Fix bug in X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL CRL handling.
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
index 8ba03d5d43d41032e22ca083c72d18e2b691c4ab..b7e3f6e996f6c575afef04f9316b43116fb2bae4 100644 (file)
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "vpm_int.h"
 
 /* CRL score values */
 
@@ -160,6 +161,32 @@ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
                return 0;
        }
 
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+       {
+       STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+       X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+       int i;
+       /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+       certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+       if (certs == NULL)
+               return NULL;
+       /* Look for exact match */
+       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+               {
+               xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+               if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+                       break;
+               }
+       if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+               CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+       else
+               xtmp = NULL;
+       sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+       return xtmp;
+       }
+
 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
@@ -710,18 +737,19 @@ static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+       X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
        X509 *x = ctx->cert;
-       if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
+       if (id->host && !X509_check_host(x, id->host, id->hostlen, 0))
                {
                if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
                        return 0;
                }
-       if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
+       if (id->email && !X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0))
                {
                if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
                        return 0;
                }
-       if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
+       if (id->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0))
                {
                if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
                        return 0;
@@ -756,6 +784,25 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                                return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
                        }
                }
+       /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
+        * certificate return success.
+        */
+       if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+               {
+               X509 *mx;
+               if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
+                       return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+               x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+               mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+               if (mx)
+                       {
+                       (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+                       X509_free(x);
+                       ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+                       return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+                       }
+               }
+
        /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
         * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
         */
@@ -790,6 +837,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
        X509 *x;
        int ok, cnum;
+       unsigned int last_reasons;
        cnum = ctx->error_depth;
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
        ctx->current_cert = x;
@@ -798,6 +846,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        ctx->current_reasons = 0;
        while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
                {
+               last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
                /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
                if (ctx->get_crl)
                        ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
@@ -841,6 +890,15 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
                crl = NULL;
                dcrl = NULL;
+               /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+                * another iteration, so exit loop.
+                */
+               if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+                       {
+                       ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+                       ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
                }
        err:
        X509_CRL_free(crl);
@@ -968,7 +1026,7 @@ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
        {
        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
        int i;
-       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
+       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
        if (i >= 0)
                {
                /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
@@ -979,7 +1037,7 @@ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
        else
                exta = NULL;
 
-       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
+       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
 
        if (i >= 0)
                {
@@ -1556,10 +1614,9 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
         * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
         * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
         */
-       if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+       if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+               && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
                {
-               if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-                       return 1;
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if(!ok)
@@ -1696,6 +1753,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                xs=xi;
        else
                {
+               if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
+                       {
+                       xs = xi;
+                       goto check_cert;
+                       }
                if (n <= 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
@@ -1746,6 +1808,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
                xs->valid = 1;
 
+               check_cert:
                ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
                if (!ok)
                        goto end;