if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
- else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
+#endif
+ if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long Time=time(NULL);
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state;
int n=0,j;
int type=0;
int v[2];
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- int use_sslv2_strong=0;
-#endif
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
(p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
- || (p[9] == p[1])))
+ || (p[9] >= p[1])))
{
/*
* SSLv3 or tls1 header
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
- * attacks. */
+ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
-#if 0
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
-#else
- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
}
+ /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
+ * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
+ * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
+ * this....
+ */
+ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
}
}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
+ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+ * record. It's format is:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0-1 msg_length
+ * 2 msg_type
+ * 3-4 version
+ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
+ * 7-8 session_id_length
+ * 9-10 challenge_length
+ * ... ...
+ */
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
+ if (n < 9)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+ * packet bytes. */
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
}
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING) ||
- use_sslv2_strong ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
else
/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
+ const SSL_METHOD *new_method;
+ new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version);
+ if (new_method == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->method = new_method;
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
-
- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
- s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
- else
- s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
s->init_num=0;
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
- s->first_packet=1;
return(SSL_accept(s));
err:
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff