#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/der_rsa.h"
-
-static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
+#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+
+#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
- { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
- { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
- { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
- { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
- { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
- { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
- { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
+ { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
+ { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
+ { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
{ 0, NULL }
};
typedef struct {
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+ char *propq;
RSA *rsa;
int operation;
*/
unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
- /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
unsigned char aid_buf[128];
unsigned char *aid;
size_t aid_len;
return 0;
}
-static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- /*
- * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
- * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
- * map.
- */
- static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
- { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
- { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
- { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
- { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
- { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
- { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
- { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
- { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
- { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
- { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
- { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
- { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
- { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
- { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
- { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
- { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
- { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
- };
- size_t i;
- int mdnid = NID_undef;
-
- if (md == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
- if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
- mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (mdnid == NID_undef)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
-
- end:
- return mdnid;
-}
-
static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
{
if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
return 1;
}
-static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ int max_saltlen;
+
+ /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
+ max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
+ if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
+ max_saltlen--;
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
- if (prsactx == NULL)
+static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
+ char *propq_copy = NULL;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return NULL;
+ if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
+ || (propq != NULL
+ && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
return prsactx;
}
/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
-static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
- return 0;
-
- RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
- prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
- prsactx->operation = operation;
- if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
- prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
- else
- prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
- prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
- prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
+ if (mdprops == NULL)
+ mdprops = ctx->propq;
+
if (mdname != NULL) {
- EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
- int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
WPACKET pkt;
+ EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+ int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+ int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
+ size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
if (md == NULL
|| md_nid == NID_undef
- || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
+ || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
+ || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
+ if (md == NULL)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+ if (md_nid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
+ if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
*/
ctx->aid_len = 0;
if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
- && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid)
+ && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
+ md_nid)
&& WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
}
static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
- const char *props)
+ const char *mdprops)
{
+ size_t len;
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+ if (mdprops == NULL)
+ mdprops = ctx->propq;
+
if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
- if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
+ if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
+ if (digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1) == NID_undef) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->mgf1_md = md;
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
return 0;
- OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
+ return 0;
+
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+ prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
+ prsactx->operation = operation;
+
+ if (!rsa_check_key(vrsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+ prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
+
+ switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+
+ {
+ const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
+ rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
+
+ if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
+ int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
+ int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
+ int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
+ const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
+ size_t len;
+
+ mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
+ mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+ if (mdname == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
+ sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "hash algorithm name too long");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
+ sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+ return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
+ clean_tbuf(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
ctx->tbuf = NULL;
}
static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = rsasize;
return 1;
}
- if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
+ if (sigsize < rsasize) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
+ "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
return 0;
+ }
if (mdsize != 0) {
if (tbslen != mdsize) {
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
+ "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
+ RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
return 0;
}
if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "minimum salt length set to %d, "
+ "but the digest only gives %d",
+ prsactx->min_saltlen,
+ EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHRU */
default:
if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
&& prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
+ "actual salt length is only set to %d",
+ prsactx->min_saltlen,
+ prsactx->saltlen);
return 0;
}
break;
static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
}
static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
int ret;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (rout == NULL) {
*routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
return 1;
}
*routlen = ret;
- if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
+ if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) {
+ if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
+ "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
+ routsize, ret);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
}
- memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
size_t rslen;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
}
return 1;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0,
+ sig, siglen) <= 0)
return 0;
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
}
static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
- const char *props, void *vrsa,
- int operation)
+ void *vrsa, int operation)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
- if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
- || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx != NULL)
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
+ if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
+ || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
return 0;
prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto error;
+ }
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
goto error;
}
static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
- const char *props, void *vrsa)
+ void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, props, vrsa,
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
+ return 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
-
/*
* If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
* are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
*/
if (sig != NULL) {
/*
- * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
- * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
- * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
+ * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
}
static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
- const char *props, void *vrsa)
+ void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, props, vrsa,
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL)
+ return 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
- * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
- * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
- * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
+ * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
if (prsactx == NULL)
return;
- RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
+ OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
free_tbuf(prsactx);
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
}
static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+
dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
- if (dstctx == NULL)
+ if (dstctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
+ }
*dstctx = *srcctx;
dstctx->rsa = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
return 0;
} else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ const char *value = NULL;
+
switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
- return 0;
+ value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST;
break;
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
- return 0;
+ value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX;
break;
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
- return 0;
+ value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
break;
default:
- if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
- <= 0)
- return 0;
- break;
+ {
+ int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
+ prsactx->saltlen);
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ p->return_size = len;
+ break;
+ }
}
+ if (value != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value))
+ return 0;
}
}
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
{
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+
+ if (propsp == NULL)
+ pmdprops = NULL;
+ else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
return 0;
- /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
/* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
}
/* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
return 0;
}
goto bad_pad;
}
if (prsactx->md == NULL
- && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
- "%s could not be fetched",
- OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1);
+ && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
break;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
cont:
- if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) == NULL)
+ if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
+ RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
break;
/* FALLTHRU */
default:
return 0;
break;
case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
- if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
+ if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
- else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
- else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
else
saltlen = atoi(p->data);
}
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ switch (saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
return 0;
}
- /* FALLTHRU */
+ break;
default:
if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+
+ if (propsp == NULL)
+ pmdprops = NULL;
+ else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
return 0;
if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
}
/* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
return 0;
}
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void *provctx)
{
/*
* TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx