Fix bug in X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL CRL handling.
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
index 508e4bd79e5283a5a2e62033280e76f584644a8b..b7e3f6e996f6c575afef04f9316b43116fb2bae4 100644 (file)
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "vpm_int.h"
 
 /* CRL score values */
 
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
@@ -159,6 +161,32 @@ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
                return 0;
        }
 
+/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
+
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+       {
+       STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+       X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+       int i;
+       /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+       certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+       if (certs == NULL)
+               return NULL;
+       /* Look for exact match */
+       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
+               {
+               xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+               if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+                       break;
+               }
+       if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
+               CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+       else
+               xtmp = NULL;
+       sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+       return xtmp;
+       }
+
 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
@@ -377,6 +405,10 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        
        if (!ok) goto end;
 
+       ok = check_id(ctx);
+
+       if (!ok) goto end;
+
        /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 
@@ -387,7 +419,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
        if(!ok) goto end;
 
-       i = X509_check_suiteb_chain(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
+       i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
                                                        ctx->param->flags);
        if (i != X509_V_OK)
                {
@@ -694,6 +726,37 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        return 1;
        }
 
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
+       {
+       ctx->error = errcode;
+       ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
+       ctx->error_depth = 0;
+       return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+       }
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+       {
+       X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+       X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
+       X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+       if (id->host && !X509_check_host(x, id->host, id->hostlen, 0))
+               {
+               if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       if (id->email && !X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0))
+               {
+               if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       if (id->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0))
+               {
+               if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }
+
 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
        int i, ok;
@@ -721,6 +784,25 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                                return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
                        }
                }
+       /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
+        * certificate return success.
+        */
+       if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+               {
+               X509 *mx;
+               if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
+                       return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+               x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+               mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+               if (mx)
+                       {
+                       (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+                       X509_free(x);
+                       ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+                       return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+                       }
+               }
+
        /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
         * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
         */
@@ -755,6 +837,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
        X509 *x;
        int ok, cnum;
+       unsigned int last_reasons;
        cnum = ctx->error_depth;
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
        ctx->current_cert = x;
@@ -763,6 +846,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        ctx->current_reasons = 0;
        while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
                {
+               last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
                /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
                if (ctx->get_crl)
                        ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
@@ -806,6 +890,15 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
                crl = NULL;
                dcrl = NULL;
+               /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+                * another iteration, so exit loop.
+                */
+               if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+                       {
+                       ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+                       ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
                }
        err:
        X509_CRL_free(crl);
@@ -933,7 +1026,7 @@ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
        {
        ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
        int i;
-       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
+       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
        if (i >= 0)
                {
                /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
@@ -944,7 +1037,7 @@ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
        else
                exta = NULL;
 
-       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
+       i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
 
        if (i >= 0)
                {
@@ -1486,7 +1579,7 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
                else
                        {
                        int rv;
-                       rv = X509_check_suiteb_crl(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
+                       rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
                        if (rv != X509_V_OK)
                                {
                                ctx->error=rv;
@@ -1521,10 +1614,9 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
         * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
         * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
         */
-       if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+       if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+               && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
                {
-               if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-                       return 1;
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if(!ok)
@@ -1661,6 +1753,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                xs=xi;
        else
                {
+               if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
+                       {
+                       xs = xi;
+                       goto check_cert;
+                       }
                if (n <= 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
@@ -1711,6 +1808,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
                xs->valid = 1;
 
+               check_cert:
                ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
                if (!ok)
                        goto end;
@@ -1888,6 +1986,125 @@ int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
        return 1;
        }
 
+/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
+
+X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
+                       EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
+       {
+       X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+       int i;
+       STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
+       /* CRLs can't be delta already */
+       if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
+                       {
+                       X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+       /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
+       if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
+                       {
+                       X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+       /* Issuer names must match */
+       if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+                               X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+                       {
+                       X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+       /* AKID and IDP must match */
+       if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
+                       {
+                       X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+       if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
+                       {
+                       X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+       /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
+       if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
+                       {
+                       X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+       /* CRLs must verify */
+       if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+                       X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
+               {
+               X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+               return NULL;
+               }
+       /* Create new CRL */
+       crl = X509_CRL_new();
+       if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+               goto memerr;
+       /* Set issuer name */
+       if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
+               goto memerr;
+
+       if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
+               goto memerr;
+       if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
+               goto memerr;
+
+       /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
+
+       if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
+               goto memerr;
+
+       /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
+        * CRL number to correct value too.
+        */
+
+       for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
+               {
+               X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+               ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+               if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
+                       goto memerr;
+               }
+
+       /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
+
+       revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
+
+       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
+               {
+               X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+               rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
+               /* Add only if not also in base.
+                * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
+                * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+                */
+               if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
+                       {
+                       rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
+                       if (!rvtmp)
+                               goto memerr;
+                       if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
+                               {
+                               X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
+                               goto memerr;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+       /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
+
+       if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+               goto memerr;
+       
+       return crl;
+
+       memerr:
+       X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+       if (crl)
+               X509_CRL_free(crl);
+       return NULL;
+       }
+
 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
             CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
        {
@@ -1934,16 +2151,9 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
-       int i;
-       X509 *x;
-       STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
-       if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
-       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
-               {
-               x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
-               CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
-               }
-       return chain;
+       if (!ctx->chain)
+               return NULL;
+       return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
        }
 
 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)