#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include "crypto.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include "lhash.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "evp.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include "x509.h"
-#include "objects.h"
-#include "pem.h"
-
-#ifndef NOPROTO
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+
static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-#else
-static int null_callback();
-static int internal_verify();
-#endif
+const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
-char *X509_version="X.509 part of OpenSSL 0.9.1c 23-Dec-1998";
static STACK *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
#if 0
static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL;
#endif
-static int null_callback(ok,e)
-int ok;
-X509_STORE_CTX *e;
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
return(ok);
}
#if 0
-static int x509_subject_cmp(a,b)
-X509 **a,**b;
+static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
{
return(X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b));
}
#endif
-int X509_verify_cert(ctx)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn;
int depth,i,ok=0;
int num;
int (*cb)();
- STACK *sktmp=NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
* present and that the first entry is in place */
if (ctx->chain == NULL)
{
- if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_new_null()) == NULL) ||
- (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)ctx->cert)))
+ if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+ (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
/* We use a temporary so we can chop and hack at it */
- if ((ctx->untrusted != NULL) && (sktmp=sk_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
+ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
+ && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
- num=sk_num(ctx->chain);
- x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
depth=ctx->depth;
for (;;)
{
/* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth <= num) break;
+ if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
+ * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
+ * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
+ * code later.
+ */
/* If we are self signed, we break */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn);
if (xtmp != NULL)
{
- if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)xtmp))
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- sk_delete_ptr(sktmp,(char *)xtmp);
+ sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
ctx->last_untrusted++;
x=xtmp;
num++;
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
- i=sk_num(ctx->chain);
- x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
+ i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),X509_get_issuer_name(x))
== 0)
{
/* we have a self signed certificate */
- if (sk_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
ctx->current_cert=x;
else
{
/* worry more about this one elsewhere */
- chain_ss=(X509 *)sk_pop(ctx->chain);
+ chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
ctx->last_untrusted--;
num--;
- x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+ x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
}
}
for (;;)
{
/* If we have enough, we break */
- if (depth <= num) break;
+ if (depth < num) break;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
break;
}
x=obj.data.x509;
- if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)obj.data.x509))
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,obj.data.x509))
{
X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
else
{
- sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)chain_ss);
+ sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
num++;
ctx->last_untrusted=num;
ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
end:
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
}
- if (sktmp != NULL) sk_free(sktmp);
+ if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
return(ok);
}
-static int internal_verify(ctx)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i,ok=0,n;
X509 *xs,*xi;
cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
- n=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+ n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
n--;
- xi=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi),
X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0)
xs=xi;
{
n--;
ctx->error_depth=n;
- xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
}
if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
{
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey=NULL;
i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs));
if (n >= 0)
{
xi=xs;
- xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+ xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
ok=1;
return(ok);
}
-int X509_cmp_current_time(ctm)
-ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm;
+int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm)
{
char *str;
ASN1_UTCTIME atm;
X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset);
i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
- if (i < 70) i+=100;
+ if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
- if (j < 70) j+=100;
+ if (j < 50) j+=100;
if (i < j) return (-1);
if (i > j) return (1);
return(i);
}
-ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(s, adj)
-ASN1_UTCTIME *s;
-long adj;
+ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, long adj)
{
time_t t;
return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
}
-int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(pkey,chain)
-EVP_PKEY *pkey;
-STACK *chain;
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
int i,j;
if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1);
- for (i=0; i<sk_num(chain); i++)
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
- ktmp=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,i));
+ ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
break;
else
{
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
ktmp=NULL;
}
}
/* first, populate the other certs */
for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
{
- ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,j));
+ ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
}
- if (pkey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
+ if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
return(1);
}
-int X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx,x)
-X509_STORE *ctx;
-X509 *x;
+int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x)
{
X509_OBJECT *obj,*r;
int ret=1;
return(ret);
}
-int X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx,x)
-X509_STORE *ctx;
-X509_CRL *x;
+int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x)
{
X509_OBJECT *obj,*r;
int ret=1;
return(ret);
}
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)
-long argl;
-char *argp;
-int (*new_func)();
-int (*dup_func)();
-void (*free_func)();
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, char *argp, int (*new_func)(),
+ int (*dup_func)(), void (*free_func)())
{
x509_store_ctx_num++;
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
}
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,idx,data)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-int idx;
-char *data;
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data));
}
-char *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,idx)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-int idx;
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx));
}
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->error);
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,err)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-int err;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
{
ctx->error=err;
}
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->error_depth);
}
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->current_cert);
}
-STACK *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(ctx)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return(ctx->chain);
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(ctx,x)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-X509 *x;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
ctx->cert=x;
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx,sk)
-X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
-STACK *sk;
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->untrusted=sk;
}
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff