Add support for legacy PEM format private keys in EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD.

[openssl.git] / ssl / s2_pkt.c

diff --git a/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index 4340404b8e940e4c2163addc8b39b3ac96273000..a10929a757f9f865021b983766a472d6c59011b7 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
        unsigned char mac[MAX_MAC_SIZE];
        unsigned char *p;
        int i;
-       unsigned int mac_size=0;
+       unsigned int mac_size;
 
  ssl2_read_again:
        if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
@@ -235,17 +235,26 @@ static int ssl2_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
                /* Data portion */
                if (s->s2->clear_text)
                        {
+                       mac_size = 0;
                        s->s2->mac_data=p;
                        s->s2->ract_data=p;
-                       s->s2->pad_data=NULL;
+                       if (s->s2->padding)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
+                               return(-1);
+                               }
                        }
                else
                        {
                        mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash);
+                       OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= MAX_MAC_SIZE);
                        s->s2->mac_data=p;
                        s->s2->ract_data= &p[mac_size];
-                       s->s2->pad_data= &p[mac_size+
-                               s->s2->rlength-s->s2->padding];
+                       if (s->s2->padding + mac_size > s->s2->rlength)
+                               {
+                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL,SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING);
+                               return(-1);
+                               }
                        }
 
                s->s2->ract_data_length=s->s2->rlength;
@@ -593,10 +602,8 @@ static int do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
        s->s2->wact_data= &(s->s2->wbuf[3+mac_size]);
        /* we copy the data into s->s2->wbuf */
        memcpy(s->s2->wact_data,buf,len);
-#ifdef PURIFY
        if (p)
-               memset(&(s->s2->wact_data[len]),0,p);
-#endif
+               memset(&(s->s2->wact_data[len]),0,p); /* arbitrary padding */
 
        if (!s->s2->clear_text)
                {
@@ -645,27 +652,36 @@ int ssl2_part_read(SSL *s, unsigned long f, int i)
        unsigned char *p;
        int j;
 
-       /* check for error */
-       if ((s->init_num == 0) && (i >= 3))
-               {
-               p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-               if (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR)
-                       {
-                       j=(p[1]<<8)|p[2];
-                       SSLerr((int)f,ssl_mt_error(j));
-                       }
-               }
-
        if (i < 0)
                {
                /* ssl2_return_error(s); */
                /* for non-blocking io,
-                * this is not fatal */
+                * this is not necessarily fatal */
                return(i);
                }
        else
                {
                s->init_num+=i;
+
+               /* Check for error.  While there are recoverable errors,
+                * this function is not called when those must be expected;
+                * any error detected here is fatal. */
+               if (s->init_num >= 3)
+                       {
+                       p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+                       if (p[0] == SSL2_MT_ERROR)
+                               {
+                               j=(p[1]<<8)|p[2];
+                               SSLerr((int)f,ssl_mt_error(j));
+                               s->init_num -= 3;
+                               if (s->init_num > 0)
+                                       memmove(p, p+3, s->init_num);
+                               }
+                       }
+
+               /* If it's not an error message, we have some error anyway --
+                * the message was shorter than expected.  This too is treated
+                * as fatal (at least if SSL_get_error is asked for its opinion). */
                return(0);
                }
        }
@@ -676,7 +692,11 @@ int ssl2_do_write(SSL *s)
 
        ret=ssl2_write(s,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],s->init_num);
        if (ret == s->init_num)
+               {
+               if (s->msg_callback)
+                       s->msg_callback(1, s->version, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg);
                return(1);
+               }
        if (ret < 0)
                return(-1);
        s->init_off+=ret;