
+ */
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
p=s->s3->client_random;
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4);
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
*(p++)=i;
if (i != 0)
{
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
p+=i;
}
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
long n;
SSL_COMP *comp;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
- SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO,
+ -1,
300, /* ?? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ {
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else /* already sent a cookie */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
- if ((j != 0) && (j != SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
+ if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
{
- /* SSLref returns 16 :-( */
- if (j < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
}
+
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
{
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
{
+ /* actually a client application bug */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher != c))
+ /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
+ cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
+ if (s->session->cipher)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
{
if (!(s->options &
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
X509 *x=NULL;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ const unsigned char *q,*p;
+ unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1,
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
+ && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- )
+ )
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
- & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+ & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
goto f_err;
}
- if (need_cert)
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type=i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- /* Why would the following ever happen?
- * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
- sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer=x;
- }
- else
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type=i;
- sc->peer_key= NULL;
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer=NULL;
- }
+ if (need_cert)
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /* Why would the following ever happen?
+ * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
+ sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer=x;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ sc->peer_key= NULL;
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer=NULL;
+ }
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ int curve_nid = 0;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
+ {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
+ }
#endif
}
else
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg & SSL_kECDHE)
+ {
+ if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
+ * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
+ * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
+ * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
+ */
+
+ /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
+ * and the ECParameters in this case is just two bytes.
+ */
+ param_len=2;
+ if ((param_len > n) ||
+ (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
+ ((curve_nid = curve_id2nid(*(p + 1))) == 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ecdh->group=EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(curve_nid)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p+=2;
+
+ /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
+ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(ecdh->group)) == NULL) ||
+ ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
+ p+=1;
+ param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
+ if ((param_len > n) ||
+ (EC_POINT_oct2point(ecdh->group, srvr_ecpoint,
+ p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ n-=param_len;
+ p+=encoded_pt_len;
+
+ /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
+ * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
+ * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (0) ;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
+ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+#endif
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ ecdh->pub_key = srvr_ecpoint;
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
+ ecdh=NULL;
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ }
+ else if (alg & SSL_kECDH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
if (alg & SSL_aFZA)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
-
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
}
}
else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ /* let's do ECDSA */
+ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
+ if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
+ {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ if (ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
unsigned long n,nc,l;
unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ const unsigned char *p,*q;
+ unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1,
}
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
-static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
long n;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+
+static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
+static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+ }
+
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int n;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
- /* Fool emacs indentation */
- if (0) {}
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH-2) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
goto err;
- s->session->master_key_length=SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
q=p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p+=2;
- n=RSA_public_encrypt(SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH,
+ n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
- memset(tmp_buf,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
- {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- l, SSL_kKRB5);
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ l, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
&kssl_err);
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
- }
+ }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if (krb5rc)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
+ goto err;
+ }
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
- ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
n+=2;
}
- if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
goto err;
/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
*/
- memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
kssl_ctx->key,iv);
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
outl += padl;
+ if (outl > sizeof epms)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
p+=outl;
n+=outl + 2;
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
- tmp_buf, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+ tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- memset(tmp_buf, 0, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
- memset(epms, 0, outl);
- }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
}
#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+ {
+ EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+ * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ */
+ if ((l & SSL_kECDH) && (s->cert != NULL))
+ {
+ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+ * To add such support, one needs to add
+ * code that checks for appropriate
+ * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ * For example, the cert have an ECC
+ * key on the same curve as the server's
+ * and the key should be authorized for
+ * key agreement.
+ *
+ * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+ * to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message.
+ *
+ * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+ * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
+ {
+ srvr_group = s->session->sess_cert-> \
+ peer_ecdh_tmp->group;
+ srvr_ecpoint = s->session->sess_cert-> \
+ peer_ecdh_tmp->pub_key;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ srvr_group = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->group;
+ srvr_ecpoint =
+ srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key;
+ }
+
+ if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ clnt_ecdh->group = srvr_group;
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Reuse key info from our certificate
+ * We only need our private key to perform
+ * the ECDH computation.
+ */
+ clnt_ecdh->priv_key = BN_dup(s->cert->key-> \
+ privatekey->pkey.eckey->priv_key);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(clnt_ecdh->group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
+ * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
+ * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
+ */
+ if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
+ n=ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
+ else
+ n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
+ -> generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
+ {
+ /* Send empty client key exch message */
+ n = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encoded_pt_len =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(clnt_ecdh->group,
+ clnt_ecdh->pub_key,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
+ sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
+ (bn_ctx == NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key */
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(clnt_ecdh->group,
+ clnt_ecdh->pub_key,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Free allocated memory */
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ /* group is shared */
+ clnt_ecdh->group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
else
{
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ {
+ /* group is shared */
+ clnt_ecdh->group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
n=j+2;
}
else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.eckey))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
+ ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j,p);
+ n=j+2;
+ }
+ else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
l2n3(n,d);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
s->init_num=(int)n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
-static int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
long algs;
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
+ {
+ if (check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0)
+ { /* check failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (algs & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
- || RSA_size(rsa) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
if (algs & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
- || DH_size(dh) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
return(0);
}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+/* This is the complement of nid2curve_id in s3_srvr.c. */
+static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+{
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
+ * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
+ static int nid_list[26] =
+ {
+ 0,
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ };
+
+ if ((curve_id < 1) || (curve_id > 25)) return 0;
+
+ return nid_list[curve_id];
+}
+#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff