Remove an OPENSSL_assert which could fail

[openssl.git] / ssl / record / ssl3_record.c

diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
index bae9490798c89db37d4c956a2c5d5d799080210e..359d247bbbf6c39f8f5da250854e77e1089d9d44 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -748,10 +748,6 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
             /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
             j = i - 1;
-            if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) {
-                if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-                    j++;
-            }
             for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++)
                 rec->input[k] = j;
             l += i;
@@ -768,10 +764,16 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
             ? (i < 0)
             : (i == 0))
             return -1;          /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
-        if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) {
-            rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-            rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
-            rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+        if (send == 0) {
+            if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
+                rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+            } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+                rec->data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                rec->input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                rec->length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+            }
         }
 
         ret = 1;
@@ -952,7 +954,8 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
         EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
         EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length);
         t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size);
-        OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+        if (t <= 0)
+            return -1;
         if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
             tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx,
                                   mac_ctx, rec->input,
@@ -1064,24 +1067,6 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s,
 
     padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1];
 
-    /*
-     * NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of even
-     * length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug
-     * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either
-     * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve]
-     */
-    if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) {
-        /* First packet is even in size, so check */
-        if ((memcmp(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer),
-                "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) &&
-            !(padding_length & 1)) {
-            s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-        }
-        if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) && padding_length > 0) {
-            padding_length--;
-        }
-    }
-
     if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) {
         /* padding is already verified */
         rec->length -= padding_length + 1;
@@ -1524,18 +1509,8 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
     /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
     if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
 #endif
-        /*
-         * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
-         * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
-         * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
-         * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
-         */
-        if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
-              RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
-                  > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
-              RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]
-                  == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-            !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
+        /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
+        if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
             rr->length = 0;
             RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
             goto again;         /* get another record */
@@ -1551,11 +1526,10 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
     /*
      * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
      * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
-     * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
-     * listening.
+     * processed at this time.
      */
     if (is_next_epoch) {
-        if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
+        if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
             if (dtls1_buffer_record
                 (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
                 rr->seq_num) < 0)
@@ -1578,4 +1552,3 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
     return (1);
 
 }
-