static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
-#if 0
-static int x509_store_num=1;
-static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL;
-#endif
+
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
}
#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
{
- return (X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b));
+ return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
}
#endif
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
}
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
{
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
num++;
}
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
+ /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
+ * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
+ */
+
+ ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+
/* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
}
if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
}
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
- else
- {
- ctx->error = ret;
- ctx->current_cert = x;
- ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
- if ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK) && ctx->verify_cb)
- return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- else
- return 0;
- }
+ /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
+ if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+ return 0;
+
+ ctx->error = ret;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
+ if (ctx->verify_cb)
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
return 0;
}
static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
-#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok=0;
}
ok = 1;
end:
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
#endif
}
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
-#ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok;
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
return 1;
- ctx->error_depth = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
else
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
#endif
}
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int i, last, ok;
+ if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+ return 1;
+ if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ last = 0;
+ else
+ last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
+ {
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ok = check_cert(ctx);
+ if (!ok) return ok;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int ok, cnum;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
+ ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
+ /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
+ * notify callback
+ */
+ if(!ok)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ if (ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
+ err:
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+ X509_CRL_free(crl);
+ return ok;
+
+ }
+
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
+ * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
+ * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
+ */
+static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ X509_OBJECT xobj;
+ ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
+ if (!ok) return 0;
+ *crl = xobj.data.crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Check CRL validity */
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+ X509 *issuer = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
+ int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
+ time_t *ptime;
+ cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+ chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+ /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
+ * is next certificate in chain.
+ */
+ if(cnum < chnum)
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+ else
+ {
+ issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+ /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
+ if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+ if(ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(issuer)
+ {
+
+ /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
+ ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
+
+ if(!ikey)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ if(ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* Verify CRL signature */
+ if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+ if(ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
+ if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ ok= 0;
+ if(ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ ok= 0;
+ if(ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
+ {
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ ok= 0;
+ if(ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ ok= 0;
+ if(ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int idx, ok;
+ X509_REVOKED rtmp;
+ /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
+ rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
+ idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
+ /* Not found: OK */
+ if(idx == -1) return 1;
+ /* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than
+ * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
+ */
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+ if (ctx->verify_cb)
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ return ok;
+ }
+
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i,ok=0,n;
if (!ok) goto end;
}
if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+ /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
+ * this is a waste of time. That check should
+ * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
+ * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
+ * we don't verify again and again in SSL
+ * handshakes and the like once the cert has
+ * been declared trusted. */
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
}
ok=1;
end:
- return (ok);
+ return ok;
}
int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
str=(char *)ctm->data;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
- if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return (0);
+ if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
memcpy(p,str,10);
p+=10;
str+=10;
else
{
if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
- return (0);
+ return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
if (*str == '-')
j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
if (j < 50) j+=100;
- if (i < j) return (-1);
- if (i > j) return (1);
+ if (i < j) return -1;
+ if (i > j) return 1;
}
i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
- return (-1);
+ return -1;
else
- return (i);
+ return i;
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
{
time_t t;
+ int type = -1;
if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
else time(&t);
t+=adj;
- if (!s) return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
- if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return (ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
- return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
+ if (s) type = s->type;
+ if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
+ if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
+ return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
}
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
int i,j;
- if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return (1);
+ if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
break;
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
- return (0);
+ return 0;
}
/* first, populate the other certs */
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
- return (1);
+ return 1;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
- {
- x509_store_ctx_num++;
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
+ {
+ /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
+ * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
+ * That function uses locking, so we don't (usually)
+ * have to worry about locking here. For the whole cruel
+ * truth, see crypto/ex_data.c */
+ x509_store_ctx_num++;
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
&x509_store_ctx_method,
- argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
- }
+ argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func);
+ }
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
- return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data));
+ return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
}
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
- return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx));
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->error);
+ return ctx->error;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->error_depth);
+ return ctx->error_depth;
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->current_cert);
+ return ctx->current_cert;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- return (ctx->chain);
+ return ctx->chain;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
- return (chain);
+ return chain;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
ctx->verify = store->verify;
+ ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
+ ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
+ ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
+ ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
ctx->cleanup = 0;
memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
{
- ctx->flags |= flags;
+ ctx->flags |= flags;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
{
- ctx->check_time = t;
- ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+ ctx->check_time = t;
+ ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
}
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff