PROV_DIGEST digest;
unsigned char *secret;
size_t secret_len;
- unsigned char *ukm;
- size_t ukm_len;
+ unsigned char *partyuinfo, *partyvinfo, *supp_pubinfo, *supp_privinfo;
+ size_t partyuinfo_len, partyvinfo_len, supp_pubinfo_len, supp_privinfo_len;
size_t dkm_len;
const unsigned char *cek_oid;
size_t cek_oid_len;
+ int use_keybits;
} KDF_X942;
/*
size_t oid_len;
size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
} kek_algs[] = {
- { "AES-128-WRAP", der_oid_id_aes128_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
- { "AES-192-WRAP", der_oid_id_aes192_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
- { "AES-256-WRAP", der_oid_id_aes256_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- { "DES3-WRAP", der_oid_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap,
+ { "AES-128-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes128_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes128_wrap,
+ 16 },
+ { "AES-192-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes192_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes192_wrap,
24 },
+ { "AES-256-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_aes256_wrap, DER_OID_SZ_id_aes256_wrap,
+ 32 },
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ { "DES3-WRAP", ossl_der_oid_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap,
+ DER_OID_SZ_id_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
#endif
};
-static int find_alg_id(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *algname, size_t *id)
+static int find_alg_id(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *algname,
+ const char *propq, size_t *id)
{
int ret = 1;
size_t i;
EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
- cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, algname, NULL);
+ cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, algname, propq);
if (cipher != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(cipher, kek_algs[i].name)) {
const unsigned char *der_oid, size_t der_oidlen,
unsigned char **pcounter)
{
- return DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1)
+ return ossl_DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1)
/* Store the initial value of 1 into the counter */
- && DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, -1, 1)
+ && ossl_DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, -1, 1)
/* Remember where we stored the counter in the buffer */
&& (pcounter == NULL
|| (*pcounter = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt)) != NULL)
- && DER_w_precompiled(pkt, -1, der_oid, der_oidlen)
- && DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1);
+ && ossl_DER_w_precompiled(pkt, -1, der_oid, der_oidlen)
+ && ossl_DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1);
}
static int der_encode_sharedinfo(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
const unsigned char *der_oid, size_t der_oidlen,
- const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
+ const unsigned char *partyu, size_t partyulen,
+ const unsigned char *partyv, size_t partyvlen,
+ const unsigned char *supp_pub, size_t supp_publen,
+ const unsigned char *supp_priv, size_t supp_privlen,
uint32_t keylen_bits, unsigned char **pcounter)
{
return (buf != NULL ? WPACKET_init_der(pkt, buf, buflen) :
WPACKET_init_null_der(pkt))
- && DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1)
- && DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, 2, keylen_bits)
- && (ukm == NULL || DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 0, ukm, ukmlen))
+ && ossl_DER_w_begin_sequence(pkt, -1)
+ && (supp_priv == NULL
+ || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 3, supp_priv, supp_privlen))
+ && (supp_pub == NULL
+ || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 2, supp_pub, supp_publen))
+ && (keylen_bits == 0
+ || ossl_DER_w_octet_string_uint32(pkt, 2, keylen_bits))
+ && (partyv == NULL || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 1, partyv, partyvlen))
+ && (partyu == NULL || ossl_DER_w_octet_string(pkt, 0, partyu, partyulen))
&& DER_w_keyinfo(pkt, der_oid, der_oidlen, pcounter)
- && DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1)
+ && ossl_DER_w_end_sequence(pkt, -1)
&& WPACKET_finish(pkt);
}
/*
* Encode the other info structure.
*
- * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
+ * The ANS X9.42-2003 standard uses OtherInfo:
*
* OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
- * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
- * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ * partyUInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * partyVInfo [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPrivInfo [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
* }
- * Note suppPubInfo is the key length (in bits) (stored into 4 bytes)
- *
*
* KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
* }
+ *
+ * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for OtherInfo
+ *
+ * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
+ * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ * Where suppPubInfo is the key length (in bits) (stored into 4 bytes)
+ *
+}
*
* |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
- * suppPubInfo (in bits).
+ * suppPubInfo (in bits). It is ignored if the value is 0.
* |cek_oid| The oid of the key wrapping algorithm.
* |cek_oidlen| The length (in bytes) of the key wrapping algorithm oid,
- * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
+ * |partyu| is the optional public info contributed by the initiator. It
+ * can be NULL. (It is also used as the ukm by CMS).
+ * |partyu_len| is the |partyu| length (in bytes).
+ * |partyv| is the optional public info contributed by the responder. It
+ * can be NULL.
+ * |partyv_len| is the |partyv| length (in bytes).
+ * |supp_pub| is the optional additional, mutually-known public information. It
+ * can be NULL. |keylen| should be 0 if this is not NULL.
+ * |supp_pub_len| is the |supp_pub| length (in bytes).
+ * |supp_priv| is the optional additional, mutually-known private information. It
* can be NULL.
- * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
+ * |supp_priv_len| is the |supp_priv| length (in bytes).
* |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
* |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
* |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
* Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
* Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
*/
-static int x942_encode_otherinfo(size_t keylen,
- const unsigned char *cek_oid, size_t cek_oidlen,
- const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
- unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
- unsigned char **out_ctr)
+static int
+x942_encode_otherinfo(size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *cek_oid, size_t cek_oidlen,
+ const unsigned char *partyu, size_t partyu_len,
+ const unsigned char *partyv, size_t partyv_len,
+ const unsigned char *supp_pub, size_t supp_pub_len,
+ const unsigned char *supp_priv, size_t supp_priv_len,
+ unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
+ unsigned char **out_ctr)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *pcounter = NULL, *der_buf = NULL;
keylen_bits = 8 * keylen;
/* Calculate the size of the buffer */
- if (!der_encode_sharedinfo(&pkt, NULL, 0, cek_oid, cek_oidlen, ukm, ukmlen,
+ if (!der_encode_sharedinfo(&pkt, NULL, 0, cek_oid, cek_oidlen,
+ partyu, partyu_len, partyv, partyv_len,
+ supp_pub, supp_pub_len, supp_priv, supp_priv_len,
keylen_bits, NULL)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &der_buflen))
goto err;
goto err;
/* Encode into the buffer */
if (!der_encode_sharedinfo(&pkt, der_buf, der_buflen, cek_oid, cek_oidlen,
- ukm, ukmlen, keylen_bits, &pcounter))
+ partyu, partyu_len, partyv, partyv_len,
+ supp_pub, supp_pub_len, supp_priv, supp_priv_len,
+ keylen_bits, &pcounter))
goto err;
/*
* Since we allocated the exact size required, the buffer should point to the
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ ctx->use_keybits = 1;
return ctx;
}
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->partyuinfo, ctx->partyuinfo_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->partyvinfo, ctx->partyvinfo_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->supp_pubinfo, ctx->supp_pubinfo_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->supp_privinfo, ctx->supp_privinfo_len);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ ctx->use_keybits = 1;
}
static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx)
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return 0;
+ /*
+ * These 2 options encode to the same field so only one of them should be
+ * active at once.
+ */
+ if (ctx->use_keybits && ctx->supp_pubinfo != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PUBINFO);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
}
- if (ctx->ukm != NULL && ctx->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
+ if (ctx->partyuinfo != NULL && ctx->partyuinfo_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
/*
- * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
+ * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits if it is used.
* For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
*/
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_UKM_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
/* generate the otherinfo der */
- if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->dkm_len,
+ if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->use_keybits ? ctx->dkm_len : 0,
ctx->cek_oid, ctx->cek_oid_len,
- ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len,
+ ctx->partyuinfo, ctx->partyuinfo_len,
+ ctx->partyvinfo, ctx->partyvinfo_len,
+ ctx->supp_pubinfo, ctx->supp_pubinfo_len,
+ ctx->supp_privinfo, ctx->supp_privinfo_len,
&der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
- const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p, *pq;
KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx;
- OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ const char *propq = NULL;
size_t id;
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
return 0;
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
- || (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
- if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
- return 0;
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY);
+ if (p != NULL && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYUINFO);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->partyuinfo, &ctx->partyuinfo_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYVINFO);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->partyvinfo, &ctx->partyvinfo_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &ctx->use_keybits))
+ return 0;
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM)) != NULL)
- if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ukm, &ctx->ukm_len, p))
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->supp_pubinfo, &ctx->supp_pubinfo_len, p))
return 0;
+ ctx->use_keybits = 0;
+ }
- if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG)) != NULL) {
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->supp_privinfo, &ctx->supp_privinfo_len, p))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG);
+ if (p != NULL) {
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
return 0;
- if (find_alg_id(provctx, p->data, &id) == 0)
+ pq = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+ /*
+ * We already grab the properties during ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params()
+ * so there is no need to check the validity again..
+ */
+ if (pq != NULL)
+ propq = p->data;
+ if (find_alg_id(provctx, p->data, propq, &id) == 0)
return 0;
ctx->cek_oid = kek_algs[id].oid;
ctx->cek_oid_len = kek_algs[id].oid_len;
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYUINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_PARTYVINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PUBINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_SUPP_PRIVINFO, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_X942_USE_KEYBITS, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
-const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset },
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff