/*
- * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* A(0) = seed
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
*/
+
+/*
+ * Low level APIs (such as DH) are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
-#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_free;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_tls1_prf_reset;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_prf_derive;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params;
+#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+#include "internal/e_os.h"
+#include "internal/safe_math.h"
+
+OSSL_SAFE_MATH_UNSIGNED(size_t, size_t)
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_dup;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_free;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn kdf_tls1_prf_reset;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_prf_derive;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params;
static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
-#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
+#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST "\x6d\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72\x20\x73\x65\x63\x72\x65\x74"
+#define TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE 13
/* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
typedef struct {
/* Secret value to use for PRF */
unsigned char *sec;
size_t seclen;
- /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
- unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
+ /* Concatenated seed data */
+ unsigned char *seed;
size_t seedlen;
} TLS1_PRF;
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx;
- if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->provctx = provctx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) != NULL)
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
return ctx;
}
static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+ void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
- EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_hash);
- EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_sha1);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_hash);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ ctx->provctx = provctx;
}
-static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen)
+static void *kdf_tls1_prf_dup(void *vctx)
+{
+ const TLS1_PRF *src = (const TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+ TLS1_PRF *dest;
+
+ dest = kdf_tls1_prf_new(src->provctx);
+ if (dest != NULL) {
+ if (src->P_hash != NULL
+ && (dest->P_hash = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(src->P_hash)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (src->P_sha1 != NULL
+ && (dest->P_sha1 = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(src->P_sha1)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (!ossl_prov_memdup(src->sec, src->seclen, &dest->sec, &dest->seclen))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ossl_prov_memdup(src->seed, src->seedlen, &dest->seed,
+ &dest->seedlen))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return dest;
+
+ err:
+ kdf_tls1_prf_free(dest);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
+
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
+ return 0;
if (ctx->P_hash == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SEED);
return 0;
}
+ if (keylen == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The seed buffer is prepended with a label.
+ * If EMS mode is enforced then the label "master secret" is not allowed,
+ * We do the check this way since the PRF is used for other purposes, as well
+ * as "extended master secret".
+ */
+ if (ossl_tls1_prf_ems_check_enabled(libctx)) {
+ if (ctx->seedlen >= TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE
+ && memcmp(ctx->seed, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+ TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_EMS_NOT_ENABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
- OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
+
+ if (params == NULL)
+ return 1;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
- if (strcasecmp(p->data, SN_md5_sha1) == 0) {
+ if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(p->data, SN_md5_sha1) == 0) {
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
NULL, SN_md5, libctx)
NULL, SN_sha1, libctx))
return 0;
} else {
- EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx->P_sha1);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
NULL, NULL, libctx))
}
/* The seed fields concatenate, so process them all */
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
- ctx->seedlen = 0;
-
for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) {
- const void *q = ctx->seed + ctx->seedlen;
- size_t sz = 0;
-
- if (p->data_size != 0
- && p->data != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
- TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - ctx->seedlen,
- &sz))
- return 0;
- ctx->seedlen += sz;
+ if (p->data_size != 0 && p->data != NULL) {
+ const void *val = NULL;
+ size_t sz = 0;
+ unsigned char *seed;
+ size_t seedlen;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string_ptr(p, &val, &sz))
+ return 0;
+
+ seedlen = safe_add_size_t(ctx->seedlen, sz, &err);
+ if (err)
+ return 0;
+
+ seed = OPENSSL_clear_realloc(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen, seedlen);
+ if (!seed)
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->seed = seed;
+ if (ossl_assert(sz != 0))
+ memcpy(ctx->seed + ctx->seedlen, val, sz);
+ ctx->seedlen = seedlen;
+ }
}
}
return 1;
}
-static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(
+ ossl_unused void *ctx, ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
return -2;
}
-static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(
+ ossl_unused void *ctx, ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
-const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_tls1_prf_functions[] = {
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_prf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_new },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_dup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_derive },
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params },
- { 0, NULL }
+ OSSL_DISPATCH_END
};
/*
unsigned char Ai[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t Ai_len;
int ret = 0;
- OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
- (void *)sec, sec_len);
- *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
- if (!EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx_init, params))
+ if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init, sec, sec_len, NULL))
goto err;
- if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
- goto err;
- chunk = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init);
+ chunk = EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx_init);
if (chunk == 0)
goto err;
/* A(0) = seed */
- ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
+ ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len))
/* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len, sizeof(Ai)))
goto err;
- EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx_Ai);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
ctx_Ai = NULL;
/* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */
- ctx = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx_init);
+ ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len))
goto err;
/* save state for calculating next A(i) value */
if (olen > chunk) {
- ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_dup_ctx(ctx);
+ ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
}
}
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, olen))
goto err;
- EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
out += chunk;
olen -= chunk;
}
ret = 1;
err:
- EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx);
- EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx_Ai);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai));
return ret;
}
seed, seed_len, out, olen))
return 0;
- if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL)
return 0;
- }
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(sha1ctx, sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
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