#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "vpm_int.h"
/* CRL score values */
return 0;
}
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+ {
+ STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+ X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ int i;
+ /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+ if (certs == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Look for exact match */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+ {
+ xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+ if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+ CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ else
+ xtmp = NULL;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+ return xtmp;
+ }
+
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
- if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
+ if (id->host && !X509_check_host(x, id->host, id->hostlen, 0))
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
+ if (id->email && !X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0))
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
+ if (id->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0))
{
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
return 0;
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
}
}
+ /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
+ * certificate return success.
+ */
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ {
+ X509 *mx;
+ if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+ mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+ if (mx)
+ {
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ X509_free(x);
+ ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ }
+
/* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
* allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
*/
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok, cnum;
+ unsigned int last_reasons;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
{
+ last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
if (ctx->get_crl)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
crl = NULL;
dcrl = NULL;
+ /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+ * another iteration, so exit loop.
+ */
+ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
}
err:
X509_CRL_free(crl);
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
int i;
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
if (i >= 0)
{
/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
else
exta = NULL;
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
+ i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
if (i >= 0)
{
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- return 1;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok)
xs=xi;
else
{
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
+ {
+ xs = xi;
+ goto check_cert;
+ }
if (n <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
xs->valid = 1;
+ check_cert:
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
if (!ok)
goto end;