#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/des.h>
#endif
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ * an internal error occurred. */
int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
- int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ int bs,i,j,k,mac_size=0;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
if (send)
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
- n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
__FILE__, __LINE__);
else if ( EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher) > 1)
{
- if (!RAND_bytes(rec->input, EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher)))
+ if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher)) <= 0)
return -1;
}
}
else
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
- n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ {
+ mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+ }
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
{
unsigned long ui;
printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- (void *)ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
- printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %ld buf_len, %ld key_len [%ld %ld], %ld iv_len\n",
- (unsigned long)ds->buf_len,
- (unsigned long)ds->cipher->key_len,
- (unsigned long)DES_KEY_SZ,
- (unsigned long)DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
- (unsigned long)ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+ ds->cipher->iv_len);
printf("\t\tIV: ");
for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
printf("\n");
if (!send)
{
if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
return 0;
- }
}
EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- unsigned long ki;
+ unsigned long i;
printf("\trec->data=");
- for (ki=0; ki<l; i++)
- printf(" %02x", rec->data[ki]); printf("\n");
+ for (i=0; i<l; i++)
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- {
- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
- i++;
- if (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
- {
- /* First packet is even in size, so check */
- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- i--;
- }
- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
- if (i > (int)rec->length)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
- return -1;
- }
- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
- {
- if (rec->data[j] != ii)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- rec->length-=i;
-
- rec->data += bs; /* skip the implicit IV */
- rec->input += bs;
- rec->length -= bs;
- }
+ return tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
}
return(1);
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff