/*
- * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/der_rsa.h"
static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
typedef struct {
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+ char *propq;
RSA *rsa;
+ int operation;
/*
* Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
/* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
- unsigned char aid[128];
+ unsigned char aid_buf[128];
+ unsigned char *aid;
size_t aid_len;
/* main digest */
{ NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
{ NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
{ NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
+ { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
+ { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
{ NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
{ NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
{ NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
}
}
- if (mdnid == NID_undef)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
-
end:
return mdnid;
}
return 1;
}
-static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ int max_saltlen;
+
+ /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
+ max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
+ max_saltlen--;
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
- if (prsactx == NULL)
+static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
+ char *propq_copy = NULL;
+
+ if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
+ || (propq != NULL
+ && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
+ }
prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
return prsactx;
}
/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
-static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
-{
- PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
-
- if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
- return 0;
-
- RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
- prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
- if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
- prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
- else
- prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
- prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
- prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
+ if (mdprops == NULL)
+ mdprops = ctx->propq;
+
if (mdname != NULL) {
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
- size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
- const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier = NULL;
-
- if (md == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (!rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
+ WPACKET pkt;
+
+ if (md == NULL
+ || md_nid == NID_undef
+ || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
+ || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)) {
+ if (md == NULL)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+ if (md_nid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
- ctx->md = NULL;
- ctx->mdctx = NULL;
- ctx->mdname[0] = '\0';
- ctx->aid[0] = '\0';
- ctx->aid_len = 0;
- algorithmidentifier =
- rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(md_nid, &algorithmidentifier_len);
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
+ * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
+ * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
+ * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
+ */
+ ctx->aid_len = 0;
+ if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
+ && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid)
+ && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+ WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
+ ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
+ }
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ ctx->mdctx = NULL;
ctx->md = md;
ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
- if (algorithmidentifier != NULL) {
- memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
- ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
- }
}
return 1;
}
static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
- const char *props)
+ const char *mdprops)
{
+ if (mdprops == NULL)
+ mdprops = ctx->propq;
+
if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
- if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
+ if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
return 0;
+ }
OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
return 1;
}
+static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
+ return 0;
+
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+ prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
+ prsactx->operation = operation;
+
+ /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+ prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
+
+ switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+
+ {
+ const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
+ rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
+
+ if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
+ int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
+ int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
+ int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
+ const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
+
+ mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
+ mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+ if (mdname == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ strncpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
+ strncpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
+ sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
+ prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
+
+ return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq);
+ }
+ }
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
+ clean_tbuf(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
ctx->tbuf = NULL;
}
+static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
+{
+ return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+}
+
static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
return 1;
}
- if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
+ if (sigsize < rsasize) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
+ "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
return 0;
+ }
if (mdsize != 0) {
if (tbslen != mdsize) {
return 0;
}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
unsigned int sltmp;
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
+ "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
+ RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
return 0;
}
if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "minimum salt length set to %d, "
+ "but the digest only gives %d",
+ prsactx->min_saltlen,
+ EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHRU */
default:
if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
&& prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
+ "actual salt length is only set to %d",
+ prsactx->min_saltlen,
+ prsactx->saltlen);
return 0;
}
break;
prsactx->pad_mode);
}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
end:
#endif
if (ret <= 0) {
return 1;
}
+static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
+{
+ return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
+}
+
static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
unsigned char *rout,
size_t *routlen,
*routlen = ret;
if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
+ "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
+ routsize, ret);
return 0;
}
memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
return 1;
}
+static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
+{
+ return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+}
+
static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
int ret;
size_t mdsize;
- /* Check PSS restrictions */
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
- return 0;
- case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
- if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
- /* FALLTHRU */
- default:
- if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
- && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
-
/*
* We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
* call
}
static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
- const char *props, void *vrsa)
+ void *vrsa, int operation)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
- if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
- || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
+ if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
+ || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
return 0;
prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto error;
+ }
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
goto error;
return 0;
}
-int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
- size_t datalen)
+static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
}
-int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
- size_t sigsize)
+static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
+ void *vrsa)
+{
+ return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+}
+
+static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
+static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
+ void *vrsa)
+{
+ return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
+ EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+}
int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen)
EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
+ OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
free_tbuf(prsactx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
- if (dstctx == NULL)
+ if (dstctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
+ }
*dstctx = *srcctx;
dstctx->rsa = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+
+ if (propsp == NULL)
+ pmdprops = NULL;
+ else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
return 0;
- /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
/* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
}
/* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
return 0;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
if (p != NULL) {
int pad_mode = 0;
+ const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
switch (p->data_type) {
case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
* OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
* with signature use.
*/
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
- "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
- return 0;
+ err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
+ goto bad_pad;
case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
- if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
- rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
- goto cont;
+ if ((prsactx->operation
+ & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
+ err_extra_text =
+ "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
+ goto bad_pad;
+ }
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL
+ && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
+ goto cont;
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
+ goto cont;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
+ goto cont;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
- PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
- "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
- return 0;
- }
+ err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
cont:
- if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
- return 0;
- break;
+ if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
+ RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
+ break;
+ /* FALLTHRU */
default:
+ bad_pad:
+ if (err_extra_text == NULL)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+ else
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ err_extra_text);
return 0;
}
+ if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
+ return 0;
prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
}
return 0;
}
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
+ if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "Should be more than %d, but would be "
+ "set to match digest size (%d)",
+ prsactx->min_saltlen,
+ EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHRU */
+ default:
+ if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "Should be more than %d, "
+ "but would be set to %d",
+ prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
}
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+
+ if (propsp == NULL)
+ pmdprops = NULL;
+ else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
return 0;
if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
return 0;
}
- /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
+ /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
|| EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
return 1;
}
/* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
return 0;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff