/*
- * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2019-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
*/
#include "e_os.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
-
-# include <stdlib.h>
-# include <stdarg.h>
-# include <string.h>
-# include <openssl/hmac.h>
-# include <openssl/cms.h>
-# include <openssl/evp.h>
-# include <openssl/kdf.h>
-# include <openssl/x509.h>
-# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
-# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-# include "internal/numbers.h"
-# include "crypto/evp.h"
-# include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
-# include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
-# include "prov/implementations.h"
-# include "internal/provider_util.h"
-
-# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
-
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params;
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/proverr.h>
+#include "internal/packet.h"
+#include "internal/der.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "prov/providercommon.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/provider_util.h"
+#include "prov/der_wrap.h"
+
+#define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params;
typedef struct {
void *provctx;
PROV_DIGEST digest;
unsigned char *secret;
size_t secret_len;
- int cek_nid;
- unsigned char *ukm;
- size_t ukm_len;
+ unsigned char *acvpinfo;
+ size_t acvpinfo_len;
+ unsigned char *partyuinfo, *partyvinfo, *supp_pubinfo, *supp_privinfo;
+ size_t partyuinfo_len, partyvinfo_len, supp_pubinfo_len, supp_privinfo_len;
size_t dkm_len;
+ const unsigned char *cek_oid;
+ size_t cek_oid_len;
+ int use_keybits;
} KDF_X942;
-/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
+/*
+ * A table of allowed wrapping algorithms, oids and the associated output
+ * lengths.
+ * NOTE: RC2wrap and camellia128_wrap have been removed as there are no
+ * corresponding ciphers for these operations.
+ */
static const struct {
- int nid;
+ const char *name;
+ const unsigned char *oid;
+ size_t oid_len;
size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
} kek_algs[] = {
- { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
- { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
- { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
- { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
+ { "AES-128-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes128_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes128_wrap,
+ 16 },
+ { "AES-192-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes192_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes192_wrap,
+ 24 },
+ { "AES-256-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes256_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes256_wrap,
+ 32 },
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ { "DES3-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap,
+ DER_OID_SZ_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
+#endif
};
-/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
-static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
+static int find_alg_id(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algname,
+ const char *propq, size_t *id)
{
- int i, tag, xclass;
- long tmplen;
- const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+ int ret = 1;
+ size_t i;
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
- if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
- return 0;
- if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
- q += tmplen;
- *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
- *plen -= q - *pp;
- return 1;
+ cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, algname, propq);
+ if (cipher != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++) {
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(cipher, kek_algs[i].name)) {
+ *id = i;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
+end:
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int DER_w_keyinfo(WPACKET *pkt,
+ const unsigned char *der_oid, size_t der_oidlen,
+ unsigned char **pcounter)
+{
+ return ossl_DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1)
+ /* Store the initial value of 1 into the counter */
+ && ossl_DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, -1, 1)
+ /* Remember where we stored the counter in the buffer */
+ && (pcounter == NULL
+ || (*pcounter = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt)) != NULL)
+ && ossl_DER_w_precompiled(pkt, -1, der_oid, der_oidlen)
+ && ossl_DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1);
+}
+
+static int der_encode_sharedinfo(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
+ const unsigned char *der_oid, size_t der_oidlen,
+ const unsigned char *acvp, size_t acvplen,
+ const unsigned char *partyu, size_t partyulen,
+ const unsigned char *partyv, size_t partyvlen,
+ const unsigned char *supp_pub, size_t supp_publen,
+ const unsigned char *supp_priv, size_t supp_privlen,
+ uint32_t keylen_bits, unsigned char **pcounter)
+{
+ return (buf != NULL ? WPACKET_init_der(pkt, buf, buflen) :
+ WPACKET_init_null_der(pkt))
+ && ossl_DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1)
+ && (supp_priv == NULL
+ || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 3, supp_priv, supp_privlen))
+ && (supp_pub == NULL
+ || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 2, supp_pub, supp_publen))
+ && (keylen_bits == 0
+ || ossl_DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, 2, keylen_bits))
+ && (partyv == NULL || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 1, partyv, partyvlen))
+ && (partyu == NULL || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 0, partyu, partyulen))
+ && (acvp == NULL || ossl_DER_w_precompiled(pkt, -1, acvp, acvplen))
+ && DER_w_keyinfo(pkt, der_oid, der_oidlen, pcounter)
+ && ossl_DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1)
+ && WPACKET_finish(pkt);
}
/*
* Encode the other info structure.
*
- * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
+ * The ANS X9.42-2003 standard uses OtherInfo:
*
* OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
- * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
- * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ * partyUInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * partyVInfo [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPrivInfo [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
* }
*
* KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
* }
*
- * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
+ * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for OtherInfo
+ *
+ * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
+ * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ * Where suppPubInfo is the key length (in bits) (stored into 4 bytes)
+ *
* |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
- * suppPubInfo (in bits).
- * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
- * can be NULL.
- * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
+ * suppPubInfo (in bits). It is ignored if the value is 0.
+ * |cek_oid| The oid of the key wrapping algorithm.
+ * |cek_oidlen| The length (in bytes) of the key wrapping algorithm oid,
+ * |acvp| is the optional blob of DER data representing one or more of the
+ * OtherInfo fields related to |partyu|, |partyv|, |supp_pub| and |supp_priv|.
+ * This field should noramlly be NULL. If |acvp| is non NULL then |partyu|,
+ * |partyv|, |supp_pub| and |supp_priv| should all be NULL.
+ * |acvp_len| is the |acvp| length (in bytes).
+ * |partyu| is the optional public info contributed by the initiator.
+ * It can be NULL. (It is also used as the ukm by CMS).
+ * |partyu_len| is the |partyu| length (in bytes).
+ * |partyv| is the optional public info contributed by the responder.
+ * It can be NULL.
+ * |partyv_len| is the |partyv| length (in bytes).
+ * |supp_pub| is the optional additional, mutually-known public information.
+ * It can be NULL. |keylen| should be 0 if this is not NULL.
+ * |supp_pub_len| is the |supp_pub| length (in bytes).
+ * |supp_priv| is the optional additional, mutually-known private information.
+ * It can be NULL.
+ * |supp_priv_len| is the |supp_priv| length (in bytes).
* |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
* |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
* |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
- * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
+ * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without
+ * re-encoding.
*
* Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
* Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
*/
-static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
- unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
- unsigned char **out_ctr)
+static int
+x942_encode_otherinfo(size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *cek_oid, size_t cek_oid_len,
+ const unsigned char *acvp, size_t acvp_len,
+ const unsigned char *partyu, size_t partyu_len,
+ const unsigned char *partyv, size_t partyv_len,
+ const unsigned char *supp_pub, size_t supp_pub_len,
+ const unsigned char *supp_priv, size_t supp_priv_len,
+ unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
+ unsigned char **out_ctr)
{
- unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
- int ret = 0, encoded_len;
- long tlen;
- /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
- static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
- X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
- ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
-
- /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
- ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
- alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
- ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (ksi == NULL
- || alg_oid == NULL
- || ctr_oct == NULL
- || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
- || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *pcounter = NULL, *der_buf = NULL;
+ size_t der_buflen = 0;
+ WPACKET pkt;
+ uint32_t keylen_bits;
+
+ /* keylenbits must fit into 4 bytes */
+ if (keylen > 0xFFFFFF)
+ return 0;
+ keylen_bits = 8 * keylen;
+
+ /* Calculate the size of the buffer */
+ if (!der_encode_sharedinfo(&pkt, NULL, 0, cek_oid, cek_oid_len,
+ acvp, acvp_len,
+ partyu, partyu_len, partyv, partyv_len,
+ supp_pub, supp_pub_len, supp_priv, supp_priv_len,
+ keylen_bits, NULL)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &der_buflen))
goto err;
- /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
- alg_oid = NULL;
- ctr_oct = NULL;
-
- /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
- if (ukm != NULL) {
- ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
- if (ukm_oct == NULL)
- goto err;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
- }
- /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
- encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
- if (encoded_len <= 0)
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ /* Alloc the buffer */
+ der_buf = OPENSSL_zalloc(der_buflen);
+ if (der_buf == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* Encode into the buffer */
+ if (!der_encode_sharedinfo(&pkt, der_buf, der_buflen, cek_oid, cek_oid_len,
+ acvp, acvp_len,
+ partyu, partyu_len, partyv, partyv_len,
+ supp_pub, supp_pub_len, supp_priv, supp_priv_len,
+ keylen_bits, &pcounter))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * Since we allocated the exact size required, the buffer should point to the
+ * start of the alllocated buffer at this point.
+ */
+ if (WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt) != der_buf)
goto err;
- /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
- p = encoded;
- tlen = (long)encoded_len;
- if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
- && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
- && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
- *out_ctr = p;
- *der = encoded;
- *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
- ret = 1;
- }
+ /*
+ * The data for the DER encoded octet string of a 32 bit counter = 1
+ * should be 04 04 00 00 00 01
+ * So just check the header is correct and skip over it.
+ * This counter will be incremented in the kdf update loop.
+ */
+ if (pcounter == NULL
+ || pcounter[0] != 0x04
+ || pcounter[1] != 0x04)
+ goto err;
+ *out_ctr = (pcounter + 2);
+ *der = der_buf;
+ *der_len = der_buflen;
+ ret = 1;
err:
- if (ret != 1)
- OPENSSL_free(encoded);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
- ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
- X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
return ret;
}
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
- if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
- || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
- || derived_key_len == 0) {
+ if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
{
KDF_X942 *ctx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ ctx->use_keybits = 1;
return ctx;
}
static void x942kdf_reset(void *vctx)
{
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
+ void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->acvpinfo, ctx->acvpinfo_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->partyuinfo, ctx->partyuinfo_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->partyvinfo, ctx->partyvinfo_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->supp_pubinfo, ctx->supp_pubinfo_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->supp_privinfo, ctx->supp_privinfo_len);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ ctx->use_keybits = 1;
}
static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx)
{
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
- x942kdf_reset(ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ x942kdf_reset(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ }
}
static int x942kdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
}
-static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
- const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
+ const EVP_MD *md;
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *ctr;
unsigned char *der = NULL;
size_t der_len = 0;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !x942kdf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * These 2 options encode to the same field so only one of them should be
+ * active at once.
+ */
+ if (ctx->use_keybits && ctx->supp_pubinfo != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PUBINFO);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If the blob of acvp data is used then the individual info fields that it
+ * replaces should not also be defined.
+ */
+ if (ctx->acvpinfo != NULL
+ && (ctx->partyuinfo != NULL
+ || ctx->partyvinfo != NULL
+ || ctx->supp_pubinfo != NULL
+ || ctx->supp_privinfo != NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
+ md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- if (ctx->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
+ if (ctx->cek_oid == NULL || ctx->cek_oid_len == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
}
- if (ctx->ukm != NULL && ctx->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
+ if (ctx->partyuinfo != NULL && ctx->partyuinfo_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
/*
- * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
+ * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits if it is used.
* For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
*/
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- if (keylen != ctx->dkm_len) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_UKM_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
/* generate the otherinfo der */
- if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->cek_nid, ctx->dkm_len,
- ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len,
+ if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->use_keybits ? ctx->dkm_len : 0,
+ ctx->cek_oid, ctx->cek_oid_len,
+ ctx->acvpinfo, ctx->acvpinfo_len,
+ ctx->partyuinfo, ctx->partyuinfo_len,
+ ctx->partyvinfo, ctx->partyvinfo_len,
+ ctx->supp_pubinfo, ctx->supp_pubinfo_len,
+ ctx->supp_privinfo, ctx->supp_privinfo_len,
&der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
- const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p, *pq;
KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx;
- OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
- size_t i;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ const char *propq = NULL;
+ size_t id;
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
return 0;
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
- || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
- if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
- return 0;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY);
+ if (p != NULL && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_ACVPINFO);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->acvpinfo, &ctx->acvpinfo_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYUINFO);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->partyuinfo, &ctx->partyuinfo_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYVINFO);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->partyvinfo, &ctx->partyvinfo_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ctx->use_keybits))
+ return 0;
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM)) != NULL)
- if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ukm, &ctx->ukm_len, p))
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->supp_pubinfo, &ctx->supp_pubinfo_len, p))
return 0;
+ ctx->use_keybits = 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->supp_privinfo, &ctx->supp_privinfo_len, p))
+ return 0;
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG)) != NULL) {
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG);
+ if (p != NULL) {
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
return 0;
- ctx->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p->data);
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++)
- if (kek_algs[i].nid == ctx->cek_nid)
- goto cek_found;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
- return 0;
-cek_found:
- ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
+ pq = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+ /*
+ * We already grab the properties during ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params()
+ * so there is no need to check the validity again..
+ */
+ if (pq != NULL)
+ propq = p->data;
+ if (find_alg_id(provctx, p->data, propq, &id) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ ctx->cek_oid = kek_algs[id].oid;
+ ctx->cek_oid_len = kek_algs[id].oid_len;
+ ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[id].keklen;
}
return 1;
}
-static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_ACVPINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYUINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYVINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return -2;
}
-static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
+ ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
-const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_get_ctx_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff