PR: 2658

[openssl.git] / ssl / s3_clnt.c

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 0633c099c62a6a98fced8fb59ba7c0d9c148d54b..3a27f9386855243b9a3b53a13b567ce59e232313 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -204,6 +204,18 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
        s->in_handshake++;
        if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+       /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
+        * already got and don't await it anymore, because
+        * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
+        */
+       if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+               {
+               s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+               s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+               }
+#endif
+
        for (;;)
                {
                state=s->state;
@@ -281,24 +293,19 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
                case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
                case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
                        ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-                       if ((ret == 0) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME))
-                               {
-                               if (!SRP_have_to_put_srp_username(s))
-                                       {
-                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME);
-                                       ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
-                                       goto end;
-                                       }
-                               s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
-                               if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-                               break;
-                               }
-#endif
                        if (ret <= 0) goto end;
 
                        if (s->hit)
+                               {
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+                               if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+                                       {
+                                       /* receive renewed session ticket */
+                                       s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+                                       }
+#endif
+                               }
                        else
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
                        s->init_num=0;
@@ -456,7 +463,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
                        s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
 #else
-                       if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+                       if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
                        else
                                s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
@@ -894,6 +901,14 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
                goto f_err;
                }
+       /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
+       if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
+               (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
+               {
+               al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
        p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
 
        sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
@@ -928,7 +943,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
        /* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
         * client authentication.
         */
-       if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
                goto f_err;
        /* lets get the compression algorithm */
        /* COMPRESSION */
@@ -1002,7 +1017,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                /* wrong packet length */
                al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
-               goto err;
+               goto f_err;
                }
 
        return(1);
@@ -1659,7 +1674,7 @@ int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
        /* if it was signed, check the signature */
        if (pkey != NULL)
                {
-               if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
                        {
                        int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
                        /* Should never happen */
@@ -1704,7 +1719,7 @@ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
                        }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
                        {
                        int num;
 
@@ -1864,8 +1879,7 @@ int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
        for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
                s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
        p+=ctype_num;
-       /* HACK! For now just skip over signatature algorithms */
-       if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
                {
                n2s(p, llen);
                /* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
@@ -2003,7 +2017,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
        if (n < 6)
                {
                /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
-               al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+               al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                goto f_err;
                }
@@ -2014,7 +2028,7 @@ int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
        /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
        if (ticklen + 6 != n)
                {
-               al = SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+               al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
                goto f_err;
                }
@@ -2409,6 +2423,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
                                {
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                               DH_free(dh_clnt);
                                goto err;
                                }
 
@@ -2420,6 +2435,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                        if (n <= 0)
                                {
                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+                               DH_free(dh_clnt);
                                goto err;
                                }
 
@@ -2886,7 +2902,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
                if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
                        {
-                       if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+                       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
                                s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
                                                NID_sha1,
                                                &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
@@ -2898,7 +2914,7 @@ int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
                /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
                 * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
                 */
-               if (s->version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
                        {
                        long hdatalen = 0;
                        void *hdata;