Client side compression algorithm sanity checks: ensure old compression
[openssl.git] / ssl / s23_clnt.c
index 78c39d9af558bf1137a52017f33aad913cc4cccc..b2a3eb02fbe302e74304748faf8908f6a235b5c9 100644 (file)
@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_client_method(int ver)
                return(SSLv3_client_method());
        else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
                return(TLSv1_client_method());
+       else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+               return(TLSv1_1_client_method());
        else
                return(NULL);
        }
@@ -250,21 +252,45 @@ end:
        return(ret);
        }
 
+static int ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(SSL *s)
+       {
+       SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+       int i;
+       ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+       for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
+               {
+               cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+               if (cipher->algorithm_ssl == SSL_SSLV2)
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }
 
 static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
        {
        unsigned char *buf;
        unsigned char *p,*d;
-       int i,j,ch_len;
+       int i,ch_len;
        unsigned long Time,l;
        int ssl2_compat;
        int version = 0, version_major, version_minor;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+       int j;
        SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
        int ret;
 
        ssl2_compat = (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) ? 0 : 1;
 
-       if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+       if (ssl2_compat && ssl23_no_ssl2_ciphers(s))
+               ssl2_compat = 0;
+
+       if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+               {
+               version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+               }
+       else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
                {
                version = TLS1_VERSION;
                }
@@ -276,7 +302,7 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
                {
                version = SSL2_VERSION;
                }
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
        if (version != SSL2_VERSION)
                {
                /* have to disable SSL 2.0 compatibility if we need TLS extensions */
@@ -285,12 +311,15 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
                        ssl2_compat = 0;
                if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1)
                        ssl2_compat = 0;
+               if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+                       ssl2_compat = 0;
                
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
                if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0 || s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
                        ssl2_compat = 0;
 #endif
                }
+#endif
 
        buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
        if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
@@ -309,7 +338,12 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
                if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
                        return -1;
 
-               if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+               if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+                       {
+                       version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;
+                       version_minor = TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR;
+                       }
+               else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
                        {
                        version_major = TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR;
                        version_minor = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
@@ -367,6 +401,10 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
                                ch_len=SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
 
                        /* write out sslv2 challenge */
+                       /* Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32),
+                          because it is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32)
+                          or SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the
+                          check in for futurproofing */
                        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
                                i=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
                        else
@@ -543,6 +581,10 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                        ch_len=SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH;
 
                /* write out sslv2 challenge */
+               /* Note that ch_len must be <= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE (32), because
+                  it is one of SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (32) or
+                  SSL2_MAX_CHALLENGE_LENGTH (16), but leave the check in for
+                  futurproofing */
                i=(SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE < ch_len)
                        ?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:ch_len;
                s->s2->challenge_length=i;
@@ -580,7 +622,7 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 #endif
                }
        else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
-                (p[2] == SSL3_VERSION_MINOR || p[2] == TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+                (p[2] >= SSL3_VERSION_MINOR && p[2] <= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
                 ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && p[5] == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
                  (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[3] == 0 && p[4] == 2)))
                {
@@ -598,6 +640,12 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                        s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
                        s->method=TLSv1_client_method();
                        }
+               else if ((p[2] == TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR) &&
+                       !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+                       {
+                       s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
+                       s->method=TLSv1_1_client_method();
+                       }
                else
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
@@ -640,6 +688,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                 * for SSLv3 */
                s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
                s->packet_length=n;
+               if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
+                       if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+                               goto err;
                s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
                memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
                s->s3->rbuf.left=n;