In EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates include explicit check to see passed...

[openssl.git] / ssl / d1_both.c

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index c195159967f5f45504484526695e588ae253109b..9f898d69978d38f7d59667f57bd2e46012917300 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -158,7 +158,6 @@ static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[]   = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1
 /* XDTLS:  figure out the right values */
 static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
 
-static unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
 static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, 
        unsigned long frag_len);
@@ -264,11 +263,10 @@ int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
                        return ret;
                mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
                }
-
-       OPENSSL_assert(mtu > 0);  /* should have something reasonable now */
-
 #endif
 
+       OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu());  /* should have something reasonable now */
+
        if ( s->init_off == 0  && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
                OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 
                        (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
@@ -468,20 +466,6 @@ again:
        if (!s->d1->listen)
                s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
 
-       /* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
-        * this means that we don't need to retransmit of the
-        * buffered messages.  
-        * XDTLS: may be able clear out this
-        * buffer a little sooner (i.e if an out-of-order
-        * handshake message/record is received at the record
-        * layer.  
-        * XDTLS: exception is that the server needs to
-        * know that change cipher spec and finished messages
-        * have been received by the client before clearing this
-        * buffer.  this can simply be done by waiting for the
-        * first data  segment, but is there a better way?  */
-       dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
-
        s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
        return s->init_num;
 
@@ -809,7 +793,13 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
                *ok = 0;
                return i;
                }
-       OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+       /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+       if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+               {
+               al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
 
        /* parse the message fragment header */
        dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
@@ -881,7 +871,12 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 
        /* XDTLS:  an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the 
         * handshake to fail */
-       OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
+       if (i != (int)frag_len)
+               {
+               al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+               goto f_err;
+               }
 
        *ok = 1;
 
@@ -1381,7 +1376,7 @@ dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
        return p;
        }
 
-static unsigned int 
+unsigned int 
 dtls1_min_mtu(void)
        {
        return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /