#endif
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
-static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
-static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
+static size_t dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
-static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
+static const size_t g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
dtls1_set_handshake_header,
+ dtls1_close_construct_packet,
dtls1_handshake_write
};
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
dtls1_set_handshake_header,
+ dtls1_close_construct_packet,
dtls1_handshake_write
};
{
pqueue *buffered_messages;
pqueue *sent_messages;
- unsigned int mtu;
- unsigned int link_mtu;
+ size_t mtu;
+ size_t link_mtu;
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned int mtu;
+ size_t mtu;
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
const unsigned char *data;
- unsigned char *p, *buf;
- unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
BIO *rbio, *wbio;
BUF_MEM *bufm;
/* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &msglen)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
- || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
|| PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
- PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
- 0) {
+ (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) == 0) {
/*
* We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
* per RFC6347
}
if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ WPACKET wpkt;
+ unsigned int version;
+ size_t wreclen;
+
/*
* There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
* HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
return -1;
}
- p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
- msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- cookie, cookielen);
-
- *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
-
- /* Message length */
- l2n3(msglen, p);
-
- /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
- s2n(0, p);
-
- /*
- * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
- * and fragment length is message length
- */
- l2n3(0, p);
- l2n3(msglen, p);
-
- /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
- reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
-
- /* Add the record header */
- p = buf;
-
- *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
/*
* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
* haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
* 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
*/
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
- *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
- } else {
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+ version = (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) ? DTLS1_VERSION
+ : s->version;
+
+ /* Construct the record and message headers */
+ if (!WPACKET_init(&wpkt, s->init_buf)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, version)
+ /*
+ * Record sequence number is always the same as in the
+ * received ClientHello
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(&wpkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
+ /* End of record, start sub packet for message */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&wpkt)
+ /* Message type */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt,
+ DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
+ /*
+ * Message length - doesn't follow normal TLS convention:
+ * the length isn't the last thing in the message header.
+ * We'll need to fill this in later when we know the
+ * length. Set it to zero for now
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(&wpkt, 0)
+ /*
+ * Message sequence number is always 0 for a
+ * HelloVerifyRequest
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&wpkt, 0)
+ /*
+ * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment
+ * offset is 0
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(&wpkt, 0)
+ /*
+ * Fragment length is the same as message length, but
+ * this *is* the last thing in the message header so we
+ * can just start a sub-packet. No need to come back
+ * later for this one.
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&wpkt)
+ /* Create the actual HelloVerifyRequest body */
+ || !dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&wpkt, cookie, cookielen)
+ /* Close message body */
+ || !WPACKET_close(&wpkt)
+ /* Close record body */
+ || !WPACKET_close(&wpkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &wreclen)
+ || !WPACKET_finish(&wpkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&wpkt);
+ /* This is fatal */
+ return -1;
}
/*
- * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
- * ClientHello
- */
- memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
- p += SEQ_NUM_SIZE;
-
- /* Length */
- s2n(reclen, p);
-
- /*
- * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
- * header
+ * Fix up the message len in the message header. Its the same as the
+ * fragment len which has been filled in by WPACKET, so just copy
+ * that. Destination for the message len is after the record header
+ * plus one byte for the message content type. The source is the
+ * last 3 bytes of the message header
*/
- reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + 1],
+ &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 3],
+ 3);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
tmpclient = NULL;
- if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
+ /* TODO(size_t): convert this call */
+ if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, wreclen) < (int)wreclen) {
if (BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
/*
* Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
}
#endif
-static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
-{
- dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len);
- s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->init_off = 0;
- /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
-
- if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
{
return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
# define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16)
-int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
+int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, size_t length)
{
unsigned char *pl;
unsigned short hbtype;
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ size_t written;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
+ size_t write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
int r;
if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return -1;
}
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length,
+ &written);
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ if (r > 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (r <= 0)
+ return -1;
} else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
unsigned int seq;
{
unsigned char *buf, *p;
int ret = -1;
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- unsigned int size;
+ size_t payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+ size_t padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ size_t size, written;
/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
goto err;
}
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size);
- if (ret >= 0) {
+ ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size, &written);
+ if (ret > 0) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buf, size, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Set to min mtu */
s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
- s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ (long)s->d1->mtu, NULL);
}
} else
return 0;
return 1;
}
-static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
+static size_t dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
{
return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
}
-unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
+size_t dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
{
return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
}
+
+size_t DTLS_get_data_mtu(const SSL *s)
+{
+ size_t mac_overhead, int_overhead, blocksize, ext_overhead;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
+ size_t mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+
+ if (ciph == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_overhead(ciph, &mac_overhead, &int_overhead,
+ &blocksize, &ext_overhead))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s))
+ ext_overhead += mac_overhead;
+ else
+ int_overhead += mac_overhead;
+
+ /* Subtract external overhead (e.g. IV/nonce, separate MAC) */
+ if (ext_overhead + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH >= mtu)
+ return 0;
+ mtu -= ext_overhead + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ /* Round encrypted payload down to cipher block size (for CBC etc.)
+ * No check for overflow since 'mtu % blocksize' cannot exceed mtu. */
+ if (blocksize)
+ mtu -= (mtu % blocksize);
+
+ /* Subtract internal overhead (e.g. CBC padding len byte) */
+ if (int_overhead >= mtu)
+ return 0;
+ mtu -= int_overhead;
+
+ return mtu;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff