Don't wait for dry at the end of a handshake

[openssl.git] / ssl / d1_srtp.c

diff --git a/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
index e99fd454095fa7dd24791fdc34eaed5aaeb54794..ff8f0c5712df54217da26aa1fc7b5d48b1c6abbc 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_srtp.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_srtp.c
@@ -136,61 +136,4 @@ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(SSL *s)
 {
     return s->srtp_profile;
 }
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
-    unsigned int id, ct, mki;
-    int i;
-
-    STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
-    SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
-
-    if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct)
-        || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
-        || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
-        || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
-               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    if (mki != 0) {
-        /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
-               SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
-        *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
-
-    /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
-    if (clnt == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
-               SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
-        *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
-     * presumably offered)
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
-        prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
-
-        if (prof->id == id) {
-            s->srtp_profile = prof;
-            *al = 0;
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,
-           SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
-    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-    return 1;
-}
-
 #endif