* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
-/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' */
+/*
+ * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ */
int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
- {
- int ret;
-
- ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- s->init_num);
- if (ret < 0) return(-1);
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
- /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
- * we'll ignore the result anyway */
- ssl3_finish_mac(s,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
-
- if (ret == s->init_num)
- return(1);
- s->init_off+=ret;
- s->init_num-=ret;
- return(0);
- }
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ s->init_num);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return (-1);
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ /*
+ * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
+ * ignore the result anyway
+ */
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ ret);
+
+ if (ret == s->init_num) {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+ return (1);
+ }
+ s->init_off += ret;
+ s->init_num -= ret;
+ return (0);
+}
int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
- {
- unsigned char *p,*d;
- int i;
- unsigned long l;
-
- if (s->state == a)
- {
- d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- p= &(d[4]);
-
- i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
- memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- p+=i;
- l=i;
-
-#ifdef WIN16
- /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
- * I do this.
- */
- l&=0xffff;
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == a) {
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender, slen,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ if (i == 0)
+ return 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ l = i;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
+ */
+ if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+ }
+
+ if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ s->state = b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
+ * to far.
+ */
+static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
+{
+ const char *sender;
+ int slen;
+ /*
+ * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
+ * the appropriate error.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+ return;
+ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
+ sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+ } else {
+ sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,
+ slen,
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+}
#endif
- *(d++)=SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
- l2n3(l,d);
- s->init_num=(int)l+4;
- s->init_off=0;
-
- s->state=b;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
- }
-
int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b)
- {
- int al,i,ok;
- long n;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- /* the mac has already been generated when we received the
- * change cipher spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
- */
-
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
- a,
- b,
- SSL3_MT_FINISHED,
- 64, /* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
- &ok);
-
- if (!ok) return((int)n);
-
- /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
-
- if (i != n)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED,SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- return(1);
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return(0);
- }
-
-/* for these 2 messages, we need to
- * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
- * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
- * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
- * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
- * ssl->session->read_compression assign
- * ssl->session->read_hash assign
+{
+ int al, i, ok;
+ long n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+ * the mac has already been generated when we received the change cipher
+ * spec message and is in s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md
+ */
+#endif
+
+ /* 64 argument should actually be 36+4 :-) */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+
+ if (i != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
+ */
+ if (s->type == SSL_ST_ACCEPT) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+ } else {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash assign
*/
int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (s->state == a)
- {
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
- s->init_num=1;
- s->init_off=0;
-
- s->state=b;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
- return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
- }
-
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- int n,i;
- unsigned long l=7;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
- X509_OBJECT obj;
-
- /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
- buf=s->init_buf;
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)(10)))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
- if (x != NULL)
- {
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,NULL,NULL);
-
- for (;;)
- {
- n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
- l2n3(n,p);
- i2d_X509(x,&p);
- l+=n+3;
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),
- X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0) break;
-
- i=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(&xs_ctx,X509_LU_X509,
- X509_get_issuer_name(x),&obj);
- if (i <= 0) break;
- x=obj.data.x509;
- /* Count is one too high since the X509_STORE_get uped the
- * ref count */
- X509_free(x);
- }
-
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
- }
-
- /* Thawte special :-) */
- if (s->ctx->extra_certs != NULL)
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
- {
- x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
- n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- return(0);
- }
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[l]);
- l2n3(n,p);
- i2d_X509(x,&p);
- l+=n+3;
- }
-
- l-=7;
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
- l2n3(l,p);
- l+=3;
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
- *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
- l2n3(l,p);
- l+=4;
- return(l);
- }
-
-/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
- * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
- * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
- * the body is read in state 'stn'.
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == a) {
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *p = SSL3_MT_CCS;
+ s->init_num = 1;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ s->state = b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+ return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+}
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l))
+ return 0;
+
+ l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ l2n3(l, p);
+ l += 3;
+
+ if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum
+ * acceptable body length 'max'. The first four bytes (msg_type and length)
+ * are read in state 'st1', the body is read in state 'stn'.
*/
long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned long l;
- long n;
- int i,al;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
- {
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
- if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- *ok=1;
- return((int)s->s3->tmp.message_size);
- }
-
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
- {
- int skip_message;
-
- do
- {
- while (s->init_num < 4)
- {
- i=ssl3_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],
- 4 - s->init_num);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- s->init_num+=i;
- }
-
- skip_message = 0;
- if (!s->server)
- if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
- /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
- * if their format is correct. Does not count for
- * 'Finished' MAC. */
- if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
- skip_message = 1;
- }
- while (skip_message);
-
- /* s->init_num == 4 */
-
- if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
- (st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
- (stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
- {
- /* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
- * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
- * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
- * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
- * we have not completed the handshake. */
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- }
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 4);
-
- s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
-
- n2l3(p,l);
- if (l > (unsigned long)max)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,(int)l))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
- s->state=stn;
-
- s->init_num=0;
- }
-
- /* next state (stn) */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- n=s->s3->tmp.message_size;
- while (n > 0)
- {
- i=ssl3_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- s->init_num += i;
- n -= i;
- }
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
- *ok=1;
- return s->init_num;
-f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
- *ok=0;
- return(-1);
- }
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned long l;
+ long n;
+ int i, al;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ *ok = 1;
+ s->state = stn;
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ if (s->state == st1) { /* s->init_num < 4 */
+ int skip_message;
+
+ do {
+ while (s->init_num < 4) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ &p[s->init_num],
+ 4 - s->init_num, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ s->init_num += i;
+ }
+
+ skip_message = 0;
+ if (!s->server)
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ /*
+ * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+ * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
+ * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
+ * MAC.
+ */
+ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ skip_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+ }
+ while (skip_message);
+
+ /* s->init_num == 4 */
+
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
+
+ n2l3(p, l);
+ if (l > (unsigned long)max) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (l > (INT_MAX - 4)) { /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l + 4)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
+ s->state = stn;
+
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* next state (stn) */
+ p = s->init_msg;
+ n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+ while (n > 0) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num],
+ n, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ s->init_num += i;
+ n -= i;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+ * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
+ * Finished verification.
+ */
+ if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ ssl3_take_mac(s);
+#endif
+
+ /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ *ok = 1;
+ return s->init_num;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ *ok = 0;
+ return (-1);
+}
int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- EVP_PKEY *pk;
- int ret= -1,i,j;
-
- if (pkey == NULL)
- pk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
- else
- pk=pkey;
- if (pk == NULL) goto err;
-
- i=pk->type;
- if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- {
- ret=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
- if (x != NULL)
- {
- j=X509_get_ext_count(x);
- /* check to see if this is a signing only certificate */
- /* EAY EAY EAY EAY */
- }
- }
- else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
- {
- ret=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- }
- else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DH)
- {
- /* if we just have a key, we needs to be guess */
-
- if (x == NULL)
- ret=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
- else
- {
- j=X509_get_signature_type(x);
- if (j == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
- ret=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
- else if (j== EVP_PKEY_DSA)
- ret=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
- else ret= -1;
- }
- }
- else
- ret= -1;
-
-err:
- if(!pkey) EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- return(ret);
- }
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pk;
+ int ret = -1, i;
+
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ else
+ pk = pkey;
+ if (pk == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ i = pk->type;
+ if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+ } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ }
+#endif
+ else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
+ } else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc) {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+ } else if (x && (i == EVP_PKEY_DH || i == EVP_PKEY_DHX)) {
+ /*
+ * For DH two cases: DH certificate signed with RSA and DH
+ * certificate signed with DSA.
+ */
+ i = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
+ if (i & EVP_PKS_RSA)
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
+ else if (i & EVP_PKS_DSA)
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ if (!pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return (ret);
+}
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
- {
- int al;
-
- switch(type)
- {
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
- al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
- al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
- al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
- case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
- al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
- al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
- al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
- case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
- al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
- break;
- case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- break;
- default:
- al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
- break;
- }
- return(al);
- }
+{
+ int al;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+ return (al);
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *b;
+
+ b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ else
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+ if (b->buf == NULL) {
+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) {
+ s->s3->init_extra = 1;
+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (ssl_allow_compression(s))
+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ b->buf = p;
+ b->len = len;
+ }
+
+ s->packet = &(b->buf[0]);
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl3_setup_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len, align = 0, headerlen;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+
+ wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ headerlen = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1;
+ else
+ headerlen = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+ align = (-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
+#endif
+
+ if (wb->buf == NULL) {
+ len = s->max_send_fragment
+ + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD + headerlen + align;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (ssl_allow_compression(s))
+ len += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+ len += headerlen + align + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
+
+ if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ wb->buf = p;
+ wb->len = len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+}
int ssl3_setup_buffers(SSL *s)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned int extra;
-
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
- {
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
- extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
- else
- extra=0;
- if ((p=Malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE+extra))
- == NULL)
- goto err;
- s->s3->rbuf.buf=p;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
- {
- if ((p=Malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE))
- == NULL)
- goto err;
- s->s3->wbuf.buf=p;
- }
- s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
- return(1);
-err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_BUFFERS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
+{
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ return 0;
+ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_write_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+
+ wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+ if (wb->buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
+ wb->buf = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_release_read_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+ SSL3_BUFFER *b;
+
+ b = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+ if (b->buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(b->buf);
+ b->buf = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ return 0;
+ return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff