* Fix a slight bug in the state-machine. This caused the client end of a
[openssl.git] / demos / tunala / cb.c
index 4633c09..ac7122d 100644 (file)
@@ -5,10 +5,15 @@
 /* For callbacks generating output, here are their file-descriptors. */
 static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_info = NULL;
 static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_verify = NULL;
+/* Output level:
+ *     0 = nothing,
+ *     1 = minimal, just errors,
+ *     2 = minimal, all steps,
+ *     3 = detail, all steps */
+static unsigned int cb_ssl_verify_level = 1;
 
 /* Other static rubbish (to mirror s_cb.c where required) */
 static int int_verify_depth = 10;
-static int int_verify_error = X509_V_OK;
 
 /* This function is largely borrowed from the one used in OpenSSL's "s_client"
  * and "s_server" utilities. */
@@ -26,12 +31,18 @@ void cb_ssl_info(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
        str2 = SSL_state_string_long(s);
 
        if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:%s\n", str1, str2);
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) %s\n", str1, str2);
        else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
                if (ret == 0)
-                       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+                       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+/* In a non-blocking model, we get a few of these "error"s simply because we're
+ * calling "reads" and "writes" on the state-machine that are virtual NOPs
+ * simply to avoid wasting the time seeing if we *should* call them. Removing
+ * this case makes the "-out_state" output a lot easier on the eye. */
+#if 0
                else if (ret < 0)
                        fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
+#endif
        }
 }
 
@@ -40,52 +51,65 @@ void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp)
        fp_cb_ssl_info = fp;
 }
 
-/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) */
+static const char *int_reason_no_issuer = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT";
+static const char *int_reason_not_yet = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID";
+static const char *int_reason_before = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD";
+static const char *int_reason_expired = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED";
+static const char *int_reason_after = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD";
+
+/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) And since then, mutilated ... */
 int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-       char buf[256];
+       char buf1[256]; /* Used for the subject name */
+       char buf2[256]; /* Used for the issuer name */
+       const char *reason = NULL; /* Error reason (if any) */
        X509 *err_cert;
        int err, depth;
-       BIO *bio;
 
-       if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify)
+       if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify || (cb_ssl_verify_level == 0))
                return ok;
-       /* There's no <damned>FILE*</damned> version of ASN1_TIME_print */
-       bio = BIO_new_fp(fp_cb_ssl_verify, BIO_NOCLOSE);
        err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
        err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
        depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
 
-       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
-       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "depth=%d %s\n", depth, buf);
-       if(!ok) {
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
-                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
-               if((int)int_verify_depth >= depth)
-                       int_verify_error = err;
-               else
-                       int_verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
-       }
+       buf1[0] = buf2[0] = '\0';
+       /* Fill buf1 */
+       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf1, 256);
+       /* Fill buf2 */
+       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf2, 256);
        switch (ctx->error) {
        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
-               X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),
-                               buf, 256);
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "issuer= %s\n", buf);
+               reason = int_reason_no_issuer;
                break;
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+               reason = int_reason_not_yet;
+               break;
        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notBefore=");
-               ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+               reason = int_reason_before;
                break;
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+               reason = int_reason_expired;
+               break;
        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notAfter=");
-               ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+               reason = int_reason_after;
                break;
        }
-       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "verify return:%d\n",ok);
+
+       if((cb_ssl_verify_level == 1) && ok)
+               return ok;
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
+       if(reason)
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%s\n", reason);
+       else
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%d\n", err);
+       if(cb_ssl_verify_level < 3)
+               return ok;
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> subject = %s\n", buf1);
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> issuer  = %s\n", buf2);
+       if(!ok)
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
+                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> verify return:%d\n",ok);
        return ok;
 }
 
@@ -99,5 +123,11 @@ void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth)
        int_verify_depth = verify_depth;
 }
 
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level)
+{
+       if(level < 4)
+               cb_ssl_verify_level = level;
+}
+
 #endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */