* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
-static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
-static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
- BUF_MEM *buf;
+ BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
unsigned long Time=time(NULL),l;
long num1;
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
p=s->s3->client_random;
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
*(p++)=i;
if (i != 0)
{
- if (i > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
- i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]));
+ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
if (i == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
long n;
SSL_COMP *comp;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
- SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO,
+ -1,
300, /* ?? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
+
+ if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ {
+ if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ else /* already sent a cookie */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
goto f_err;
}
- if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher != c))
+ /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
+ cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
+ if (s->session->cipher)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
{
if (!(s->options &
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
X509 *x=NULL;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ const unsigned char *q,*p;
+ unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
-1,
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
+ && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
- )
+ )
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
- & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+ & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+ == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
goto f_err;
}
- if (need_cert)
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type=i;
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- /* Why would the following ever happen?
- * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
- if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
- sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
- sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer=x;
- }
- else
- {
- sc->peer_cert_type=i;
- sc->peer_key= NULL;
-
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
- s->session->peer=NULL;
- }
+ if (need_cert)
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /* Why would the following ever happen?
+ * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
+ sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer=x;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ sc->peer_cert_type=i;
+ sc->peer_key= NULL;
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer=NULL;
+ }
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x=NULL;
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg & SSL_kECDHE)
{
+ EC_GROUP *ngroup;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!(ecdh->group=EC_GROUP_new_by_nid(curve_nid)))
+ ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
+ if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
p+=2;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
- if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(ecdh->group)) == NULL) ||
+ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
p+=1;
param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
if ((param_len > n) ||
- (EC_POINT_oct2point(ecdh->group, srvr_ecpoint,
+ (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
- ecdh->pub_key = srvr_ecpoint;
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg & SSL_kECDH)
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
unsigned long n,nc,l;
unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
- unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
+ const unsigned char *p,*q;
+ unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1,
}
}
- d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
{
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
}
-static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok,ret=0;
long n;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
+static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ *outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SHA */
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int n;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
- EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
- /* Fool emacs indentation */
- if (0) {}
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
- memset(tmp_buf,0,sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
- {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- l, SSL_kKRB5);
+ printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ l, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
authp = NULL;
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
&kssl_err);
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ {
+ printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
- }
+ }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if (krb5rc)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ if (krb5rc)
+ {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
+ goto err;
+ }
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
**
- ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- **
+ ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ ** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ ** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ **
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
p+=outl;
n+=outl + 2;
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
- memset(tmp_buf, 0, sizeof tmp_buf);
- memset(epms, 0, outl);
- }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
{
- EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *tkey;
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
/* Did we send out the client's
* ECDH share for use in premaster
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
{
- srvr_group = s->session->sess_cert-> \
- peer_ecdh_tmp->group;
- srvr_ecpoint = s->session->sess_cert-> \
- peer_ecdh_tmp->pub_key;
+ tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
}
else
{
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
(srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
- (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey == NULL))
+ (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- srvr_group = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->group;
- srvr_ecpoint =
- srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key;
+ tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
}
+ srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
goto err;
}
- clnt_ecdh->group = srvr_group;
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
- /* Reuse key info from our certificate
+ /* Reuse key info from our certificate
* We only need our private key to perform
* the ECDH computation.
*/
- clnt_ecdh->priv_key = BN_dup(s->cert->key-> \
- privatekey->pkey.eckey->priv_key);
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+ if (priv_key == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
else
{
}
}
- /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
- * make sure to clear it out afterwards
+ /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
+ * make sure to clear it out afterwards
*/
- n=ECDH_compute_key(p, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh);
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+ if (field_size <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
+ * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
+ * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
+ */
+ if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
+ n=ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
+ else
+ n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
if (n <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
+ goto err;
}
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
-> generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p, n);
- memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
{
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encoded_pt_len =
- EC_POINT_point2oct(clnt_ecdh->group,
- clnt_ecdh->pub_key,
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
}
/* Encode the public key */
- n = EC_POINT_point2oct(clnt_ecdh->group,
- clnt_ecdh->pub_key,
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
- /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- /* group is shared */
- clnt_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- }
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- /* group is shared */
- clnt_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned u=0;
#endif
unsigned long n;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
int j;
#endif
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.eckey))
+ (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
l2n3(n,d);
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
s->init_num=(int)n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
-static int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i,idx;
long algs;
if (algs & SSL_kRSA)
{
if (rsa == NULL
- || RSA_size(rsa) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
if (algs & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
if (dh == NULL
- || DH_size(dh) > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
+ || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
/* This is the complement of nid2curve_id in s3_srvr.c. */
static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
{
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
+ /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
+ * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
static int nid_list[26] =
{
0,
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff