#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
+static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+ unsigned char *));
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_client_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
- ssl_undefined_function,
- ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
-#endif
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+ if (!SSL_clear(s))
+ return -1;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/*
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
- if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
+ if ((s->version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
+ && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
+ if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
return -1;
}
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf = buf;
/* setup buffing BIO */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
if (s->hit) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
-#endif
} else {
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+ /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
+ ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
/* or PSK */
if (!
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
skip = 1;
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
s->init_num = 0;
break;
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
}
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#else
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
{
ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
goto end;
}
break;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
}
} else {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/*
* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
*/
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
-#endif
-
s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
-#endif
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
- }
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
/*
* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
goto end;
/* break; */
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
- if (buf != NULL)
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
+/*
+ * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
+ * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
+ * Returns 1 on success
+ * Returns 0 on error
+ */
+static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
+
+ if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /*
+ * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
+ * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
+ * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
+ * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
+ * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
+ * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
+ */
+ mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+ | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+#endif
+ ;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
+ if ((options & mask) != mask) {
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((options & mask) == mask) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+#endif
+
+ mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
+ if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
+ s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
+ /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
+ */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
+ */
+ s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We only support one version: update method
+ */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
- if ((sess == NULL) ||
- (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
- !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) {
+
+ /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
+ if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+ /*
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+ * "ticket" without a session ID.
+ */
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+ (sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
- int options = s->options;
- /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
- if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
- */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
- goto err;
- }
- /*
- * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
- */
- s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- } else {
- /*
- * We only support one version: update method
- */
- if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- }
- s->client_version = s->version;
- }
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
} else
i = 1;
- if (i)
- ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
+ sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /*-
- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
- * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
- * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
- * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
- * choke if we initially report a higher version then
- * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
- * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
- * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
- * 1.0.
- *
- * Possible scenario with previous logic:
- * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
- * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
- * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
- * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
- * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
- * know that is maximum server supports.
- * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
- * containing version 1.0.
- *
- * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
- * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
- * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
- * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
- * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
- * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
- * the negotiated version.
- */
-#if 0
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- s->client_version = s->version;
-#else
+ /*-
+ * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+ * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+ * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+ * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+ * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+ * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+ * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+ * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+ * 1.0.
+ *
+ * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+ * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+ * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+ * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+ * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+ * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+ * know that is maximum server supports.
+ * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+ * containing version 1.0.
+ *
+ * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+ * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+ * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+ * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+ * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+ * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+ * the negotiated version.
+ */
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
-#endif
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
#endif
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-#endif
l = p - d;
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- CERT *ct = s->cert;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
unsigned int j;
* Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
* first packet if we're negotiating version.
*/
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- s->first_packet = 1;
+ s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
+ s->first_packet = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- s->first_packet = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
}
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+
+ if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ int sversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
+
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+#error Code needs updating for new TLS version
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
+ if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
+ } else
+#endif
+ if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
+ s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
+ } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
+ s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
+ } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
+ s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
+
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Work out correct protocol version to use */
int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
int options = s->options;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
- s->version = s->method->version;
- }
-
- if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
+ } else if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
/*
- * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
- * secret
+ * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+ * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+ * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+ * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+ * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+ * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+ * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+ * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+ * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+ * server wants to resume.
*/
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+ s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
- s->hit = 1;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
- if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+ if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
- }
- /* a miss or crap from the other end */
- if (!s->hit) {
+ } else {
/*
- * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
- * we don't stuff up other people
+ * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+ * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+ * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+ * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
}
/* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
- ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
- ct->mask_ssl = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
* return an error.
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
-/* Workaround is now obsolete */
-#if 0
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
-#endif
- {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/*
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
-#endif
if (p != (d + n)) {
/* wrong packet length */
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
- int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
+ int al, i, ok, ret = -1, exp_idx;
unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *q, *p;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
- * KRB5 */
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
- if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- ) {
+ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
if (sc == NULL)
goto err;
- if (s->session->sess_cert)
- ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
s->session->sess_cert = sc;
sc->cert_chain = sk;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
- ? 0 : 1;
-
-#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
- fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
-#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
+ if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
- if (need_cert && i < 0) {
+ if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
goto f_err;
}
- if (need_cert) {
- int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
- x = NULL;
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- /*
- * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
- * of lines ago.
- */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
- sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer = x;
- } else {
- sc->peer_cert_type = i;
- sc->peer_key = NULL;
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer = NULL;
+ exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
}
+ sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /*
+ * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
+ * of lines ago.
+ */
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
+ sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = 1;
- if (0) {
+ goto done;
+
f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- }
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ done:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
*/
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
- OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
- RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
- }
+ RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
- DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
- }
+ DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
- EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
- }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
} else {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
*/
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
+ if ((rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
+ if ((rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
param_len += i;
- if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
dh = NULL;
- } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (dh != NULL)
- DH_free(dh);
+ DH_free(dh);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- if (ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
/* get the certificate types */
ctype_num = *(p++);
- if (s->cert->ctypes) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
- s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
+ s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
- s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
}
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p, llen);
-#if 0
- {
- FILE *out;
- out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
- fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
- fclose(out);
- }
-#endif
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2s(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
- goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
q = p;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
- /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
- goto cont;
- else {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
nc += l + 2;
}
- if (0) {
- cont:
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
-
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
- if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
+ goto done;
err:
- if (ca_sk != NULL)
- sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ done:
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
}
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+ /*
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+ * one
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+ /*
+ * Remove the old session from the cache
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
+ if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+ s->session);
+ } else {
+ /* We carry on if this fails */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
*/
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-# else
- EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-# endif
ret = 1;
return (ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
-#endif
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return -1;
}
ret = 1;
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
RSA *rsa;
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
/*
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
-
q = p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
- n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
- tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
p[1]++;
s2n(n, q);
n += 2;
}
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
- kssl_err.text);
- }
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*-
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- *
- * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- *
- * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- * Example:
- * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- * optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*-
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
}
}
+ pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
- n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
+ n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
DH_free(dh_srvr);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
-
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
- /* clean up */
- memset(p, 0, n);
+ pmslen = n;
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
n = 0;
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
- clnt_ecdh, NULL);
- if (n <= 0) {
+ pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+ n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
-
- memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
-
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
- memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
/* increment n to account for length field */
n += 1;
}
/* Free allocated memory */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
int keytype;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+ pmslen = 32;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+
/*
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
- RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32);
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ };
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
*/
*/
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
- < 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- premaster_secret,
- 32);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) <
- 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
size_t identity_len;
unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
+ pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ pms, pmslen);
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
+ /* Change pmslen to real length */
+ pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
identity_len = strlen(identity);
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ t = pms;
+ memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
s2n(psk_len, t);
- if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint =
BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
goto psk_err;
}
- if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
goto psk_err;
}
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
s2n(identity_len, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
n = 2 + identity_len;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
goto err;
}
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ n = ssl_do_write(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Check for SRP */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ /*
+ * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
+ * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
+ */
+ if (n > 0) {
+ if ((s->session->master_key_length =
+ SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key)) <
+ 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+ } else {
+ /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
+ pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
+ }
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ pms, pmslen);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+ if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return n;
+ memerr:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- if (encodedPoint != NULL)
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
- const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
+ const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ /*
+ * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
+ * records.
+ */
+ if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
}
if (i == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
- if (x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(x509);
- if (pkey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
return (1);
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
}
}
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return 0;
}
}
int i, idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int pkey_bits;
SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
- if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
sc = s->session->sess_cert;
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
}
#endif
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
# endif
#endif
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (rsa == NULL
}
/*
- * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a case
- * of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of session
- * tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
+ * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
+ * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
+ * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
+ * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
+ * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
+ * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
*/
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
+ !s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
+ * so permit appropriate message length.
+ * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
+ * and not its length.
+ */
+ s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return -1;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
-# endif
#endif
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p,
+ int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+ unsigned char *))
+{
+ int i, j = 0;
+ SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+ /* Set disabled masks for this session */
+ ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ q = p;
+ if (put_cb == NULL)
+ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
+ continue;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+ if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
+ if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
+ continue;
+ else
+ empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ j = put_cb(c, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
+ * applicable SCSVs.
+ */
+ if (p != q) {
+ if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+ }
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (p - q);
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff