/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include <assert.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "record_locl.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
return 1;
}
-int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int *al)
+int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send)
{
uint32_t max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
/*
* If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
- * session. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early data set in
- * the session and the configured max_early_data.
+ * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
+ * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
*/
- if (!s->server || (s->hit
- && s->session->ext.max_early_data < s->max_early_data))
- max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data;
+ if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
+ && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sess = s->psksession;
+ }
+ if (!s->server
+ || (s->hit && sess->ext.max_early_data < s->max_early_data))
+ max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
if (max_early_data == 0) {
- if (al != NULL)
- *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
+ SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
return 0;
}
max_early_data += overhead;
if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
- if (al != NULL)
- *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
+ SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
return 0;
}
s->early_data_count += length;
/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
{
- int al;
- int enc_err, rret, ret = -1;
+ int enc_err, rret;
int i;
size_t more, n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer),
RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
}
sslv2pkt = pkt;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len)
|| !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
}
/*
* The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
- SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
}
if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return -1;
}
} else {
/* SSLv3+ style record */
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): This callback only provides the "outer" record
- * type to the callback. Somehow we need to pass the "inner"
- * record type
- */
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
}
thisrr->type = type;
thisrr->rec_version = version;
- /* Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field */
+ /*
+ * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field
+ * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the
+ * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3
+ * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for
+ * that explicitly
+ */
if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& version != (unsigned int)s->version) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
&& !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
* shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
* end.
*/
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return -1;
}
/*
* Send back error using their minor version number :-)
*/
s->version = (unsigned short)version;
}
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return -1;
}
if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+ return -1;
} else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
- SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+ return -1;
}
/* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
- SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return -1;
} else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
- SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return -1;
}
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
- && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+ if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
if (thisrr->length >
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
}
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
}
} else {
size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
#endif
if (thisrr->length > len) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
}
}
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
&& ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
+ if (num_recs == 1
+ && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
+ && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ /*
+ * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01
+ */
+ if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty
+ * handshake record
+ */
+ thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
+ > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ thisrr->read = 1;
+ RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
/*
* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
* the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
unsigned char *mac;
/* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- if (imac_size < 0 || imac_size > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ return -1;
}
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
thisrr = &rr[j];
if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return -1;
}
thisrr->length -= mac_size;
mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
+ return -1;
}
}
}
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
if (enc_err == 0) {
+ if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already got called */
+ return -1;
+ }
if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
/*
* Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as
thisrr = &rr[0];
if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length,
- EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
- goto f_err;
+ EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
thisrr->length = 0;
thisrr->read = 1;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
return 1;
}
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ return -1;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length);
+ printf("dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length);
{
size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++)
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
thisrr = &rr[j];
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return -1;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
* contents of the padding bytes.
*/
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size);
+ if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
thisrr->length -= mac_size;
} else {
/*
}
if (enc_err < 0) {
+ if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ /* We already called SSLfatal() */
+ return -1;
+ }
if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
/*
* We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an
* so we use the previously saved value
*/
if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len,
- EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
- goto f_err;
+ EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
thisrr = &rr[0];
thisrr->length = 0;
* not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
* visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
*/
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
- SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ return -1;
}
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
/* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL) {
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ return -1;
}
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
size_t end;
- if (thisrr->length == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ if (thisrr->length == 0
+ || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+ return -1;
}
/* Strip trailing padding */
if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+ return -1;
}
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
+ &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in
+ * length.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
+ || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+ && thisrr->length == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return -1;
}
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */
+ if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
+ && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return -1;
}
thisrr->off = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
> MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
}
} else {
RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) {
thisrr = &rr[0];
if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
- && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, &al))
- goto f_err;
+ && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ return -1;
+ }
}
RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
return 1;
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return ret;
}
int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
(int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD),
wr->input, (int)wr->length);
if (i < 0)
- return (0);
+ return 0;
else
wr->length = i;
wr->input = wr->data;
#endif
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
/*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Will call
+ * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
* occurred.
*/
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send)
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
*/
if (n_recs != 1)
return 0;
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
enc = NULL;
/* COMPRESS */
- if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
i = bs - (l % bs);
/* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
}
- if (!send) {
+ if (!sending) {
if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
return 0;
/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
/* TODO(size_t): convert me */
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- if (imac_size < 0)
+ if (imac_size < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
+ }
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
}
- if ((bs != 1) && !send)
+ if ((bs != 1) && !sending)
return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size);
}
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
#define MAX_PADDING 256
/*-
- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
+ * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for
+ * internal errors, but not otherwise.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send)
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
int imac_size;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
- if (n_recs == 0)
+ if (n_recs == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
+ }
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
* we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
* happen?? (steve)
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
- } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ } else if (ssl_randbytes(s, recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
}
} else {
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
}
ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
* We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
* cipher doesn't support pipelining
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
unsigned char *seq;
- seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+ seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
: RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* DTLS does not support pipelining */
unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
- s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
+ s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
- if (pad <= 0)
+ if (pad <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
+ }
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
reclen[ctr] += pad;
recs[ctr].length += pad;
}
- } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
+ } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
- if (padnum > MAX_PADDING)
+ if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
+ }
/* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
recs[ctr].length += padnum;
}
- if (!send) {
+ if (!sending) {
if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0)
return 0;
}
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
(int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
}
/* Set the input buffers */
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
(int)n_recs, data) <= 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
(int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
? (tmpr < 0)
: (tmpr == 0))
return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
- if (send == 0) {
+
+ if (sending == 0) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
ret = 1;
if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- if (imac_size < 0)
+ if (imac_size < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
+ }
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
}
- if ((bs != 1) && !send) {
+ if ((bs != 1) && !sending) {
int tmpret;
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size);
ret, -1);
}
}
- if (pad && !send) {
+ if (pad && !sending) {
for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
recs[ctr].length -= pad;
}
return ret;
}
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
{
unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
size_t npad;
int t;
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->write_hash;
md_size = t;
npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
- if (!send &&
+ if (!sending &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
/*
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
{
unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char header[13];
- int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
+ int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
: (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
int t;
- if (send) {
+ if (sending) {
seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
hash = ssl->write_hash;
} else {
}
t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
+ return 0;
md_size = t;
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
mac_ctx = hash;
} else {
hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash))
+ if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
return 0;
+ }
mac_ctx = hmac;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
- s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
+ s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
- if (!send && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
+ if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
/*
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
- return -1;
+ return 0;
}
} else {
/* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
*/
#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size)
{
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
size_t i, j;
size_t rotate_offset;
- OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size
+ && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
+ return 0;
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
}
#endif
+
+ return 1;
}
int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
- int i, al;
+ int i;
int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
/* check is not needed I believe */
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
unsigned char *mac;
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return 0;
}
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = rr->data + rr->length;
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
- goto f_err;
+ return 0;
}
}
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
if (enc_err == 0) {
+ if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() got called */
+ return 0;
+ }
/* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
- goto err;
+ return 0;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length);
/* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */
imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if (imac_size < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ return 0;
}
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
/*
* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return 0;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
* contents of the padding bytes.
*/
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
rr->length -= mac_size;
} else {
/*
/* decryption failed, silently discard message */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
- goto err;
+ return 0;
}
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL) {
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ return 0;
}
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto f_err;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
}
rr->off = 0;
/* Mark receipt of record. */
dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
- return (1);
-
- f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- return (0);
+ return 1;
}
/*
- * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
- * processed
+ * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
*/
#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
* This is a non-blocking operation.
*/
- if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
+ if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
+ }
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
- if (rret <= 0)
+ if (rret <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
+ }
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
n2s(p, rr->length);
- /* Lets check version */
- if (!s->first_packet) {
+ /*
+ * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
+ * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
+ */
+ if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
if (version != s->version) {
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
goto again;
}
+ /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */
+ if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
+ && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) {
+ /* record too long, silently discard it */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+ goto again;
+ }
+
/* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (rret <= 0 || n != more) {
+ if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */
+ return -1;
+ }
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
*/
if (is_next_epoch) {
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
- if (dtls1_buffer_record
- (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
- rr->seq_num) < 0)
+ if (dtls1_buffer_record (s,
+ &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
+ rr->seq_num) < 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
+ }
}
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
+ if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
+ /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */
+ return -1;
+ }
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff