+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-/*
- * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
- * internal use.
- */
-#include "internal/deprecated.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
-#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/params.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/nelem.h"
-#include "internal/sizes.h"
-#include "crypto/rsa.h"
-#include "prov/providercommon.h"
-#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
-#include "prov/implementations.h"
-#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
-#include "prov/der_rsa.h"
-#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
-
-#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
-
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
-
-static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
- { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
- { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
- { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
- { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
- { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
-
-/*
- * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
- * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
- * we use that here too.
- */
-
-typedef struct {
- OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
- char *propq;
- RSA *rsa;
- int operation;
-
- /*
- * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
- * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
- * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
- * by their Final function.
- */
- unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
-
- /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
- unsigned char aid_buf[128];
- unsigned char *aid;
- size_t aid_len;
-
- /* main digest */
- EVP_MD *md;
- EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
- int mdnid;
- char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
-
- /* RSA padding mode */
- int pad_mode;
- /* message digest for MGF1 */
- EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
- char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
- /* PSS salt length */
- int saltlen;
- /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
- int min_saltlen;
-
- /* Temp buffer */
- unsigned char *tbuf;
-
-} PROV_RSA_CTX;
-
-static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
-{
- if (prsactx->md != NULL)
- return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
-{
- if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
-{
- if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- int max_saltlen;
-
- /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
- max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
- if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
- max_saltlen--;
- if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
- char *propq_copy = NULL;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return NULL;
-
- if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
- || (propq != NULL
- && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
- OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
- prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
- return prsactx;
-}
-
-/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
-#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
-
-static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
- const char *mdprops)
-{
- if (mdprops == NULL)
- mdprops = ctx->propq;
-
- if (mdname != NULL) {
- WPACKET pkt;
- EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
- int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
- int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
- size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
-
- if (md == NULL
- || md_nid == NID_undef
- || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
- || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
- if (md == NULL)
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
- if (md_nid == NID_undef)
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
- "digest=%s", mdname);
- if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
- EVP_MD_free(md);
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
- EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
-
- /*
- * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
- * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
- * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
- * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
- * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
- */
- ctx->aid_len = 0;
- if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
- && ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1,
- ctx->rsa,
- md_nid)
- && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
- WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
- ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
- }
- WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
-
- ctx->mdctx = NULL;
- ctx->md = md;
- ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
- OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
- const char *mdprops)
-{
- size_t len;
- EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-
- if (mdprops == NULL)
- mdprops = ctx->propq;
-
- if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
- EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
-
- if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
- return 0;
- }
- /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
- if (digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1) == NID_undef) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
- "digest=%s", mdname);
- EVP_MD_free(md);
- return 0;
- }
- ctx->mgf1_md = md;
- len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
- if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
- return 0;
-
- RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
- prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
- prsactx->operation = operation;
-
- if (!ossl_rsa_check_key(vrsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
- prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
- prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
-
- switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
- case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
- prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- break;
- case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
- prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
-
- {
- const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
- ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
-
- if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
- int md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
- int mgf1md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
- int min_saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
- const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
- size_t len;
-
- mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
- mgf1mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
- prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
-
- if (mdname == NULL) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
- return 0;
- }
- if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
- return 0;
- }
-
- len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
- sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
- if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "hash algorithm name too long");
- return 0;
- }
- len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
- sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
- if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
- return 0;
- }
- prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
-
- return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
- && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
- && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
- }
- }
-
- break;
- default:
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
- return 1;
- if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
-}
-
-static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
-{
- clean_tbuf(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
- ctx->tbuf = NULL;
-}
-
-static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
-{
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
- return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
-}
-
-static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
- size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- int ret;
- size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
- size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
-
- if (sig == NULL) {
- *siglen = rsasize;
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (sigsize < rsasize) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
- "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (mdsize != 0) {
- if (tbslen != mdsize) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
-
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
- unsigned int sltmp;
-
- if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
- "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
- return 0;
- }
- ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
- prsactx->rsa);
-
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = sltmp;
- goto end;
- }
-#endif
- switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
- "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
- RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
- prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
- sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
- clean_tbuf(prsactx);
- break;
-
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- {
- unsigned int sltmp;
-
- ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
- prsactx->rsa);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = sltmp;
- }
- break;
-
- case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
- /* Check PSS restrictions */
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
- if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
- "minimum salt length set to %d, "
- "but the digest only gives %d",
- prsactx->min_saltlen,
- EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
- return 0;
- }
- /* FALLTHRU */
- default:
- if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
- && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
- "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
- "actual salt length is only set to %d",
- prsactx->min_saltlen,
- prsactx->saltlen);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
- return 0;
- if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
- prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
- prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
- prsactx->saltlen)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
- sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- clean_tbuf(prsactx);
- break;
-
- default:
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
- "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
- prsactx->pad_mode);
- }
-
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- end:
-#endif
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
-
- *siglen = ret;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
-{
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
- return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
-}
-
-static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
- unsigned char *rout,
- size_t *routlen,
- size_t routsize,
- const unsigned char *sig,
- size_t siglen)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- int ret;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
-
- if (rout == NULL) {
- *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
- switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
- return 0;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
- RSA_X931_PADDING);
- if (ret < 1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- ret--;
- if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- "Should be %d, but got %d",
- EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
- return 0;
- }
-
- *routlen = ret;
- if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) {
- if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
- "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
- routsize, ret);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
- }
- break;
-
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- {
- size_t sltmp;
-
- ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
- sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = sltmp;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
- "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
- prsactx->pad_mode);
- if (ret < 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- *routlen = ret;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
-{
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
- return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
-}
-
-static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
- const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- size_t rslen;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
- if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
- switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
- prsactx->rsa)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
- return 0;
- if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0,
- sig, siglen) <= 0)
- return 0;
- break;
- case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
- {
- int ret;
- size_t mdsize;
-
- /*
- * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
- * call
- */
- mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
- if (tbslen != mdsize) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- "Should be %d, but got %d",
- mdsize, tbslen);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
- return 0;
- ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
- prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
- prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
- prsactx->tbuf,
- prsactx->saltlen);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
- default:
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
- "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
- return 0;
- rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
- prsactx->pad_mode);
- if (rslen == 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
- void *vrsa, int operation)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
-
- if (prsactx != NULL)
- prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
- if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
- || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
- return 0;
-
- prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
- goto error;
-
- return 1;
-
- error:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
- EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
- prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
- prsactx->md = NULL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t datalen)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
-}
-
-static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
- void *vrsa)
-{
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
- return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
- EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
-}
-
-static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
- size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int dlen = 0;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
- return 0;
- prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
- return 0;
- /*
- * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
- * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
- */
- if (sig != NULL) {
- /*
- * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
- * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
- */
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
-}
-
-static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
- void *vrsa)
-{
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
- return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
- EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
-}
-
-int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
- size_t siglen)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned int dlen = 0;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return 0;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL)
- return 0;
- prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
- * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
- */
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
- return 0;
-
- return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
-}
-
-static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL)
- return;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
- EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
- EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
- OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
- free_tbuf(prsactx);
- RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
-}
-
-static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
-
- if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
- return NULL;
-
- dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
- if (dstctx == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- *dstctx = *srcctx;
- dstctx->rsa = NULL;
- dstctx->md = NULL;
- dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
- dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
-
- if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
- goto err;
- dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
-
- if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
- goto err;
- dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
-
- if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
- goto err;
- dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
-
- if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
- dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
- || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- return dstctx;
- err:
- rsa_freectx(dstctx);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
- if (p != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
- return 0;
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
- if (p != NULL)
- switch (p->data_type) {
- case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
- return 0;
- break;
- case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
- {
- int i;
- const char *word = NULL;
-
- for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
- if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
- word = padding_item[i].ptr;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (word != NULL) {
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
- return 0;
- } else {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- }
- }
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
- return 0;
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
- return 0;
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
- if (p != NULL) {
- if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
- return 0;
- } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
- const char *value = NULL;
-
- switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
- value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST;
- break;
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
- value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX;
- break;
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
- value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
- break;
- default:
- {
- int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
- prsactx->saltlen);
-
- if (len <= 0)
- return 0;
- p->return_size = len;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (value != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value))
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
-{
- return known_gettable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- const OSSL_PARAM *p;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
- /* Not allowed during certain operations */
- if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
- return 0;
- if (p != NULL) {
- char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
- char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
- const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
- OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
- OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
-
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
- return 0;
-
- if (propsp == NULL)
- pmdprops = NULL;
- else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
- &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
- return 0;
-
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
- if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
- return 0;
- }
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
- if (p != NULL) {
- int pad_mode = 0;
- const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
-
- switch (p->data_type) {
- case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
- return 0;
- break;
- case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
- {
- int i;
-
- if (p->data == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
- if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
- pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
- switch (pad_mode) {
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- /*
- * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
- * with signature use.
- */
- err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
- goto bad_pad;
- case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
- if ((prsactx->operation
- & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
- err_extra_text =
- "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
- goto bad_pad;
- }
- if (prsactx->md == NULL
- && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
- goto cont;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
- goto cont;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
- goto cont;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
- cont:
- if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
- RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
- break;
- /* FALLTHRU */
- default:
- bad_pad:
- if (err_extra_text == NULL)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
- else
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
- err_extra_text);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
- return 0;
- prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
- }
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
- if (p != NULL) {
- int saltlen;
-
- if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
- "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
- "PSS padding has been specified first");
- return 0;
- }
-
- switch (p->data_type) {
- case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
- return 0;
- break;
- case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
- if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0)
- saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
- else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0)
- saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
- else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
- saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
- else
- saltlen = atoi(p->data);
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
- * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
- * lowest saltlen number possible.
- */
- if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- switch (saltlen) {
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
- if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
- if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
- "Should be more than %d, but would be "
- "set to match digest size (%d)",
- prsactx->min_saltlen,
- EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- default:
- if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
- "Should be more than %d, "
- "but would be set to %d",
- prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
- }
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
- if (p != NULL) {
- char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
- char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
- const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
- OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
- OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
-
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
- return 0;
-
- if (propsp == NULL)
- pmdprops = NULL;
- else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
- &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
- return 0;
-
- if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
- if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
- || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_END
-};
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
-{
- /*
- * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
- * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
- * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
- * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
- */
- return known_settable_ctx_params;
-}
-
-static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx->md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
-}
-
-static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
-}
-
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx->md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
-}
-
-const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
- { 0, NULL }
-};
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff