Client side compression algorithm sanity checks: ensure old compression

[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_clnt.c

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 861ce301387de3198a24747d5b1ad0b6e015dbd5..af30d1af14630161ef44023b973e1883a990cbbb 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -166,9 +166,6 @@
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
-#endif
 
 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
        {
@@ -618,9 +615,15 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
        buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
        if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
                {
-               if ((s->session == NULL) ||
-                       (s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
-                       (s->session->not_resumable))
+               SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+               if ((sess == NULL) ||
+                       (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                       !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+                       (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+                       (sess->not_resumable))
                        {
                        if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
                                goto err;
@@ -888,10 +891,31 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
                goto f_err;
                }
+       /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+        * using compression.
+        */
+       if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
+               {
+               al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
 #else
        j= *(p++);
-       if ((j == 0) || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION))
+       if (s->hit && j != (int)s->session->compress_meth)
+               {
+               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
+       if (j == 0)
                comp=NULL;
+       else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+               {
+               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
        else
                comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
        
@@ -909,7 +933,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
        /* TLS extensions*/
-       if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+       if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
                {
                if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
                        {
@@ -1815,6 +1839,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                goto f_err;
                }
+
        p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
        n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
        n2s(p, ticklen);
@@ -1838,7 +1863,28 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
                }
        memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
        s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
-       
+       /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
+        * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
+        * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
+        * client session ID matching to work and we know much 
+        * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
+        * 
+        * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
+        * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
+        * session resumption.
+        *
+        * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
+        * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
+        * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
+        * ticket.
+        */ 
+       EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
+                       s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+                                                       EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+#else
+                                                       EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+#endif
        ret=1;
        return(ret);
 f_err:
@@ -2707,7 +2753,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                        NID_id_GostR3411_94,
                        data);
-               if (!EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx,signbuf,&sigsize,data,32)) {
+               if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
                        ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        goto err;
@@ -2958,7 +3004,7 @@ err:
  */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
        {
        int ok;
        long n;