* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
+#endif
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
+ else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return(TLSv1_2_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void)
- {
- static int init=1;
- static SSL_METHOD SSLv23_server_data;
-
- if (init)
- {
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv23_server_data,
- (char *)sslv23_base_method(),sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv23_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl23_accept;
- SSLv23_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl23_get_server_method;
- init=0;
- }
- return(&SSLv23_server_data);
- }
+IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_server_method,
+ ssl23_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl23_get_server_method)
int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long Time=time(NULL);
- void (*cb)()=NULL;
+ unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state;
- RAND_seed(&Time,sizeof(Time));
+ RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
for (;;)
{
}
}
end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
- s->in_handshake--;
return(ret);
}
int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
- char buf_space[11]; /* request this many bytes in initial read */
+ char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
+ * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
+ * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
+ * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
+ * the protocol specification:
+ * Byte Content
+ * 0 type \
+ * 1/2 version > record header
+ * 3/4 length /
+ * 5 msg_type \
+ * 6-8 length > Client Hello message
+ * 9/10 client_version /
+ */
char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
- unsigned char *p,*d,*dd;
+ unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
- int n=0,j,tls1=0;
- int type=0,use_sslv2_strong=0;
+ int n=0,j;
+ int type=0;
int v[2];
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ /* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
+ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
- tls1=1;
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST)
- /* Not only utterly confusing, but broken
- * ('fractured programming'?) -- the details
- * of this block nearly make it work
- * as intended in this environment, but on one
- * of the fine points (w.r.t. restarts) it fails.
- * The obvious fix would be even more devastating
- * to program structure; if you want the functionality,
- * throw this away and implement it in a way
- * that makes sense */
- {
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- SSL_CIPHER *c;
- int ne2,ne3;
-
- j=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
- if (j > (1024*4))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- n=ssl23_read_bytes(s,j+2);
- if (n <= 0) return(n);
- p=s->packet;
-
- if ((buf=Malloc(n)) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(buf,p,n);
-
- p+=5;
- n2s(p,csl);
- p+=4;
-
- sk=ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(
- s,p,csl,NULL);
- if (sk != NULL)
- {
- ne2=ne3=0;
- for (j=0; j<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); j++)
- {
- c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,j);
- if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
- {
- if ((c->id>>24L) == 2L)
- ne2=1;
- else
- ne3=1;
- }
- }
- if (ne2 && !ne3)
- {
- type=1;
- use_sslv2_strong=1;
- goto next_bit;
- }
- }
- }
}
}
else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
(p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
- (p[9] == p[1]))
+ ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
+ || (p[9] >= p[1])))
{
/*
* SSLv3 or tls1 header
*/
- /* we must look at client_version inside the client hello: */
- v[0]=p[9]; v[1]=p[10];
+ v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
+ /* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
+ * to get the correct minor version.
+ * However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
+ * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
+ * to read more records to find out.
+ * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+ * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
+ * attacks. */
+ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+ {
+#if 0
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+#else
+ v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+#endif
+ }
+ /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
+ * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
+ * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
+ * this....
+ */
+ else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ v[1]=0xff;
+ else
+ v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
+ else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
+ s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
- tls1=1;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* client requests SSL 3.0 */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ {
+ s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
+ else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ {
+ /* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
+ * but this will send an appropriate alert */
+ s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+ type=3;
+ }
}
- else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
- type=3;
}
else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
(strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
}
}
-next_bit:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
{
- /* we have a SSLv3/TLSv1 in a SSLv2 header
- * (other cases skip this state)* */
+ /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
+ * (other cases skip this state) */
+
type=2;
p=s->packet;
- v[0] = p[3];
+ v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
+
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
if (j <= 0) return(j);
- ssl3_finish_mac(s,&(s->packet[2]),s->packet_length-2);
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */
p=s->packet;
p+=5;
n2s(p,sil);
n2s(p,cl);
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length)
+ if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) /* We can't have TLS extensions in SSL 2.0 format
+ * Client Hello, can we? Error condition should be
+ * '>' otherweise */
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
- *(d++)=SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR;
- if (tls1)
- *(d++)=TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
- else
- *(d++)=SSL3_VERSION_MINOR;
+ /* record header: msg_type ... */
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
+ /* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
+ d_len = d;
+ d += 3;
+
+ /* client_version */
+ *(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
+ *(d++) = v[1];
/* lets populate the random area */
- /* get the chalenge_length */
+ /* get the challenge_length */
i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
*(d++)=1;
*(d++)=0;
- i=(d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data);
+#if 0
+ /* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
+ p = p+csl+sil+cl;
+ while (p < s->packet+s->packet_length)
+ {
+ *(d++)=*(p++);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
+ l2n3((long)i, d_len);
/* get the data reused from the init_buf */
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
if (type == 1)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+#else
/* we are talking sslv2 */
/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
* sslv2 stuff. */
if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
{
goto err;
}
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING) ||
- use_sslv2_strong)
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
else
+ /* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
+ * (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+#endif
}
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
* for SSLv3 */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
+ if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+ if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+ goto err;
+
s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
-
- if (tls1)
- {
- s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
- s->method=TLSv1_server_method();
- }
+ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
+ else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+ s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
+ else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+ s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
else
- {
- s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
- s->method=SSLv3_server_method();
- }
+ s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
}
s->init_num=0;
- if (buf != buf_space) Free(buf);
- s->first_packet=1;
+ if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(SSL_accept(s));
err:
- if (buf != buf_space) Free(buf);
+ if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(-1);
}
-
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff