PR: 1997
[openssl.git] / ssl / d1_pkt.c
index b9bbbd482629f7f06d5e849c3cbf9889c053dde4..0664636b521a3ccf810a952abccb1faf18a88f18 100644 (file)
@@ -207,6 +207,10 @@ dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
        DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
        pitem *item;
 
+       /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
+       if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
+               return 0;
+               
        rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
        item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
        if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
@@ -423,11 +427,15 @@ printf("\n");
        if (    (sess == NULL) ||
                (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
                (s->read_hash == NULL))
-       clear=1;
+               clear=1;
 
        if (!clear)
                {
-               mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+               /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+               int t;
+               t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+               OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+               mac_size=t;
 
                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
                        {
@@ -452,7 +460,7 @@ printf("\n");
                        }
                rr->length-=mac_size;
                i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-               if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+               if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
                        {
                        goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
                        }
@@ -522,7 +530,7 @@ err:
 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
        {
-       int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
+       int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
        int i,n;
        SSL3_RECORD *rr;
        SSL_SESSION *sess;
@@ -553,7 +561,12 @@ again:
                /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
                if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
 
-               OPENSSL_assert(s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+               /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+               if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+                       {
+                       s->packet_length = 0;
+                       goto again;
+                       }
 
                s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
 
@@ -578,26 +591,27 @@ again:
                        {
                        if (version != s->version)
                                {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                               /* Send back error using their
-                                * version number :-) */
-                               s->version=version;
-                               al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-                               goto f_err;
+                               /* unexpected version, silently discard */
+                               rr->length = 0;
+                               s->packet_length = 0;
+                               goto again;
                                }
                        }
 
-               if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
+               if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
                        {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
-                       goto err;
+                       /* wrong version, silently discard record */
+                       rr->length = 0;
+                       s->packet_length = 0;
+                       goto again;
                        }
 
                if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
                        {
-                       al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
-                       goto f_err;
+                       /* record too long, silently discard it */
+                       rr->length = 0;
+                       s->packet_length = 0;
+                       goto again;
                        }
 
                /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
@@ -615,6 +629,7 @@ again:
                /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
                if ( n != i)
                        {
+                       rr->length = 0;
                        s->packet_length = 0;
                        goto again;
                        }
@@ -628,6 +643,7 @@ again:
        bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
        if ( bitmap == NULL)
                {
+               rr->length = 0;
                s->packet_length = 0;  /* dump this record */
                goto again;   /* get another record */
                }
@@ -635,6 +651,7 @@ again:
        /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
        if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
                {
+               rr->length = 0;
                s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
                goto again;     /* get another record */
                }
@@ -651,6 +668,7 @@ again:
                {
                dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
                dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
+               rr->length = 0;
                s->packet_length = 0;
                goto again;
                }
@@ -661,10 +679,6 @@ again:
        dtls1_clear_timeouts(s);  /* done waiting */
        return(1);
 
-f_err:
-       ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
-err:
-       return(0);
        }
 
 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
@@ -741,6 +755,27 @@ start:
         * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
        rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 
+       /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
+        * so process data buffered during the last handshake
+        * in advance, if any.
+        */
+       if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
+               {
+               pitem *item;
+               item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
+               if (item)
+                       {
+                       dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+                       OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+                       pitem_free(item);
+                       }
+               }
+
+       /* Check for timeout */
+       if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
+               goto start;
+
        /* get new packet if necessary */
        if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
                {
@@ -762,9 +797,14 @@ start:
                                       * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
                && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
                {
-               al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
-               goto err;
+               /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
+                * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
+                * buffer the application data for later processing rather
+                * than dropping the connection.
+                */
+               dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), 0);
+               rr->length = 0;
+               goto start;
                }
 
        /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
@@ -834,15 +874,28 @@ start:
                        dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
                        dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
                        }
-                /* else it's a CCS message, or it's wrong */
-                else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
-                        {
-                          /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
-                          al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-                          SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
-                          goto f_err;
-                        }
+               /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
+               else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+                       {
+                       /* Application data while renegotiating
+                        * is allowed. Try again reading.
+                        */
+                       if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+                               {
+                               BIO *bio;
+                               s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+                               bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+                               s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+                               BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+                               BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+                               return(-1);
+                               }
 
+                       /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
+                       al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+                       goto f_err;
+                       }
 
                if (dest_maxlen > 0)
                        {
@@ -850,6 +903,14 @@ start:
              *  may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
                        if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
                                {
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+                               /*
+                                * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
+                                * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
+                                * non-existing alert...
+                                */
+                               FIX ME
+#endif
                                s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
                                rr->length = 0;
                                goto start;
@@ -972,7 +1033,9 @@ start:
                                n2s(p, seq);
                                n2l3(p, frag_off);
 
-                               dtls1_retransmit_message(s, seq, frag_off, &found);
+                               dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+                                                                                dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
+                                                                                frag_off, &found);
                                if ( ! found  && SSL_in_init(s))
                                        {
                                        /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
@@ -1017,13 +1080,17 @@ start:
        if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
                {
                struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
+               unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
 
                dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
 
+               if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                       ccs_hdr_len = 3;
+
                /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
                 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
                /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
-               if (    (rr->length != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH) || 
+               if (    (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || 
                        (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
                        {
                        i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
@@ -1037,6 +1104,16 @@ start:
                        s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, 
                                rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
+               /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
+                * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
+                */
+               if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
+                       {
+                       goto start;
+                       }
+
+               s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
+
                s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
                if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
                        goto err;
@@ -1044,8 +1121,8 @@ start:
                /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
                dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
 
-               /* handshake read seq is reset upon handshake completion */
-               s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+               if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                       s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
 
                goto start;
                }
@@ -1064,6 +1141,16 @@ start:
                        goto start;
                        }
 
+               /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
+                * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
+                */
+               if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+                       {
+                       dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+                       rr->length = 0;
+                       goto start;
+                       }
+
                if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
                        !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
                        {
@@ -1289,7 +1376,7 @@ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
        else 
                s->s3->wnum += i;
 
-       return tot + i;
+       return i;
        }
 
 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
@@ -1334,13 +1421,17 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
        if (clear)
                mac_size=0;
        else
+               {
                mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+               if (mac_size < 0)
+                       goto err;
+               }
 
        /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
 #if 0
        /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
        if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
-               && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION)
+           && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
                {
                /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
                 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) 
@@ -1367,7 +1458,6 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
                s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
                }
 #endif
-
        p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
 
        /* write the header */
@@ -1421,7 +1511,8 @@ int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len,
 
        if (mac_size != 0)
                {
-               s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1);
+               if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
+                       goto err;
                wr->length+=mac_size;
                }
 
@@ -1549,7 +1640,7 @@ int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
        {
        int i,j;
        void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-       unsigned char buf[2 + 2 + 3]; /* alert level + alert desc + message seq +frag_off */
+       unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
        unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
 
        s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
@@ -1713,6 +1804,7 @@ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
        else
                {
                seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
+               memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
                s->d1->w_epoch++;
                }