* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
-#ifndef NO_RSA
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver);
static int get_server_finished(SSL *s);
static int get_server_verify(SSL *s);
static int get_server_hello(SSL *s);
unsigned char *to,int padding);
#define BREAK break
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_client_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_client_method());
return(NULL);
}
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void)
- {
- static int init=1;
- static SSL_METHOD SSLv2_client_data;
-
- if (init)
- {
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv2_client_data,(char *)sslv2_base_method(),
- sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv2_client_data.ssl_connect=ssl2_connect;
- SSLv2_client_data.get_ssl_method=ssl2_get_client_method;
- init=0;
- }
- return(&SSLv2_client_data);
- }
+IMPLEMENT_ssl2_meth_func(SSLv2_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl2_connect,
+ ssl2_get_client_method)
int ssl2_connect(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned long l=time(NULL);
+ unsigned long l=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
int ret= -1;
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int new_state,state;
- RAND_seed(&l,sizeof(l));
+ RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
for (;;)
{
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,
SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
{
+ if (buf == s->init_buf)
+ buf=NULL;
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
+ buf=NULL;
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
/* ERR_clear_error();*/
/* If we want to cache session-ids in the client
- * and we sucessfully add the session-id to the
+ * and we successfully add the session-id to the
* cache, and there is a callback, then pass it out.
* 26/11/96 - eay - only add if not a re-used session.
*/
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p;
int i,j;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl;
+ unsigned long len;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl, *prio, *allow;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=buf;
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),11-s->init_num);
if (i < (11-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
+ s->init_num = 11;
if (*(p++) != SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
{
SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
return(-1);
}
-#ifdef __APPLE_CC__
- /* The Rhapsody 5.5 (a.k.a. MacOS X) compiler bug
- * workaround. <appro@fy.chalmers.se> */
- s->hit=(i=*(p++))?1:0;
-#else
+#if 0
s->hit=(*(p++))?1:0;
+ /* Some [PPC?] compilers fail to increment p in above
+ statement, e.g. one provided with Rhapsody 5.5, but
+ most recent example XL C 11.1 for AIX, even without
+ optimization flag... */
+#else
+ s->hit=(*p)?1:0; p++;
#endif
s->s2->tmp.cert_type= *(p++);
n2s(p,i);
n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.csl=i;
n2s(p,i); s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length=i;
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B;
- s->init_num=0;
}
/* SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_HELLO_B */
- j=s->s2->tmp.cert_length+s->s2->tmp.csl+s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length
- - s->init_num;
- i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),j);
+ len = 11 + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.cert_length + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.csl + (unsigned long)s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
+ if (len > SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ j = (int)len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),j);
if (i != j) return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,i));
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-HELLO */
/* things are looking good */
- p=buf;
+ p = buf + 11;
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->s2->tmp.cert_length != 0)
*/
#endif
- /* we need to do this incase we were trying to reuse a
+ /* we need to do this in case we were trying to reuse a
* client session but others are already reusing it.
* If this was a new 'blank' session ID, the session-id
* length will still be 0 */
return(-1);
}
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
/* get the array of ciphers we will accept */
- cl=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
-
+ cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+ /*
+ * If server preference flag set, choose the first
+ * (highest priority) cipher the server sends, otherwise
+ * client preference has priority.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ {
+ prio = sk;
+ allow = cl;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ prio = cl;
+ allow = sk;
+ }
/* In theory we could have ciphers sent back that we
* don't want to use but that does not matter since we
- * will check against the list we origionally sent and
+ * will check against the list we originally sent and
* for performance reasons we should not bother to match
* the two lists up just to check. */
- for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cl); i++)
+ for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
{
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cl,i)) >= 0)
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i)) >= 0)
break;
}
- if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cl))
+ if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
return(-1);
}
- s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cl,i);
- }
+ s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
- if (s->session->peer != NULL)
- X509_free(s->session->peer);
-
-#if 0 /* What is all this meant to accomplish?? */
- /* hmmm, can we have the problem of the other session with this
- * cert, Free's it before we increment the reference count. */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- s->session->peer=s->session->sess_cert->key->x509;
- /* Shouldn't do this: already locked */
- /*CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/
- s->session->peer->references++;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-#else
- s->session->peer = s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509;
- /* peer_key->x509 has been set by ssl2_set_certificate. */
- CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-#endif
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* can't happen*/
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ s->session->peer = s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509;
+ /* peer_key->x509 has been set by ssl2_set_certificate. */
+ CRYPTO_add(&s->session->peer->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL
+ || s->session->peer != s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509)
+ /* can't happen */
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
s->s2->conn_id_length=s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length;
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(s->s2->conn_id,p,s->s2->tmp.conn_id_length);
return(1);
}
s2n(SSL2_VERSION,p); /* version */
n=j=0;
- n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),d);
+ n=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),d,0);
d+=n;
if (n == 0)
s->s2->challenge_length=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
s2n(SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH,p); /* challenge length */
/*challenge id data*/
- RAND_bytes(s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH) <= 0)
+ return -1;
memcpy(d,s->s2->challenge,SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
d+=SSL2_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
{
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL))
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL, 0))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
/* make key_arg data */
i=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
sess->key_arg_length=i;
- if (i > 0) RAND_bytes(sess->key_arg,i);
+ if (i > SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (i > 0)
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(sess->key_arg,i) <= 0)
+ return -1;
/* make a master key */
i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
sess->master_key_length=i;
- if (i > 0) RAND_bytes(sess->master_key,i);
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(sess->master_key))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (RAND_bytes(sess->master_key,i) <= 0)
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
if (sess->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
enc=8;
else
enc=i;
- if (i < enc)
+ if ((int)i < enc)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR);
d+=enc;
karg=sess->key_arg_length;
s2n(karg,p); /* key arg size */
+ if (karg > (int)sizeof(sess->key_arg))
+ {
+ ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(d,sess->key_arg,(unsigned int)karg);
d+=karg;
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED;
+ if (s->s2->conn_id_length > sizeof s->s2->conn_id)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
memcpy(p,s->s2->conn_id,(unsigned int)s->s2->conn_id_length);
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_FINISHED_B;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i;
unsigned int n;
- int cert_ch_len=0;
+ int cert_ch_len;
unsigned char *cert_ch;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- cert_ch= &(buf[2]);
/* We have a cert associated with the SSL, so attach it to
* the session if it does not have one */
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A)
{
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
- SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+1-s->init_num);
- if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+1-s->init_num))
+ SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num);
+ if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* REQUEST-CERTIFICATE */
/* type=buf[0]; */
/* type eq x509 */
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE);
return(-1);
}
- cert_ch_len=i-1;
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_C;
}
+ cert_ch = buf + 2;
+ cert_ch_len = s->init_num - 2;
+
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_X509_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE)
{
X509 *x509=NULL;
/* ok, now we calculate the checksum
* do it first so we can reuse buf :-) */
p=buf;
- EVP_SignInit(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
- (unsigned int)s->s2->key_material_length);
+ s->s2->key_material_length);
EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,cert_ch,(unsigned int)cert_ch_len);
- n=i2d_X509(s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509,&p);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,buf,(unsigned int)n);
+ i=i2d_X509(s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->x509,&p);
+ /* Don't update the signature if it fails - FIXME: probably should handle this better */
+ if(i > 0)
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&ctx,buf,(unsigned int)i);
p=buf;
d=p+6;
{
/* this is not good. If things have failed it
* means there so something wrong with the key.
- * We will contiune with a 0 length signature
+ * We will continue with a 0 length signature
*/
}
- memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
s2n(n,p);
d+=n;
static int get_server_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
- int i;
+ int i, n, len;
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_A)
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
if (i < (1-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
s->state= SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_VERIFY_B;
- s->init_num=0;
if (*p != SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY)
{
if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_ERROR)
SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
}
else
- SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,
- SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ /* try to read the error message */
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
+ return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
+ }
return(-1);
}
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),
- (unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length-s->init_num);
- if (i < ((int)s->s2->challenge_length-s->init_num))
+ len = 1 + s->s2->challenge_length;
+ n = len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),n);
+ if (i < n)
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i));
- if (memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,(unsigned int)s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-VERIFY */
+ p += 1;
+
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p,s->s2->challenge,s->s2->challenge_length) != 0)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT);
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p;
- int i;
+ int i, n, len;
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=buf;
i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),1-s->init_num);
if (i < (1-s->init_num))
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
- s->init_num=i;
+ s->init_num += i;
+
if (*p == SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE)
{
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A;
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE);
}
else
+ {
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_PEER_ERROR);
+ /* try to read the error message */
+ i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(p[s->init_num]),3-s->init_num);
+ return ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY,i);
+ }
return(-1);
}
- s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num=0;
+ s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_SERVER_FINISHED_B;
}
- i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
- SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH-s->init_num);
- if (i < (SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH-s->init_num))
+ len = 1 + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ n = len - s->init_num;
+ i = ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]), n);
+ if (i < n) /* XXX could be shorter than SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, that's the maximum */
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,i));
+ s->init_num += i;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, 0, buf, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* SERVER-FINISHED */
if (!s->hit) /* new session */
{
* or bad things can happen */
/* ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ */
s->session->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id,p+1,SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
}
else
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG))
{
- if (memcmp(buf,s->session->session_id,
- (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length) != 0)
+ if ((s->session->session_id_length > sizeof s->session->session_id)
+ || (0 != memcmp(buf + 1, s->session->session_id,
+ (unsigned int)s->session->session_id_length)))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT);
}
}
}
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
return(1);
}
/* loads in the certificate from the server */
-int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, unsigned char *data)
+int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, const unsigned char *data)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i))
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* server's cert for this session */
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(i);
}
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
#endif
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff