/*
- * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/*
+ * DSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
-#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
#include "crypto/dsa.h"
-
-static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn dsa_newctx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn dsa_signature_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn dsa_signature_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn dsa_sign;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn dsa_verify;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn dsa_digest_signverify_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn dsa_digest_sign_final;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn dsa_digest_signverify_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn dsa_digest_verify_final;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn dsa_freectx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn dsa_dupctx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
+#include "prov/der_dsa.h"
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn dsa_newctx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn dsa_sign_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn dsa_verify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn dsa_sign;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn dsa_verify;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn dsa_digest_sign_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn dsa_digest_sign_final;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn dsa_digest_verify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn dsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn dsa_digest_verify_final;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn dsa_freectx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn dsa_dupctx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_get_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_set_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn dsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
/*
* What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
*/
typedef struct {
- OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
+ char *propq;
DSA *dsa;
- size_t mdsize;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
+ * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
+ * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
+ * by their Final function.
+ */
+ unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
+
char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
- /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
- unsigned char aid[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
+ unsigned char aid_buf[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *aid;
size_t aid_len;
/* main digest */
EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+ int operation;
} PROV_DSA_CTX;
-static void *dsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+
+static size_t dsa_get_md_size(const PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx)
+{
+ if (pdsactx->md != NULL)
+ return EVP_MD_size(pdsactx->md);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void *dsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
{
- PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_DSA_CTX));
+ PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx;
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+ pdsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_DSA_CTX));
if (pdsactx == NULL)
return NULL;
- pdsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
+ pdsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
+ pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ if (propq != NULL && (pdsactx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(pdsactx);
+ pdsactx = NULL;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ }
return pdsactx;
}
-static int dsa_signature_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
+static int dsa_setup_md(PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *mdname, const char *mdprops)
+{
+ if (mdprops == NULL)
+ mdprops = ctx->propq;
+
+ if (mdname != NULL) {
+ int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+ WPACKET pkt;
+ EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+ int md_nid = ossl_digest_get_approved_nid_with_sha1(md, sha1_allowed);
+ size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
+
+ if (md == NULL || md_nid == NID_undef) {
+ if (md == NULL)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
+ if (md_nid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
+ if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
+ * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had, but the operation itself is
+ * still valid, just as long as it's not used to construct
+ * anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
+ */
+ ctx->aid_len = 0;
+ if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
+ && ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_DSA_with_MD(&pkt, -1, ctx->dsa,
+ md_nid)
+ && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+ WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
+ ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
+ }
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+
+ ctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ ctx->md = md;
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int dsa_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa, int operation)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
- if (pdsactx == NULL || vdsa == NULL || !DSA_up_ref(vdsa))
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running()
+ || pdsactx == NULL
+ || vdsa == NULL
+ || !DSA_up_ref(vdsa))
return 0;
DSA_free(pdsactx->dsa);
pdsactx->dsa = vdsa;
+ pdsactx->operation = operation;
+ if (!ossl_dsa_check_key(vdsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
+static int dsa_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+}
+
+static int dsa_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+}
+
static int dsa_sign(void *vpdsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
int ret;
unsigned int sltmp;
size_t dsasize = DSA_size(pdsactx->dsa);
+ size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx);
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = dsasize;
if (sigsize < (size_t)dsasize)
return 0;
- if (pdsactx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != pdsactx->mdsize)
+ if (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize)
return 0;
- ret = dsa_sign_int(pdsactx->libctx, 0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
- pdsactx->dsa);
+ ret = ossl_dsa_sign_int(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, pdsactx->dsa);
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
+ size_t mdsize = dsa_get_md_size(pdsactx);
- if (pdsactx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != pdsactx->mdsize)
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (mdsize != 0 && tbslen != mdsize))
return 0;
return DSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, pdsactx->dsa);
}
-static int get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- /*
- * Because the DSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
- * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
- * map.
- */
- static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
- { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
- { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
- { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
- { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
- { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
- { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
- { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
- { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
- { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
- };
- size_t i;
- int mdnid = NID_undef;
-
- if (md == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
- if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
- mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (mdnid == NID_undef)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
-
- end:
- return mdnid;
-}
-
static int dsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
- const char *props, void *vdsa)
+ void *vdsa, int operation)
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
- size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
- const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(pdsactx->mdctx);
- EVP_MD_free(pdsactx->md);
- pdsactx->mdctx = NULL;
- pdsactx->mdsize = 0;
- pdsactx->md = NULL;
- if (!dsa_signature_init(vpdsactx, vdsa))
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
- pdsactx->md = EVP_MD_fetch(pdsactx->libctx, mdname, props);
- algorithmidentifier =
- dsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(get_md_nid(pdsactx->md),
- &algorithmidentifier_len);
+ pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
+ if (!dsa_signverify_init(vpdsactx, vdsa, operation))
+ return 0;
- if (algorithmidentifier == NULL)
- goto error;
+ if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, NULL))
+ return 0;
- pdsactx->mdsize = EVP_MD_size(pdsactx->md);
pdsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
goto error;
- memcpy(pdsactx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
- pdsactx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
-
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, pdsactx->md, NULL))
goto error;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(pdsactx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(pdsactx->md);
pdsactx->mdctx = NULL;
- pdsactx->mdsize = 0;
pdsactx->md = NULL;
return 0;
}
+static int dsa_digest_sign_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname,
+ void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+}
+
+static int dsa_digest_verify_init(void *vpdsactx, const char *mdname, void *vdsa)
+{
+ return dsa_digest_signverify_init(vpdsactx, mdname, vdsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+}
+
int dsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vpdsactx, const unsigned char *data,
size_t datalen)
{
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
- if (pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
return 0;
}
+ pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+
return dsa_sign(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
- if (pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || pdsactx == NULL || pdsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(pdsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
+ pdsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+
return dsa_verify(vpdsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
}
static void dsa_freectx(void *vpdsactx)
{
- PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
-
- DSA_free(pdsactx->dsa);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(pdsactx->mdctx);
- EVP_MD_free(pdsactx->md);
-
- OPENSSL_free(pdsactx);
+ PROV_DSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->propq = NULL;
+ ctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ ctx->md = NULL;
+ DSA_free(ctx->dsa);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
static void *dsa_dupctx(void *vpdsactx)
PROV_DSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
PROV_DSA_CTX *dstctx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+
dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
if (dstctx == NULL)
return NULL;
dstctx->dsa = NULL;
dstctx->md = NULL;
dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ dstctx->propq = NULL;
if (srcctx->dsa != NULL && !DSA_up_ref(srcctx->dsa))
goto err;
|| !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
goto err;
}
+ if (srcctx->propq != NULL) {
+ dstctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(srcctx->propq);
+ if (dstctx->propq == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
return dstctx;
err:
&& !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, pdsactx->aid, pdsactx->aid_len))
return 0;
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, pdsactx->mdsize))
- return 0;
-
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, pdsactx->md == NULL
- ? pdsactx->mdname
- : EVP_MD_name(pdsactx->md)))
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, pdsactx->mdname))
return 0;
return 1;
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
{
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
{
PROV_DSA_CTX *pdsactx = (PROV_DSA_CTX *)vpdsactx;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
- char *mdname;
if (pdsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
return 0;
- if (pdsactx->md != NULL) {
- /*
- * You cannot set the digest name/size when doing a DigestSign or
- * DigestVerify.
- */
- return 1;
- }
-
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &pdsactx->mdsize))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * We never actually use the mdname, but we do support getting it later.
- * This can be useful for applications that want to know the MD that they
- * previously set.
- */
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
- mdname = pdsactx->mdname;
- if (p != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &mdname, sizeof(pdsactx->mdname)))
+ /* Not allowed during certain operations */
+ if (p != NULL && !pdsactx->flag_allow_md)
return 0;
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
+ char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
+ return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+ if (!dsa_setup_md(pdsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ return 0;
+ }
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *dsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
/*
* TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
* params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
* case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
* digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
+ * NOTE: Ideally we would check pdsactx->flag_allow_md, but this is
+ * problematic because there is no nice way of passing the
+ * PROV_DSA_CTX down to this function...
+ * Because we have API's that dont know about their parent..
+ * e.g: EVP_SIGNATURE_gettable_ctx_params(const EVP_SIGNATURE *sig).
+ * We could pass NULL for that case (but then how useful is the check?).
*/
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(pdsactx->md);
}
-const OSSL_DISPATCH dsa_signature_functions[] = {
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_dsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))dsa_newctx },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))dsa_sign },
- { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))dsa_verify },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_sign_final },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
- (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ (void (*)(void))dsa_digest_verify_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
(void (*)(void))dsa_digest_signverify_update },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
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