#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/der_rsa.h"
+#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+
+#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
*/
unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
- /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
unsigned char aid_buf[128];
unsigned char *aid;
size_t aid_len;
return 0;
}
-static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- /*
- * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
- * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
- * map.
- */
- static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
- { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
- { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
- { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
- { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
- { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
- { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
- { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
- { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
- { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
- { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
- { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
- { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
- { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
- { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
- { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
- { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
- { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
- };
- size_t i;
- int mdnid = NID_undef;
-
- if (md == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
- if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
- mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- end:
- return mdnid;
-}
-
static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
{
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
return 1;
}
-static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
+static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
{
if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
int max_saltlen;
/* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
- max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
+ max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
max_saltlen--;
- if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
char *propq_copy = NULL;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+
if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
|| (propq != NULL
&& (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
mdprops = ctx->propq;
if (mdname != NULL) {
- EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
- int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
WPACKET pkt;
+ EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+ int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+ int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
if (md == NULL
|| md_nid == NID_undef
|| !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
- || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)
|| mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
if (md == NULL)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
*/
ctx->aid_len = 0;
if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
- && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
- md_nid)
+ && ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1,
+ ctx->rsa,
+ md_nid)
&& WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
const char *mdprops)
{
size_t len;
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (mdprops == NULL)
mdprops = ctx->propq;
if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
- if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
+ if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
return 0;
}
+ /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
+ if (digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1) == NID_undef) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->mgf1_md = md;
len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
return 1;
}
-static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
+static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
return 0;
prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
prsactx->operation = operation;
+ if (!ossl_rsa_check_key(vrsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
{
const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
- rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
+ ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
- if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
- int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
- int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
- int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
+ int md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
+ int mgf1md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
+ int min_saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
size_t len;
- mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
- mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
+ mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
+ mgf1mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
if (mdname == NULL) {
prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
- && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq);
+ && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
}
}
static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = rsasize;
return 1;
static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
}
static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
int ret;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (rout == NULL) {
*routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
return 1;
static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
size_t rslen;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
- if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx != NULL)
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
+ if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
|| !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
return 0;
static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
void *vrsa)
{
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
+ return 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
-
/*
* If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
* are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
*/
if (sig != NULL) {
/*
- * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
- * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
- * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
+ * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
void *vrsa)
{
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL)
+ return 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
- * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
- * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
- * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
+ * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
if (prsactx == NULL)
return;
- RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
free_tbuf(prsactx);
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
}
static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+
dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
if (dstctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
{
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
goto bad_pad;
}
if (prsactx->md == NULL
- && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
+ && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
break;
}
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ switch (saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
return 0;
}
- /* FALLTHRU */
+ break;
default:
if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
/*
* TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
}
-const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
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