-/* ssl/d1_lib.c */
/*
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
# include <sys/timeb.h>
-#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
-# include <sys/timeval.h>
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
# include <sys/times.h>
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
-int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client);
static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
break;
- case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
- ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
- break;
case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
return 0;
return (ret);
}
-/*
- * As it's impossible to use stream ciphers in "datagram" mode, this
- * simple filter is designed to disengage them in DTLS. Unfortunately
- * there is no universal way to identify stream SSL_CIPHER, so we have
- * to explicitly list their SSL_* codes. Currently RC4 is the only one
- * available, but if new ones emerge, they will have to be added...
- */
-const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
-{
- const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
-
- if (ciph != NULL) {
- if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
- return NULL;
- }
-
- return ciph;
-}
-
void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
#define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2
#define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1
-
-int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
{
int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
- unsigned char *data, *p, *buf;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ unsigned char *p, *buf;
unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
BIO *rbio, *wbio;
BUF_MEM *bufm;
- struct sockaddr_storage tmpclient;
+ BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL;
PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
/* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
if(!rbio || !wbio) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
return -1;
}
* SSL_accept)
*/
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
return -1;
}
if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
BUF_MEM_free(bufm);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
s->init_buf = bufm;
clearpkt = 1;
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto end;
}
/* Get the record header */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
|| !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
* the same.
*/
if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
/* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
|| !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)
- || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
+ /*
+ * We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could
+ * be a second record (but we ignore it)
+ */
/* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
|| !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, msglen)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
|| PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto end;
}
/* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
if(msgseq > 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
- /* We don't support a fragmented ClientHello whilst listening */
- if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen != msglen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+ /*
+ * We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst
+ * listening because that would require server side state (which is
+ * against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest
+ * mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment
+ * and require that the cookie must be contained within it.
+ */
+ if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) {
+ /* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
goto end;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
- msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
*/
if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto end;
}
if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ /*
+ * Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial
+ * ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto end;
}
* We have a cookie, so lets check it.
*/
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
/* This is fatal */
return -1;
}
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
cookielen > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
/* This is fatal */
return -1;
}
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
/*
- * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
- * maybe they're not.
+ * This is unnecessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
+ * maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
+ * support this.
*/
- if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, &tmpclient) <= 0
- || BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, &tmpclient) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto end;
+ if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
+ (void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient);
}
+ BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
+ tmpclient = NULL;
if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
*/
ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
- if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
+ /* Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address */
+ if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0)
+ BIO_ADDR_clear(client);
ret = 1;
clearpkt = 0;
end:
+ BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
if (clearpkt) {
/* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */
}
return ret;
}
+#endif
static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
{
- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, htype, len, 0, len);
+ dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len);
s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
s->init_off = 0;
/* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+
+#define HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding) ( \
+ 1 /* heartbeat type */ + \
+ 2 /* heartbeat length */ + \
+ (payload) + (padding))
+
+#define HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, 16)
+
int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
{
unsigned char *pl;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
+ /* Read type and payload length */
+ if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(0) > length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
- if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
+ if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) > length)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = p;
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
- unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
- 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
- payload + padding;
+ unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
int r;
if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
- /*
- * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
- * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
- */
+ /* Allocate memory for the response. */
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
if (buffer == NULL)
return -1;
return -1;
}
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
int ret = -1;
unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+ unsigned int size;
/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
+ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
return -1;
}
* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
* as payload to distuingish different messages and add
* some random stuff.
- * - Message Type, 1 byte
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
- * - Padding
*/
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ size = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
if (buf == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
goto err;
}
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+ ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, size);
if (ret >= 0) {
if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buf, size,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
dtls1_start_timer(s);