Fix typos in files in ssl directory
[openssl.git] / ssl / record / ssl3_record.c
index 7383f13..bd27290 100644 (file)
-/* ssl/record/ssl3_record.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
@@ -135,33 +33,105 @@ static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
 /*
  * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
  */
-void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r)
+void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
 {
-    unsigned char *comp = r->comp;
+    unsigned char *comp;
+    size_t i;
 
-    memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
-    r->comp = comp;
+    for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
+        comp = r[i].comp;
+
+        memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
+        r[i].comp = comp;
+    }
 }
 
-void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r)
+void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
 {
-    OPENSSL_free(r->comp);
-    r->comp = NULL;
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
+        OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp);
+        r[i].comp = NULL;
+    }
 }
 
-int SSL3_RECORD_setup(SSL3_RECORD *r)
+void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
 {
-    if (r->comp == NULL)
-        r->comp = (unsigned char *)
-            OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
-    if (r->comp == NULL)
+    memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
+ * for us in the buffer.
+ */
+static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
+    size_t left, len;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+    p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf);
+    if (p == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
+
+    if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+        return 0;
+
+    p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf);
+
+    /*
+     * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version
+     * etc later
+     */
+    if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+        return 0;
+
+    p += 3;
+    n2s(p, len);
+
+    if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len)
         return 0;
+
     return 1;
 }
 
-void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
+int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int *al)
 {
-    memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
+    uint32_t max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
+
+    /*
+     * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
+     * session. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early data set in
+     * the session and the configured max_early_data.
+     */
+    if (!s->server || (s->hit
+                       && s->session->ext.max_early_data < s->max_early_data))
+        max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data;
+
+    if (max_early_data == 0) {
+        if (al != NULL)
+            *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
+    max_early_data += overhead;
+
+    if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
+        if (al != NULL)
+            *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    s->early_data_count += length;
+
+    return 1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -174,232 +144,362 @@ void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
 
 #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH   2
 /*-
- * Call this to get a new input record.
+ * Call this to get new input records.
  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
  * or non-blocking IO.
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i':
+ * rr[i].type    - is the type of record
+ * rr[i].data,   - data
+ * rr[i].length, - number of bytes
+ * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all
+ * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <=
+ * |max_pipelines|
  */
 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
 int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 {
-    int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
-    int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
-    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+    int al;
+    int enc_err, rret, ret = -1;
+    int i;
+    size_t more, n;
+    SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
+    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
     SSL_SESSION *sess;
     unsigned char *p;
     unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-    short version;
-    unsigned mac_size;
-    size_t extra;
-    unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
+    unsigned int version;
+    size_t mac_size;
+    int imac_size;
+    size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
+    PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
+    size_t first_rec_len;
 
     rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+    rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+    max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
+    if (max_recs == 0)
+        max_recs = 1;
     sess = s->session;
 
-    if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
-        extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
-    else
-        extra = 0;
-    if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
-        /*
-         * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
-         * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
-         */
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
- again:
-    /* check if we have the header */
-    if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
-        (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
-        n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
-            SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0);
-        if (n <= 0)
-            return (n);         /* error or non-blocking */
-        RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
-
-        p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
-
-        /*
-         * Check whether this is a regular record or an SSLv2 style record. The
-         * latter is only used in an initial ClientHello for old clients. We
-         * check s->read_hash and s->enc_read_ctx to ensure this does not apply
-         * during renegotiation
-         */
-        if (s->first_packet && s->server && !s->read_hash && !s->enc_read_ctx
-                && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
-            /* SSLv2 style record */
-            rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
-            rr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
-
-            rr->length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
-
-            if (rr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf)
-                                    - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
-                al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+    do {
+        thisrr = &rr[num_recs];
+
+        /* check if we have the header */
+        if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+            (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
+             < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+            size_t sslv2len;
+            unsigned int type;
+
+            rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                               SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0,
+                               num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n);
+            if (rret <= 0)
+                return rret;     /* error or non-blocking */
+            RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
+
+            p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+            if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer),
+                                 RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 goto f_err;
             }
-
-            if (rr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
-                al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            sslv2pkt = pkt;
+            if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len)
+                    || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                 goto f_err;
             }
-        } else {
-            /* SSLv3+ style record */
-            if (s->msg_callback)
-                s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
-                                s->msg_callback_arg);
-
-            /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
-            rr->type = *(p++);
-            ssl_major = *(p++);
-            ssl_minor = *(p++);
-            version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
-            rr->rec_version = version;
-            n2s(p, rr->length);
-
-            /* Lets check version */
-            if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
-                    && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
-                    if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+            /*
+             * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
+             */
+            if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)
+                    && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0
+                    && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
+                /*
+                 *  SSLv2 style record
+                 *
+                 * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
+                 * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
+                 * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
+                 * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
+                 * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
+                 */
+                thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+                thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
+
+                thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;
+
+                if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
+                    - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+
+                if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* SSLv3+ style record */
+                if (s->msg_callback)
+                    s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
+                                    s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+                /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+                if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
+                        || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
+                        || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                thisrr->type = type;
+                thisrr->rec_version = version;
+
+                /* Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field */
+                if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+                        && version != (unsigned int)s->version) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                    if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
+                        && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
+                        if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+                            /*
+                             * The record is using an incorrect version number,
+                             * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
+                             * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a
+                             * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably
+                             * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
+                             * end.
+                             */
+                            goto err;
+                        }
                         /*
-                         * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
-                         * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
-                         * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
-                         * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
-                         * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
+                         * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
                          */
-                         goto err;
+                        s->version = (unsigned short)version;
                     }
-                    /*
-                     * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
-                     */
-                    s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+                    al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+
+                if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+                    if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+                        /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
+                         * that we have. */
+                        p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
+                        if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
+                            strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
+                            strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
+                            strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
+                            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
+                            goto err;
+                        } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
+                            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                                   SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
+                            goto err;
+                        }
+
+                        /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                               SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                        goto err;
+                    } else {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                               SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                        al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+                        goto f_err;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
+                        && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+                    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+
+                if (thisrr->length >
+                    SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                    goto f_err;
                 }
-                al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-                goto f_err;
             }
 
-            if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                goto err;
+            /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+        }
+
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+            if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+                al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                goto f_err;
             }
+        } else {
+            size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+            /*
+             * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+             * does not include the compression overhead anyway.
+             */
+            if (s->expand == NULL)
+                len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
+#endif
 
-            if (rr->length >
-                    SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf)
-                    - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+            if (thisrr->length > len) {
                 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                 goto f_err;
             }
         }
 
-        /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
-    }
+        /*
+         * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
+         * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
+         * record
+         */
+        if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+            more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+                - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+        } else {
+            more = thisrr->length;
+        }
+        if (more > 0) {
+            /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
 
-    /*
-     * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
-     * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the record
-     */
-    if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
-        i = rr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
-    } else {
-        i = rr->length;
-    }
-    if (i > 0) {
-        /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+            rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n);
+            if (rret <= 0)
+                return rret;     /* error or non-blocking io */
+        }
 
-        n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
-        if (n <= 0)
-            return (n);         /* error or non-blocking io */
-    }
+        /* set state for later operations */
+        RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
 
-    /* set state for later operations */
-    RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
+        /*
+         * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+         * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+         * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+         */
+        if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+            thisrr->input =
+                &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+        } else {
+            thisrr->input =
+                &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+        }
 
-    /*
-     * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length,
-     * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
-     * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
-     */
-    if(rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
-        rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-    } else {
-        rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
-    }
+        /*
+         * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input
+         * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into
+         * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When
+         * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will
+         * be pointed at the new buffer
+         */
 
-    /*
-     * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
-     * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
-     * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
-     * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
-     */
+        /*
+         * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
+         * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+         */
 
-    /*
-     * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
-     * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
-     */
+        /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */
+        thisrr->data = thisrr->input;
+        thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length;
 
-    /* check is not needed I believe */
-    if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
-        al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-        goto f_err;
-    }
+        /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
+        thisrr->read = 0;
+
+        num_recs++;
+
+        /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+        RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
+    } while (num_recs < max_recs
+             && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+             && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+             && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
+             && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
+                 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
+             && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
 
-    /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
-    rr->data = rr->input;
-    rr->orig_len = rr->length;
     /*
      * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
      * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
      */
-    if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
+    if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
         unsigned char *mac;
-        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
-        if (rr->length < mac_size) {
-            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-            goto f_err;
+        /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */
+        imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+                goto f_err;
         }
-        rr->length -= mac_size;
-        mac = rr->data + rr->length;
-        i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
-        if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
-            al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
-                   SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
-            goto f_err;
+        mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
+        for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+            thisrr = &rr[j];
+
+            if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            thisrr->length -= mac_size;
+            mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
+            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+            if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
+                al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+                       SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
         }
     }
 
-    enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+    first_rec_len = rr[0].length;
+
+    enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0);
+
     /*-
      * enc_err is:
-     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid.
      *    1: if the padding is valid
      *    -1: if the padding is invalid
      */
     if (enc_err == 0) {
+        if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
+            /*
+             * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as
+             * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record.
+             */
+
+            thisrr = &rr[0];
+
+            if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length,
+                                     EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
+                goto f_err;
+
+            thisrr->length = 0;
+            thisrr->read = 1;
+            RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+            return 1;
+        }
         al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
         goto f_err;
     }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length);
     {
-        unsigned int z;
-        for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
-            printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+        size_t z;
+        for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++)
+            printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
     }
     printf("\n");
 #endif
@@ -407,57 +507,90 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
     /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
     if ((sess != NULL) &&
         (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
-        (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) {
+        (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
         /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
         unsigned char *mac = NULL;
         unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 
-        /*
-         * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
-         * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
-         * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
-         * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
-         */
-        if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
-            /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
-            (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
-             rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
-            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             goto f_err;
         }
 
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+        for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+            thisrr = &rr[j];
             /*
-             * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
-             * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
-             * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
-             * contents of the padding bytes.
+             * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+             * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+             * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+             * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
              */
-            mac = mac_tmp;
-            ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
-            rr->length -= mac_size;
-        } else {
-            /*
-             * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
-             * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
-             * |mac_size| above.
-             */
-            rr->length -= mac_size;
-            mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
-        }
+            if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+                /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+                (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                 thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
 
-        i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
-        if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
-            || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
-            enc_err = -1;
-        if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
-            enc_err = -1;
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+                /*
+                 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+                 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+                 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+                 * contents of the padding bytes.
+                 */
+                mac = mac_tmp;
+                if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) {
+                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    goto f_err;
+                }
+                thisrr->length -= mac_size;
+            } else {
+                /*
+                 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+                 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+                 * |mac_size| above.
+                 */
+                thisrr->length -= mac_size;
+                mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length];
+            }
+
+            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+            if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
+                || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+                enc_err = -1;
+            if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
+                enc_err = -1;
+        }
     }
 
     if (enc_err < 0) {
+        if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
+            /*
+             * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an
+             * empty record
+             */
+
+            /*
+             * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above
+             * so we use the previously saved value
+             */
+            if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len,
+                                     EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
+                goto f_err;
+
+            thisrr = &rr[0];
+            thisrr->length = 0;
+            thisrr->read = 1;
+            RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+            return 1;
+        }
         /*
          * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
          * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
@@ -471,86 +604,142 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
         goto f_err;
     }
 
-    /* r->length is now just compressed */
-    if (s->expand != NULL) {
-        if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
-            al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-            goto f_err;
-        }
-        if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
-            al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
-            goto f_err;
+    for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+        thisrr = &rr[j];
+
+        /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
+        if (s->expand != NULL) {
+            if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
+                al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
         }
-    }
 
-    if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
-        al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-        goto f_err;
-    }
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+            size_t end;
 
-    rr->off = 0;
-    /*-
-     * So at this point the following is true
-     * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
-     * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
-     * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
-     * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
-     *                         after use :-).
-     */
+            if (thisrr->length == 0
+                    || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
 
-    /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
-    RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+            /* Strip trailing padding */
+            for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
+                 end--)
+                continue;
+
+            thisrr->length = end;
+            thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
+            if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+                    && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
+                    && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            if (s->msg_callback)
+                s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
+                                &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+        }
 
-    /* just read a 0 length packet */
-    if (rr->length == 0) {
-        empty_record_count++;
-        if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+        /*
+         * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in
+         * length.
+         */
+        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+                && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
+                    || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+                && thisrr->length == 0) {
             al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
             goto f_err;
         }
-        goto again;
+
+        if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+            al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+
+        thisrr->off = 0;
+        /*-
+         * So at this point the following is true
+         * thisrr->type   is the type of record
+         * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record
+         * thisrr->off    == offset to first valid byte
+         * thisrr->data   == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
+         */
+
+        /* just read a 0 length packet */
+        if (thisrr->length == 0) {
+            RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
+            if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
+                > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
+        }
     }
 
-    return (1);
+    if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) {
+        thisrr = &rr[0];
+        if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+                && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, &al))
+            goto f_err;
+    }
+
+    RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
+    return 1;
 
  f_err:
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
  err:
-    return (ret);
+    return ret;
 }
 
-int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
 {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
     int i;
-    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 
-    rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+    if (rr->comp == NULL) {
+        rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
+            OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
+    }
+    if (rr->comp == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
     i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
-                          SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
-                          (int)rr->length);
+                          SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length);
     if (i < 0)
-        return (0);
+        return 0;
     else
         rr->length = i;
     rr->data = rr->comp;
 #endif
-    return (1);
+    return 1;
 }
 
-int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
 {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
     int i;
-    SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 
-    wr = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+    /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
     i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
-                            SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+                            (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD),
                             wr->input, (int)wr->length);
     if (i < 0)
         return (0);
@@ -563,7 +752,7 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
 }
 
 /*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|
  *
  * Returns:
  *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
@@ -572,24 +761,29 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
  *   -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error
  *       occurred.
  */
-int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
 {
     SSL3_RECORD *rec;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-    unsigned long l;
-    int bs, i, mac_size = 0;
+    size_t l, i;
+    size_t bs, mac_size = 0;
+    int imac_size;
     const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
-    if (send) {
+    rec = inrecs;
+    /*
+     * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
+     */
+    if (n_recs != 1)
+        return 0;
+    if (sending) {
         ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer);
         if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
             enc = NULL;
         else
             enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
     } else {
         ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
         if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
             enc = NULL;
         else
@@ -601,12 +795,13 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         rec->input = rec->data;
     } else {
         l = rec->length;
-        bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+        /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
+        bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds);
 
         /* COMPRESS */
 
-        if ((bs != 1) && send) {
-            i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
+        if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
+            i = bs - (l % bs);
 
             /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
             l += i;
@@ -616,28 +811,35 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
              */
             memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
             rec->length += i;
-            rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1);
+            rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
         }
 
-        if (!send) {
+        if (!sending) {
             if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
                 return 0;
             /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
         }
 
-        if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1)
+        /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
+        if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1)
             return -1;
 
-        if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-            mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-        if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-            return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
+            /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
+            imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+            if (imac_size < 0)
+                return -1;
+            mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
+        }
+        if ((bs != 1) && !sending)
+            return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size);
     }
     return (1);
 }
 
+#define MAX_PADDING 256
 /*-
- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|.
  *
  * Returns:
  *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
@@ -646,21 +848,29 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
  *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
  *       an internal error occurred.
  */
-int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
+int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending)
 {
-    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
-    unsigned long l;
-    int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0;
+    size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+    unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
+    int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr;
+    size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop;
+    unsigned char padval;
+    int imac_size;
     const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
-    if (send) {
+    if (n_recs == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (sending) {
         if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) {
             int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
-            OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+            if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return -1;
+            }
         }
         ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer);
         if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
             enc = NULL;
         else {
@@ -673,25 +883,30 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
             else
                 ivlen = 0;
             if (ivlen > 1) {
-                if (rec->data != rec->input)
-                    /*
-                     * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
-                     * happen?? (steve)
-                     */
-                    fprintf(stderr,
-                            "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
-                            __FILE__, __LINE__);
-                else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
-                    return -1;
+                for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                    if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
+                        /*
+                         * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+                         * happen?? (steve)
+                         */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        return -1;
+                    } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                        return -1;
+                    }
+                }
             }
         }
     } else {
         if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) {
             int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-            OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+            if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return -1;
+            }
         }
         ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
         if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
             enc = NULL;
         else
@@ -699,112 +914,180 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
     }
 
     if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
-        memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
-        rec->input = rec->data;
+        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+            memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
+            recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
+        }
         ret = 1;
     } else {
-        l = rec->length;
-        bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
+        bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds));
+
+        if (n_recs > 1) {
+            if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) {
+                /*
+                 * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
+                 * cipher doesn't support pipelining
+                 */
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
+        }
+        for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+            reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
+
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+                & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+                unsigned char *seq;
+
+                seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
+                    : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+                if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+                    /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
+                    unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+
+                    s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
+                        DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
+                    memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
+                    memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
+                } else {
+                    memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
+                    for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
+                        ++seq[i];
+                        if (seq[i] != 0)
+                            break;
+                    }
+                }
 
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
-            unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq;
+                buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
+                buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
+                buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
+                buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
+                buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
+                pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
+                                          EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
+                if (pad <= 0)
+                    return -1;
 
-            seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
-                : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+                if (sending) {
+                    reclen[ctr] += pad;
+                    recs[ctr].length += pad;
+                }
 
-            if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-                unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
+            } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) {
+                padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
 
-                s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
-                    DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
-                memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
-                memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8);
-            } else {
-                memcpy(buf, seq, 8);
-                for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
-                    ++seq[i];
-                    if (seq[i] != 0)
-                        break;
-                }
-            }
+                /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
 
-            buf[8] = rec->type;
-            buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
-            buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
-            buf[11] = rec->length >> 8;
-            buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff;
-            pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
-                                      EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf);
-            if (pad <= 0)
-                return -1;
-            if (send) {
-                l += pad;
-                rec->length += pad;
+                if (padnum > MAX_PADDING)
+                    return -1;
+                /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
+                padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
+                for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
+                    recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
+                reclen[ctr] += padnum;
+                recs[ctr].length += padnum;
             }
-        } else if ((bs != 1) && send) {
-            i = bs - ((int)l % bs);
-
-            /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
 
-            /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
-            j = i - 1;
-            for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
-                rec->input[k] = j;
-            l += i;
-            rec->length += i;
+            if (!sending) {
+                if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0)
+                    return 0;
+            }
         }
+        if (n_recs > 1) {
+            unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
 
-        if (!send) {
-            if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0)
-                return 0;
+            /* Set the output buffers */
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
+            }
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
+                                    (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+            }
+            /* Set the input buffers */
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
+            }
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
+                                    (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
+                || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
+                                       (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
+                return -1;
+            }
         }
 
-        i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l);
-        if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
-            ? (i < 0)
-            : (i == 0))
+        /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
+        tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
+                          (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
+        if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds))
+             & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+            ? (tmpr < 0)
+            : (tmpr == 0))
             return -1;          /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-        if (send == 0) {
+        if (sending == 0) {
             if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
-                rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                }
             } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
-                rec->data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                rec->input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-                rec->length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                    recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                    recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                }
             }
         }
 
         ret = 1;
-        if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
-            mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-        if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-            ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
-        if (pad && !send)
-            rec->length -= pad;
+        if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) {
+            imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+            if (imac_size < 0)
+                return -1;
+            mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
+        }
+        if ((bs != 1) && !sending) {
+            int tmpret;
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size);
+                /*
+                 * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can
+                 * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant
+                 * time behaviour.
+                 */
+                if (tmpret == 0)
+                    return 0;
+                ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1),
+                                               ret, -1);
+            }
+        }
+        if (pad && !sending) {
+            for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+                recs[ctr].length -= pad;
+            }
+        }
     }
     return ret;
 }
 
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
 {
-    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
     unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
-    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
     const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
     unsigned char *p, rec_char;
     size_t md_size;
-    int npad;
+    size_t npad;
     int t;
 
-    if (send) {
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+    if (sending) {
         mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
         seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
         hash = ssl->write_hash;
     } else {
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
         mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
         seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
         hash = ssl->read_hash;
@@ -812,11 +1095,11 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 
     t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
     if (t < 0)
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     md_size = t;
     npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
 
-    if (!send &&
+    if (!sending &&
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
         ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
         /*
@@ -834,7 +1117,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
          * total size.
          */
         unsigned char header[75];
-        unsigned j = 0;
+        size_t j = 0;
         memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
         j += md_size;
         memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
@@ -842,86 +1125,90 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
         j += 8;
         header[j++] = rec->type;
-        header[j++] = rec->length >> 8;
-        header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff;
+        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
 
         /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
-        ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
-                               md, &md_size,
-                               header, rec->input,
-                               rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
-                               mac_sec, md_size, 1);
+        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash,
+                                   md, &md_size,
+                                   header, rec->input,
+                                   rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+                                   mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
+            return 0;
     } else {
         unsigned int md_size_u;
         /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
-        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+
+        if (md_ctx == NULL)
+            return 0;
 
-        EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8);
         rec_char = rec->type;
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1);
         p = md;
         s2n(rec->length, p);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad);
-        EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size);
-        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u);
-        md_size = md_size_u;
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+        if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+            || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
     }
 
     ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
-    return (md_size);
+    return 1;
 }
 
-int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
+int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
 {
-    SSL3_RECORD *rec;
     unsigned char *seq;
     EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
     size_t md_size;
     int i;
-    EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
     unsigned char header[13];
-    int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
+    int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
                       : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
     int t;
 
-    if (send) {
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+    if (sending) {
         seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
         hash = ssl->write_hash;
     } else {
-        rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
         seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
         hash = ssl->read_hash;
     }
 
     t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-    OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+    if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
+        return 0;
     md_size = t;
 
     /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
     if (stream_mac) {
         mac_ctx = hash;
     } else {
-        if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash))
-            return -1;
-        mac_ctx = &hmac;
+        hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+        if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash))
+            return 0;
+        mac_ctx = hmac;
     }
 
     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
         unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
 
-        s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
+        s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
             DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
         memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
 
@@ -932,10 +1219,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
     header[8] = rec->type;
     header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
     header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-    header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8;
-    header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff;
+    header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
+    header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
 
-    if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
+    if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
         ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
         /*
@@ -944,26 +1231,28 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
          * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
          */
         /* Final param == not SSLv3 */
-        ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
-                               md, &md_size,
-                               header, rec->input,
-                               rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
-                               ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
-                               ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0);
+        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx,
+                                   md, &md_size,
+                                   header, rec->input,
+                                   rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+                                   ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+            return 0;
+        }
     } else {
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
-        EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
-        t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
-        OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
-        if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
-            tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
-                                  mac_ctx, rec->input,
-                                  rec->length, rec->orig_len);
+        /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
+        if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
+            || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
+            EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+            return 0;
+        }
     }
 
-    if (!stream_mac)
-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
+
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
     fprintf(stderr, "seq=");
     {
         int z;
@@ -973,7 +1262,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
     }
     fprintf(stderr, "rec=");
     {
-        unsigned int z;
+        size_t z;
         for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++)
             fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]);
         fprintf(stderr, "\n");
@@ -987,7 +1276,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
                 break;
         }
     }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
     {
         unsigned int z;
         for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++)
@@ -995,7 +1284,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         fprintf(stderr, "\n");
     }
 #endif
-    return (md_size);
+    return 1;
 }
 
 /*-
@@ -1008,12 +1297,12 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
  *   1: if the padding was valid
  *  -1: otherwise.
  */
-int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
-                            SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-                            unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+                            size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
 {
-    unsigned padding_length, good;
-    const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */  + mac_size;
+    size_t padding_length;
+    size_t good;
+    const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */  + mac_size;
 
     /*
      * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time.
@@ -1022,11 +1311,11 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
         return 0;
 
     padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
-    good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
+    good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead);
     /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */
-    good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1);
+    good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1);
     rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
-    return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+    return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1);
 }
 
 /*-
@@ -1044,10 +1333,11 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
  */
 int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
                             SSL3_RECORD *rec,
-                            unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size)
+                            size_t block_size, size_t mac_size)
 {
-    unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i;
-    const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */  + mac_size;
+    size_t good;
+    size_t padding_length, to_check, i;
+    const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */  + mac_size;
     /* Check if version requires explicit IV */
     if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
         /*
@@ -1066,13 +1356,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
 
     padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
 
-    if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
+    if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) &
+        EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
         /* padding is already verified */
         rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
         return 1;
     }
 
-    good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
+    good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length);
     /*
      * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and
      * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length
@@ -1082,12 +1373,12 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
      * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record
      * is public information so we can use it.)
      */
-    to_check = 255;             /* maximum amount of padding. */
-    if (to_check > rec->length - 1)
-        to_check = rec->length - 1;
+    to_check = 256;            /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */
+    if (to_check > rec->length)
+        to_check = rec->length;
 
     for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) {
-        unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i);
+        unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i);
         unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i];
         /*
          * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value
@@ -1100,10 +1391,10 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
      * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one
      * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared.
      */
-    good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff);
+    good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff);
     rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1);
 
-    return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1);
+    return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1);
 }
 
 /*-
@@ -1126,8 +1417,8 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
  */
 #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE
 
-void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
-                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size)
+int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
+                       const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size)
 {
 #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
     unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
@@ -1139,19 +1430,20 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
     /*
      * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC.
      */
-    unsigned mac_end = rec->length;
-    unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+    size_t mac_end = rec->length;
+    size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size;
+    size_t in_mac;
     /*
      * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the
      * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes.
      */
-    unsigned scan_start = 0;
-    unsigned i, j;
-    unsigned div_spoiler;
-    unsigned rotate_offset;
+    size_t scan_start = 0;
+    size_t i, j;
+    size_t rotate_offset;
 
-    OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size);
-    OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+    if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size
+                     && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
+        return 0;
 
 #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE)
     rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63);
@@ -1160,25 +1452,20 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
     /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */
     if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1)
         scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1);
-    /*
-     * div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the
-     * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies
-     * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least.
-     * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't
-     * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it to
-     * prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it.
-     */
-    div_spoiler = md_size >> 1;
-    div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8;
-    rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size;
 
+    in_mac = 0;
+    rotate_offset = 0;
     memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size);
     for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) {
-        unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start);
-        unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end);
+        size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start);
+        size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end);
         unsigned char b = rec->data[i];
-        rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended;
-        j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size);
+
+        in_mac |= mac_started;
+        in_mac &= mac_ended;
+        rotate_offset |= j & mac_started;
+        rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac;
+        j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size);
     }
 
     /* Now rotate the MAC */
@@ -1188,28 +1475,31 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out,
         /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */
         ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32];
         out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++];
-        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
     }
 #else
     memset(out, 0, md_size);
     rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset;
-    rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+    rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
     for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) {
         for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
-            out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset);
+            out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset);
         rotate_offset++;
-        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size);
+        rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size);
     }
 #endif
+
+    return 1;
 }
 
-int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
+int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
 {
     int i, al;
     int enc_err;
     SSL_SESSION *sess;
     SSL3_RECORD *rr;
-    unsigned int mac_size;
+    int imac_size;
+    size_t mac_size;
     unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 
     rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
@@ -1244,7 +1534,31 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
     rr->data = rr->input;
     rr->orig_len = rr->length;
 
-    enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+    if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
+        unsigned char *mac;
+        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
+            al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        rr->length -= mac_size;
+        mac = rr->data + rr->length;
+        i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+        if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+                   SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0);
     /*-
      * enc_err is:
      *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
@@ -1257,10 +1571,10 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
         RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
         goto err;
     }
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
-    printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+    printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length);
     {
-        unsigned int z;
+        size_t z;
         for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
             printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
     }
@@ -1268,13 +1582,25 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 #endif
 
     /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-    if ((sess != NULL) &&
+    if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) &&
         (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
         /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
         unsigned char *mac = NULL;
         unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-        mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+        /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */
+        imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+        if (imac_size < 0) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
+        mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
+        if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+            al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            goto f_err;
+        }
 
         /*
          * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
@@ -1299,7 +1625,11 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
              * contents of the padding bytes.
              */
             mac = mac_tmp;
-            ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+            if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
             rr->length -= mac_size;
         } else {
             /*
@@ -1311,9 +1641,9 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
             mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
         }
 
-        i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
-        if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
-            || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+        i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+        if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
+            || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
             enc_err = -1;
         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
             enc_err = -1;
@@ -1334,7 +1664,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
                    SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
             goto f_err;
         }
-        if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
+        if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
             al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
             SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
             goto f_err;
@@ -1359,6 +1689,10 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 
     /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
     RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+
+    /* Mark receipt of record. */
+    dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+
     return (1);
 
  f_err:
@@ -1367,10 +1701,8 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
     return (0);
 }
 
-
 /*
- * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
- * processed
+ * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
  */
 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
                    dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
@@ -1389,7 +1721,8 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 {
     int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
-    int i, n;
+    int rret;
+    size_t more, n;
     SSL3_RECORD *rr;
     unsigned char *p = NULL;
     unsigned short version;
@@ -1398,11 +1731,12 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
 
     rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
 
+ again:
     /*
      * The epoch may have changed.  If so, process all the pending records.
      * This is a non-blocking operation.
      */
-    if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
+    if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
         return -1;
 
     /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
@@ -1410,18 +1744,19 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
         return 1;
 
     /* get something from the wire */
- again:
+
     /* check if we have the header */
     if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
         (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
-        n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
-            SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0);
+        rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+                           SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n);
         /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
-        if (n <= 0)
-            return (n);         /* error or non-blocking */
+        if (rret <= 0)
+            return rret;         /* error or non-blocking */
 
         /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
-        if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+        if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
+            DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
             RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
             goto again;
         }
@@ -1480,10 +1815,10 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
     if (rr->length >
         RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
         /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
-        i = rr->length;
-        n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+        more = rr->length;
+        rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n);
         /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
-        if (n != i) {
+        if (rret <= 0 || n != more) {
             rr->length = 0;
             RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
             goto again;
@@ -1501,7 +1836,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
     bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
     if (bitmap == NULL) {
         rr->length = 0;
-        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);   /* dump this record */
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
         goto again;             /* get another record */
     }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
@@ -1509,6 +1844,10 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
     if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
 #endif
         /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
+        /*
+         * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where
+         * we have no integrity negotiated yet?
+         */
         if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
             rr->length = 0;
             RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
@@ -1528,25 +1867,22 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
      * processed at this time.
      */
     if (is_next_epoch) {
-        if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)) {
+        if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
             if (dtls1_buffer_record
                 (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
-                rr->seq_num) < 0)
+                 rr->seq_num) < 0)
                 return -1;
-            /* Mark receipt of record. */
-            dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
         }
         rr->length = 0;
         RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
         goto again;
     }
 
-    if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
+    if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
         rr->length = 0;
-        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);   /* dump this record */
+        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
         goto again;             /* get another record */
     }
-    dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
 
     return (1);