Document dead code.

[openssl.git] / ssl / d1_pkt.c

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 8cde57509c3bf7c0d6f7c233036082d4e1d7abe5..dea63d694a548ff0ad9f895afa3e3c0de223cc4a 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
@@ -422,11 +423,15 @@ printf("\n");
        if (    (sess == NULL) ||
                (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
                (s->read_hash == NULL))
-       clear=1;
+               clear=1;
 
        if (!clear)
                {
-               mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+               /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+               int t;
+               t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+               OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+               mac_size=t;
 
                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
                        {
@@ -451,7 +456,7 @@ printf("\n");
                        }
                rr->length-=mac_size;
                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-               if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+               if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
                        {
                        goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
                        }
@@ -634,6 +639,7 @@ again:
        /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
        if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
                {
+               rr->length = 0;
                s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
                goto again;     /* get another record */
                }
@@ -849,6 +855,14 @@ start:
              *  may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
                        if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
                                {
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+                               /*
+                                * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
+                                * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
+                                * non-existing alert...
+                                */
+                               FIX ME
+#endif
                                s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
                                rr->length = 0;
                                goto start;
@@ -1014,47 +1028,36 @@ start:
                }
 
        if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
-        {
-        struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
+               {
+               struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
 
                dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
 
-               if ( ccs_hdr.seq == s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
-                       {
-                       /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
-                        * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
-                       /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
-                       if (    (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) || 
-                               (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
-                               {
-                               i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
-                               goto err;
-                               }
-                       
-                       rr->length=0;
-                       
-                       if (s->msg_callback)
-                               s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 
-                                       rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
-                       
-                       s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
-                       if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
-                               goto err;
-                       
-                       /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
-                       dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
-                       
-                       /* handshake read seq is reset upon handshake completion */
-                       s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
-                       
-                       goto start;
-                       }
-               else
+               /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
+                * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
+               /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
+               if (    (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) || 
+                       (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
                        {
-                       rr->length = 0;
-                       goto start;
+                       i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+                       goto err;
                        }
+
+               rr->length=0;
+
+               if (s->msg_callback)
+                       s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 
+                               rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+               s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
+               if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+                       goto err;
+
+               /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
+               dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
+
+               goto start;
                }
 
        /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
@@ -1296,7 +1299,7 @@ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
        else 
                s->s3->wnum += i;
 
-       return tot + i;
+       return i;
        }
 
 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
@@ -1341,7 +1344,11 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
        if (clear)
                mac_size=0;
        else
+               {
                mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+               if (mac_size < 0)
+                       goto err;
+               }
 
        /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
 #if 0
@@ -1428,7 +1435,8 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 
        if (mac_size != 0)
                {
-               s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
+               if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
+                       goto err;
                wr->length+=mac_size;
                }
 
@@ -1438,8 +1446,14 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 
 
        /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
-       wr->length += bs;  /* bs != 0 in case of CBC.  The enc fn provides
-                                               * the randomness */ 
+       if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
+               {
+               RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
+               /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
+                * the rest of randomness */
+               wr->length += bs;
+               }
+
        s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
 
        /* record length after mac and block padding */
@@ -1550,7 +1564,7 @@ int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
        {
        int i,j;
        void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-       unsigned char buf[2 + 2 + 3]; /* alert level + alert desc + message seq +frag_off */
+       unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
        unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
 
        s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;