-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
/*
* Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
*/
-void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
+void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
{
unsigned char *comp;
- unsigned int i;
+ size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
comp = r[i].comp;
}
}
-void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
+void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
{
- unsigned int i;
+ size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp);
}
}
-int SSL3_RECORD_setup(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
-{
- unsigned int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
- if (r[i].comp == NULL)
- r[i].comp = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
- if (r[i].comp == NULL) {
- if (i > 0)
- SSL3_RECORD_release(r, i);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
{
memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
}
-
/*
* Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
* for us in the buffer.
*/
-static int have_whole_app_data_record_waiting(SSL *s)
+static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
{
SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
- int left, len;
+ size_t left, len;
unsigned char *p;
rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
- int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
+ int enc_err, rret, ret = -1;
+ int i;
+ size_t more, n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
- unsigned mac_size;
- unsigned empty_record_count = 0, curr_empty = 0;
- unsigned int num_recs = 0;
- unsigned int max_recs;
- unsigned int j;
+ size_t mac_size;
+ int imac_size;
+ size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
max_recs = 1;
sess = s->session;
- again:
do {
/* check if we have the header */
if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0);
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0,
+ num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n);
+ if (rret <= 0)
+ return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
/*
- * Check whether this is a regular record or an SSLv2 style record.
- * The latter is only used in an initial ClientHello for old
- * clients. We check s->read_hash and s->enc_read_ctx to ensure this
- * does not apply during renegotiation
+ * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
*/
- if (s->first_packet && s->server && !s->read_hash
- && !s->enc_read_ctx
- && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
- /* SSLv2 style record */
+ if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)
+ && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+ /*
+ * SSLv2 style record
+ *
+ * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
+ * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
+ * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
+ * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
+ * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
+ */
rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
- if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&rbuf[num_recs])
- - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
+ - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
* shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
* end.
*/
- goto err;
+ goto err;
}
/*
* Send back error using their minor version number :-)
}
if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- if (s->first_packet) {
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) {
/* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
* that we have. */
p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
+
+ /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
}
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- goto err;
}
if (rr[num_recs].length >
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
* record
*/
if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- i = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ more = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
- i = rr[num_recs].length;
+ more = rr[num_recs].length;
}
- if (i > 0) {
+ if (more > 0) {
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0);
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n);
+ if (rret <= 0)
+ return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */
}
/* set state for later operations */
* or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
*/
- if(rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
rr[num_recs].input =
&(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
} else {
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input;
rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length;
+
+ /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
+ rr[num_recs].read = 0;
+
num_recs++;
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
- } while (num_recs < max_recs && rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
+ } while (num_recs < max_recs
+ && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
&& s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
&& (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
- && have_whole_app_data_record_waiting(s));
-
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+ && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
/*
* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
*/
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
unsigned char *mac;
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */
+ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (imac_size < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
if (rr[j].length < mac_size) {
rr[j].length -= mac_size;
mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length;
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+ if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+ printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr->length);
{
- unsigned int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- for (j=0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
/*
* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
}
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+ if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr[j].length == 0) {
- curr_empty++;
- empty_record_count++;
- if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+ RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
+ > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
+ } else {
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
}
}
- if (curr_empty == num_recs) {
- /* We have no data - do it all again */
- num_recs = 0;
- curr_empty = 0;
- goto again;
- }
RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
return 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
+ if (rr->comp == NULL) {
+ rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+ }
+ if (rr->comp == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
- (int)rr->length);
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length);
if (i < 0)
- return (0);
+ return 0;
else
rr->length = i;
rr->data = rr->comp;
#endif
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int i;
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
wr->input, (int)wr->length);
}
/*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
* occurred.
*/
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int numpipes, int send)
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- unsigned long l;
- int bs, i, mac_size = 0;
+ size_t l, i;
+ size_t bs, mac_size = 0;
+ int imac_size;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
rec = inrecs;
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
+ */
+ if (n_recs != 1)
+ return 0;
if (send) {
ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
rec->input = rec->data;
} else {
l = rec->length;
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds);
/* COMPRESS */
if ((bs != 1) && send) {
- i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
+ i = bs - (l % bs);
/* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
l += i;
*/
memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
rec->length += i;
- rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1);
+ rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
}
if (!send) {
/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
}
- if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1)
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
+ if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1)
return -1;
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
+ /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
+ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (imac_size < 0)
+ return -1;
+ mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
+ }
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size);
}
return (1);
}
+#define MAX_PADDING 256
/*-
- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
*
* Returns:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
* -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
* an internal error occurred.
*/
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int numpipes, int send)
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
- int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
+ int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr;
+ size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop;
+ unsigned char padval;
+ int imac_size;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
- unsigned int ctr;
if (send) {
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
else
ivlen = 0;
if (ivlen > 1) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
/*
* we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
}
if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
}
} else {
bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds));
- if (numpipes > 1) {
- if(!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) {
+ if (n_recs > 1) {
+ if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) {
/*
* We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
* cipher doesn't support pipelining
return -1;
}
}
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
unsigned char *seq;
seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
- buf[ctr][11] = recs[ctr].length >> 8;
- buf[ctr][12] = recs[ctr].length & 0xff;
+ buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
+ buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
if (pad <= 0)
}
} else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
- i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs);
+ padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
/* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
- /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
- j = i - 1;
- for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++)
- recs[ctr].input[k] = j;
- reclen[ctr] += i;
- recs[ctr].length += i;
+ if (padnum > MAX_PADDING)
+ return -1;
+ /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
+ padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
+ for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
+ recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
+ reclen[ctr] += padnum;
+ recs[ctr].length += padnum;
}
if (!send) {
return 0;
}
}
- if (numpipes > 1) {
+ if (n_recs > 1) {
unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
/* Set the output buffers */
- for(ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
- numpipes, data) <= 0) {
+ (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
}
/* Set the input buffers */
- for(ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
- numpipes, data) <= 0
+ (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
- numpipes, reclen) <= 0) {
+ (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
}
- i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]);
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
+ tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
+ (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
- ? (i < 0)
- : (i == 0))
+ & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+ ? (tmpr < 0)
+ : (tmpr == 0))
return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
if (send == 0) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
}
} else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
}
ret = 1;
- if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
+ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (imac_size < 0)
+ return -1;
+ mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
+ }
if ((bs != 1) && !send) {
int tmpret;
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size);
- if (tmpret == -1)
- return -1;
- ret &= tmpret;
+ /*
+ * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can
+ * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant
+ * time behaviour.
+ */
+ if (tmpret == 0)
+ return 0;
+ ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1),
+ ret, -1);
}
}
if (pad && !send) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < numpipes; ctr++) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
recs[ctr].length -= pad;
}
}
const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
unsigned char *p, rec_char;
size_t md_size;
- int npad;
+ size_t npad;
int t;
if (send) {
t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
if (t < 0)
- return -1;
+ return 0;
md_size = t;
npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
* total size.
*/
unsigned char header[75];
- unsigned j = 0;
+ size_t j = 0;
memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
j += md_size;
memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
j += 8;
header[j++] = rec->type;
- header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
- header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+ header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+ header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
/* Final param == is SSLv3 */
if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
header, rec->input,
rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
- return -1;
+ return 0;
} else {
unsigned int md_size_u;
/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL)
- return -1;
+ return 0;
rec_char = rec->type;
p = md;
s2n(rec->length, p);
if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx);
- return -1;
+ return 0;
}
- md_size = md_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
}
ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
- return (md_size);
+ return 1;
}
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send)
mac_ctx = hash;
} else {
hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (hmac == NULL
- || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash))
- return -1;
+ if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash))
+ return 0;
mac_ctx = hmac;
}
header[8] = rec->type;
header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
- header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
- header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
+ header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+ header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
return -1;
}
} else {
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+ || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
- return -1;
+ return 0;
}
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
- tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
- mac_ctx, rec->input,
- rec->length, rec->orig_len);
+ if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+ mac_ctx, rec->input,
+ rec->length, rec->orig_len)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
}
fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
{
- unsigned int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
- return (md_size);
+ return 1;
}
/*-
* -1: otherwise.
*/
int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+ size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
{
- unsigned padding_length, good;
- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+ size_t padding_length;
+ size_t good;
+ const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
/*
* These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
return 0;
padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
- good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
+ good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
/* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
- good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1);
+ good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1);
rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
- return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+ return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1);
}
/*-
*/
int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
SSL3_RECORD *rec,
- unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+ size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
{
- unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
- const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
+ size_t good;
+ size_t padding_length, to_check, i;
+ const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size;
/* Check if version requires explicit IV */
if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
/*
padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
- if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) &
+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
/* padding is already verified */
rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
return 1;
}
- good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
+ good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
/*
* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
* then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length
* maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record
* is public information so we can use it.)
*/
- to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */
- if (to_check > rec->length - 1)
- to_check = rec->length - 1;
+ to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */
+ if (to_check > rec->length)
+ to_check = rec->length;
for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
- unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
+ unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i);
unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];
/*
* The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
* If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one
* or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
*/
- good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
+ good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff);
rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
- return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+ return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1);
}
/*-
#define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
- const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size)
+ const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size)
{
#if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
/*
* mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
*/
- unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
- unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+ size_t mac_end = rec->length;
+ size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
/*
* scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
* MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
*/
- unsigned scan_start = 0;
- unsigned i, j;
- unsigned div_spoiler;
- unsigned rotate_offset;
+ size_t scan_start = 0;
+ size_t i, j;
+ size_t div_spoiler;
+ size_t rotate_offset;
OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) {
- unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
- unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
+ unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8_s(i, mac_start);
+ unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8_s(i, mac_end);
unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
- j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
+ j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size);
}
/* Now rotate the MAC */
/* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32];
out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+ rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
}
#else
memset(out, 0, md_size);
rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+ rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
- out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+ out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset);
rotate_offset++;
- rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+ rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
}
#endif
}
-int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
{
int i, al;
int enc_err;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- unsigned int mac_size;
+ int imac_size;
+ size_t mac_size;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rr->data = rr->input;
rr->orig_len = rr->length;
+ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
+ unsigned char *mac;
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = rr->data + rr->length;
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+ printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length);
{
- unsigned int z;
+ size_t z;
for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
#endif
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
- if ((sess != NULL) &&
+ if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+
+ /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */
+ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ if (imac_size < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
/*
}
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
- || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
enc_err = -1;
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+
+ /* Mark receipt of record. */
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+
return (1);
f_err:
return (0);
}
-
/*
* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
* processed
int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
- int i, n;
+ int rret;
+ size_t more, n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+ again:
/*
* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
* This is a non-blocking operation.
*/
- if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
+ if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
return -1;
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
- again:
+
/* check if we have the header */
if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1);
+ rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
- if (n <= 0)
- return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ if (rret <= 0)
+ return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
- if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
if (rr->length >
RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
- i = rr->length;
- n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1);
+ more = rr->length;
+ rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
- if (n != i) {
+ if (rret <= 0 || n != more) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if (bitmap == NULL) {
rr->length = 0;
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
+ /*
+ * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where
+ * we have no integrity negotiated yet?
+ */
if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
if (dtls1_buffer_record
(s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
- rr->seq_num) < 0)
+ rr->seq_num) < 0)
return -1;
- /* Mark receipt of record. */
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
}
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
- if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
+ if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
rr->length = 0;
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
return (1);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff