#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
*/
#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
-
-
/*
* u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
* little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
*/
char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return 0;
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
case NID_md5:
case NID_sha1:
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
*/
int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *md_out,
- size_t *md_out_size,
- const unsigned char header[13],
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_plus_mac_size,
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
- const unsigned char *mac_secret,
- unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char header[13],
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
{
union {
double align;
} md_state;
void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
- unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
- unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+ size_t md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+ size_t sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
- unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
+ size_t bits; /* at most 18 bits */
unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
/* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+ size_t i, j;
+ unsigned md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
/*
* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that
* terminates * the hash.
*/
- unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+ size_t md_length_size = 8;
char length_is_big_endian = 1;
int ret;
* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
* many possible overflows later in this function.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
+ if (!ossl_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024))
+ return 0;
switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
case NID_md5:
* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
* check that the hash function is supported.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
- if (md_out_size)
+ if (md_out_size != NULL)
*md_out_size = 0;
- return 0;
+ return ossl_assert(0);
}
- OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES)
+ || !ossl_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ || !ossl_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
+ return 0;
header_length = 13;
if (is_sslv3) {
*/
bits += 8 * md_block_size;
memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)))
+ return 0;
memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
if (k > 0) {
if (is_sslv3) {
- unsigned overhang;
+ size_t overhang;
/*
* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks;
i++) {
unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
- unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
- unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+ unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_a);
+ unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_b);
for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
if (k < header_length)
b = data[k - header_length];
k++;
- is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
- is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
+ is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c);
+ is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c + 1);
/*
* If this is the block containing the end of the application
* data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then
*/
b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
/*
- * If this the the block containing the end of the application
- * data and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
+ * If this block contains the end of the application data
+ * and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
*/
b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
/*
memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
goto err;
}
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
if (ret && md_out_size)
*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 1;
-err:
+ err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 0;
}
-
-/*
- * Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
- * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases by
- * digesting additional data.
- */
-
-int tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
-{
- size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- return 1;
- block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
- /*-
- * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
- * digests and TLS to deal with.
- * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
- * otherwise.
- * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
- * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
- * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
- * So we have:
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
- * equivalently:
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
- * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
- * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
- * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
- * for SHA384/SHA512 and
- * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
- * otherwise.
- */
- digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
- blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
- blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
- /*
- * MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original and
- * actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a no op.
- * The "data" pointer should always have enough space to perform this
- * operation as it is large enough for a maximum length TLS buffer.
- */
- return EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
- (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
-}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff