* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret=ssl3_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ s->init_num);
+ if (ret < 0) return(-1);
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+ * we'll ignore the result anyway */
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s,(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],ret);
+
+ if (ret == s->init_num)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ return(1);
+ }
+ s->init_off+=ret;
+ s->init_num-=ret;
+ return(0);
+ }
int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
{
p+=i;
l=i;
-#ifdef WIN16
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
/* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
* I do this.
*/
if (!ok) return((int)n);
- /* If this occurs if we has missed a message */
+ /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
if (i != n)
}
if (x != NULL)
{
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,NULL,NULL);
+ if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,NULL,NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
for (;;)
{
return(l);
}
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * The first four bytes (msg_type and length) are read in state 'st1',
+ * the body is read in state 'stn'.
+ */
long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
{
unsigned char *p;
goto f_err;
}
*ok=1;
- return((int)s->s3->tmp.message_size);
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->init_num;
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- if (s->state == st1)
+ if (s->state == st1) /* s->init_num < 4 */
{
- i=ssl3_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],
- 4-s->init_num);
- if (i < (4-s->init_num))
+ int skip_message;
+
+ do
{
- *ok=0;
- return(ssl3_part_read(s,i));
+ while (s->init_num < 4)
+ {
+ i=ssl3_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],
+ 4 - s->init_num, 0);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ s->init_num+=i;
+ }
+
+ skip_message = 0;
+ if (!s->server)
+ if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+ * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
+ * if their format is correct. Does not count for
+ * 'Finished' MAC. */
+ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
+ {
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ skip_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
}
+ while (skip_message);
+
+ /* s->init_num == 4 */
if ((mt >= 0) && (*p != mt))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
- if((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ if ((mt < 0) && (*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
(st1 == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A) &&
(stn == SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B))
{
/* At this point we have got an MS SGC second client
- * hello. We need to restart the mac and mac the data
- * currently received.
- */
+ * hello (maybe we should always allow the client to
+ * start a new handshake?). We need to restart the mac.
+ * Don't increment {num,total}_renegotiations because
+ * we have not completed the handshake. */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p + s->init_num, i);
}
-
+
s->s3->tmp.message_type= *(p++);
n2l3(p,l);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
goto f_err;
}
- if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,(int)l))
+ if (l > (INT_MAX-4)) /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,(int)l+4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
s->state=stn;
- s->init_num=0;
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + 4;
+ s->init_num = 0;
}
/* next state (stn) */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- n=s->s3->tmp.message_size;
- if (n > 0)
+ p = s->init_msg;
+ n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
+ while (n > 0)
{
- i=ssl3_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n);
- if (i != (int)n)
+ i=ssl3_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],n,0);
+ if (i <= 0)
{
- *ok=0;
- return(ssl3_part_read(s,i));
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
}
+ s->init_num += i;
+ n -= i;
}
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + 4);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
*ok=1;
- return(n);
+ return s->init_num;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
else ret= -1;
}
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /* XXX: Structurally, there is no distinction between
+ * ECDSA and ECDH public keys (both are ECPoints).
+ * So EVP_PKEY_ECDSA should really be renamed EVP_PKEY_ECC
+ * (or similar). As for ECC certificates, additional
+ * information (e.g. in the optional key usage X509v3
+ * extension) could be used when available to distinguish
+ * between ECDH and ECDSA certificates. For now, we do not
+ * make that distinction here. Instead, we shift the burden
+ * of checking for appropriate key usage to the SSL code
+ * responsible for sending/processing ECC certificates.
+ */
+ else if (i == EVP_PKEY_ECDSA)
+ {
+ ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+ }
+#endif
else
ret= -1;
{
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
+ case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
break;
case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
+ al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
+ break;
default:
al=SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
break;
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned int extra;
+ size_t len;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
{
extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
else
extra=0;
- if ((p=(unsigned char *)Malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE+extra))
- == NULL)
+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE + extra;
+ if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
goto err;
- s->s3->rbuf.buf=p;
+ s->s3->rbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->rbuf.len = len;
}
if (s->s3->wbuf.buf == NULL)
{
- if ((p=(unsigned char *)Malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE))
- == NULL)
+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE;
+ len += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 256; /* extra space for empty fragment */
+ if ((p=OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
goto err;
- s->s3->wbuf.buf=p;
+ s->s3->wbuf.buf = p;
+ s->s3->wbuf.len = len;
}
s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
return(1);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff