/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/dane.h"
#include "crypto/x509.h"
#include "x509_local.h"
/* CRL score values */
-/* No unhandled critical extensions */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
-
-/* certificate is within CRL scope */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
-
-/* CRL times valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
-
-/* Issuer name matches certificate */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
-
-/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
-
-/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
-
-/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
-
-/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
-
-/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
-
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \
+ (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
/*-
* Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error.
* This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested.
- * It calls X509v3_cache_extensions()
+ * It calls ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions()
* to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
* present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc.
*/
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert)) == NULL) { /* handles cert == NULL */
- X509err(0, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
return -1;
}
- if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert))
+ if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert))
return -1;
if ((cert->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) == 0)
return 0;
return X509_verify(cert, pkey);
}
-/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
-static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+/*
+ * Given a certificate, try and find an exact match in the store.
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 on not found, -1 on internal error.
+ */
+static int lookup_cert_match(X509 **result, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
X509 *xtmp = NULL;
- int i;
+ int i, ret;
+
+ *result = NULL;
/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
+ ERR_set_mark();
certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
if (certs == NULL)
- return NULL;
+ return -1;
/* Look for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
- if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
+ if (X509_cmp(xtmp, x) == 0)
break;
xtmp = NULL;
}
- if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp))
- xtmp = NULL;
- sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
- return xtmp;
+ ret = xtmp != NULL;
+ if (ret) {
+ if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp))
+ ret = -1;
+ else
+ *result = xtmp;
+ }
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(certs);
+ return ret;
}
/*-
* Inform the verify callback of an error.
- * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
- * B<depth>.
- * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
- * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
+ * The error code is set to |err| if |err| is not X509_V_OK, else
+ * |ctx->error| is left unchanged (under the assumption it is set elsewhere).
+ * The error depth is |depth| if >= 0, else it defaults to |ctx->error_depth|.
+ * The error cert is |x| if not NULL, else defaults to the chain cert at depth.
*
* Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
*/
static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
{
- ctx->error_depth = depth;
+ if (depth < 0)
+ depth = ctx->error_depth;
+ else
+ ctx->error_depth = depth;
ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
if (err != X509_V_OK)
ctx->error = err;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
-#define CHECK_CB(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
- if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
+#define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
+ if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
return 0
/*-
* We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
* check the security of issuer keys.
*/
- CHECK_CB(i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert),
- ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert),
+ ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
/*
* We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
* except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
*/
- CHECK_CB(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert),
- ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert),
+ ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
}
return 1;
}
+/* Returns -1 on internal error */
static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int err;
int ok;
- /*
- * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
- * instantiate chain public key parameters.
- */
- if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
- (ok = check_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
- (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
- (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
- X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
- if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) <= 0
+ || (ok = check_extensions(ctx)) <= 0
+ || (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) <= 0
+ || (ok = check_id(ctx)) <= 0
+ || (ok = X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain) ? 1 : -1) <= 0
+ || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) <= 0)
return ok;
err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->flags);
- CHECK_CB(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err);
/* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
- ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
- if (!ok)
+ ok = ctx->verify != NULL ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
+ if (ok <= 0)
return ok;
- if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) <= 0)
return ok;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
- if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0)
return ok;
- if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) <= 0)
return ok;
#endif
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) != 0)
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
return ok;
}
+int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ctx->cert == NULL && sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted) >= 1)
+ ctx->cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, 0);
+ return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+}
+
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
int ret;
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
* This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
* cannot do another one.
*/
- X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
- if (!X509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, ctx->cert, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
+ if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, ctx->cert, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return -1;
}
ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
/* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
- CHECK_CB(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert),
- ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert),
+ ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
- ret = dane_verify(ctx);
- else
- ret = verify_chain(ctx);
+ ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx);
/*
* Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
return ret;
}
+static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert)
+{
+ int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
- * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+ * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) |sk| an issuer cert (if any) of given cert |x|.
+ * The issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the exception that
+ * |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element.
+ * Prefer the first non-expired one, else take the most recently expired one.
*/
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
- /*
- * Below check 'issuer != x' is an optimization and safety precaution:
- * Candidate issuer cert cannot be the same as the subject cert 'x'.
- */
- if (issuer != x && ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
- rv = issuer;
- if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
- break;
+ if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)
+ && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+ || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) {
+ if (ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1))
+ return issuer;
+ if (rv == NULL || ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer),
+ X509_get0_notAfter(rv)) > 0)
+ rv = issuer;
}
}
return rv;
}
-/*
- * Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer'
- * and the issuer is not yet in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case
- * that 'x' is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed.
- */
-static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
+/* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
+static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
- if (x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) != X509_V_OK)
- return 0;
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0 || sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) != 1) {
- int i;
- X509 *ch;
+ int err = ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer, x);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
- ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (ch == issuer || X509_cmp(ch, issuer) == 0)
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
+ if (err == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH just means 'x' is clearly not issued by 'issuer'.
+ * Every other error code likely indicates a real error.
+ */
+ if (err != X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH)
+ ctx->error = err;
+ return 0;
}
-/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
+/*-
+ * Alternative get_issuer method: look up from a STACK_OF(X509) in other_ctx.
+ * Returns -1 on internal error.
+ */
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
-
- if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer))
- goto err;
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- *issuer = NULL;
+ if (*issuer != NULL)
+ return X509_up_ref(*issuer) ? 1 : -1;
return 0;
}
+/*-
+ * Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx.
+ * Returns NULL on internal error (such as out of memory).
+ */
static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
const X509_NAME *nm)
{
- STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = sk_X509_new_null();
X509 *x;
int i;
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
- if (!X509_add_cert_new(&sk, x, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
- sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ if (!X509_add_cert(sk, x, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
* auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
+ * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error.
*/
static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
int must_be_ca)
}
/*
- * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
- * purpose
+ * Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose.
+ * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error.
*/
-
-static int check_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
- int proxy_path_length = 0;
- int purpose;
- int allow_proxy_certs;
- int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ int ret, proxy_path_length = 0;
+ int purpose, allow_proxy_certs, num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
/*-
* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent) {
+ if (ctx->parent != NULL) {
allow_proxy_certs = 0;
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
} else {
allow_proxy_certs =
- ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
+ (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0;
purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- int ret;
-
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- CHECK_CB((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION);
- CHECK_CB(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY),
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED);
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
switch (must_be_ca) {
case -1:
- CHECK_CB((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0
- && ret != 1 && ret != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
- ret = 1;
+ CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0
+ && ret != 1 && ret != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
break;
case 0:
- CHECK_CB(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA);
- ret = 1;
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA);
break;
default:
/* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
- CHECK_CB(ret == 0
- || ((i + 1 < num
- || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
- && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
- ret = 1;
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0
+ || ((i + 1 < num
+ || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0)
+ && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
break;
}
if (num > 1) {
/* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
ret = check_curve(x);
- CHECK_CB(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED);
- CHECK_CB(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret < 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS);
}
/*
- * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requrested
+ * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested
* and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs
* because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2.
*/
*/
/* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */
if (x->ex_pathlen != -1) {
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA;
- if ((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN;
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx,
+ x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN);
}
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL;
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL);
/* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) {
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE;
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE);
} else {
- if ((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA;
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i,
+ X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA);
}
/* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */
- if (X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY;
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY);
/* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */
- if (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
- || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0
- || x->altname == NULL
- ) && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY;
- if (X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0
- && x->altname != NULL
- && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL;
+ CB_FAIL_IF(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0
+ || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0
+ || x->altname == NULL)
+ && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0
+ && x->altname != NULL
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL);
/* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */
- if (x->altname != NULL && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME;
- /* TODO add more checks on SAN entries */
+ CB_FAIL_IF(x->altname != NULL
+ && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME);
/* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */
- if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY;
- if (x->akid != NULL && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL;
- if (x->skid != NULL && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL;
- if (X509_get_version(x) >= 2) { /* at least X.509v3 */
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(x->akid != NULL
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(x->skid != NULL
+ && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL);
+ if (X509_get_version(x) >= X509_VERSION_3) {
/* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */
- if (i + 1 < num /*
- * this means not last cert in chain,
- * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
- */
- && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL))
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i + 1 < num /*
+ * this means not last cert in chain,
+ * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
+ */
+ && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx,
+ x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
/* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */
- if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER;
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER);
} else {
- if (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0)
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3;
+ CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3);
}
- if (ctx->error != X509_V_OK)
- ret = 0;
- CHECK_CB(ret == 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK);
}
/* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
return 0;
- /* Check pathlen */
- CHECK_CB(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1
- && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
+ /* Check path length */
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1
+ && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
/* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */
if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0)
plen++;
* increment proxy_path_length.
*/
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
- CHECK_CB(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
- } else
+ } else {
must_be_ca = 1;
+ }
}
return 1;
}
return ret;
}
+/* Returns -1 on internal error */
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
int j;
/* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */
- if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+ if (i != 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
continue;
/*
* added.
* (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
*/
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0) {
X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
- int last_object_nid = 0;
+ int last_nid = 0;
int err = X509_V_OK;
- int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
+ int last_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
/* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
- if (last_object_loc < 1) {
+ if (last_loc < 1) {
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
goto proxy_name_done;
}
/*
* Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
- * multivalued RDN
+ * multi-valued RDN
*/
- if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
- last_object_loc))
+ if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc))
== X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
- last_object_loc - 1))) {
+ last_loc - 1))) {
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
goto proxy_name_done;
}
*/
tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
- tmpentry =
- X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
- last_object_nid =
- OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
+ tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc);
+ last_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
- if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
+ if (last_nid != NID_commonName
|| X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
}
X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
- proxy_name_done:
- CHECK_CB(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err);
+ proxy_name_done:
+ CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, x, i, err);
}
/*
if (nc) {
int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+ int ret = 1;
/* If EE certificate check commonName too */
if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0
& X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0
&& ((ctx->param->hostflags
& X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0
- || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)))
+ || (ret = has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)) == 0))
rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
switch (rv) {
case X509_V_OK:
break;
case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
- return 0;
+ return -1;
default:
- CHECK_CB(1, ctx, x, i, rv);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, x, i, rv);
break;
}
}
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
- if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+
+ if (vpm->hosts != NULL && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (vpm->email != NULL
+ && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
- if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+ if (vpm->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
+/* Returns -1 on internal error */
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
{
- int i;
+ int i, res;
X509 *x = NULL;
X509 *mx;
SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
* match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
*/
if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
- switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
- case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
- case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
+ trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted);
+ if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)
return trust;
- }
}
/*
for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
- /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
+ /* If explicitly trusted (so not neutral nor rejected) return trusted */
if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
goto trusted;
if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
* the chain is PKIX trusted.
*/
if (num_untrusted < num) {
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0)
goto trusted;
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
- if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+ if (num_untrusted == num
+ && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) {
/*
* Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
* for a direct trust store match.
*/
i = 0;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
- if (!mx)
+ res = lookup_cert_match(&mx, ctx, x);
+ if (res < 0)
+ return res;
+ if (mx == NULL)
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
/*
}
/* Replace leaf with trusted match */
- (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
X509_free(x);
ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
goto trusted;
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
+/* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK) == 0)
return 1;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) != 0) {
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
- else {
+ } else {
/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
if (ctx->parent)
return 1;
return 1;
}
+/* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0)
return 1;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
- if (ctx->get_crl)
+ if (ctx->get_crl != NULL)
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
else
ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
- /*
- * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
- */
+ /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */
if (!ok) {
ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
goto done;
if (!ok)
goto done;
- if (dcrl) {
+ if (dcrl != NULL) {
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
if (!ok)
goto done;
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
if (!ok)
goto done;
- } else
+ } else {
ok = 1;
+ }
/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
if (ok != 2) {
}
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
-
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
{
time_t *ptime;
if (notify)
ctx->current_crl = crl;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
return 1;
else
ptime = NULL;
if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
return 0;
}
- /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
- if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
- if (!notify)
- return 0;
- if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
+ /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */
+ if (i < 0 && (ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA) == 0) {
+ if (!notify || !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
return 0;
}
}
/* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
int day, sec;
+
if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
continue;
best_reasons = reasons;
}
- if (best_crl) {
+ if (best_crl != NULL) {
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
* both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
*/
-
static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
{
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
- int i;
- i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta = NULL, *extb = NULL;
+ int i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
+
if (i >= 0) {
/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
- } else
- exta = NULL;
+ }
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
-
if (i >= 0) {
-
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
- } else
- extb = NULL;
+ }
- if (!exta && !extb)
+ if (exta == NULL && extb == NULL)
return 1;
- if (!exta || !extb)
- return 0;
-
- if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
+ if (exta == NULL || extb == NULL)
return 0;
- return 1;
+ return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb) == 0;
}
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
-
static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
{
/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
- if (!delta->base_crl_number)
+ if (delta->base_crl_number == NULL)
return 0;
/* Base must have a CRL number */
- if (!base->crl_number)
+ if (base->crl_number == NULL)
return 0;
/* Issuer names must match */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) != 0)
return 0;
/* AKID and IDP must match */
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
return 0;
/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
- if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0;
}
/*
* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
* retrieve a chain of deltas...
*/
-
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
X509_CRL *delta;
int i;
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
+
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS) == 0)
return;
- if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
+ if (((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST) == 0)
return;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
* also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
* is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
*/
-
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
-
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0)
return 0;
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0) {
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
return 0;
- } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
+ } else if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) != 0) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ if ((crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0)
return 0;
}
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
- else if (crl->base_crl_number)
+ else if (crl->base_crl_number != NULL)
return 0;
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
- if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) != 0) {
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT) == 0)
return 0;
- } else
+ } else {
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+ }
- if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
+ if ((crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) == 0)
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
- /* Check expiry */
+ /* Check expiration */
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
-
- if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
+ if ((crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID) == 0)
return 0;
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
-
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
- if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
+ if ((crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons) == 0)
return 0;
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
}
/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
-
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT) == 0)
return;
/*
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm) != 0)
continue;
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
* parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
* be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
*/
-
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
- X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
+ X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx = {0};
int ret;
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
- if (ctx->parent)
+ if (ctx->parent != NULL)
return 0;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted))
return -1;
/*
* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
* certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
- * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
+ * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more
* strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
* though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
* RFC5280 version
*/
-
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
{
- X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
- cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
- crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
- if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ X509 *cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
+ X509 *crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
+
+ return X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta) == 0;
}
/*-
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
* 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
*/
-
static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
{
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
int i, j;
- if (!a || !b)
+
+ if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a->type == 1) {
- if (!a->dpname)
+ if (a->dpname == NULL)
return 0;
/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
if (b->type == 1) {
- if (!b->dpname)
- return 0;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
- return 1;
- else
+ if (b->dpname == NULL)
return 0;
+ return X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname) == 0;
}
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
nm = a->dpname;
gens = b->name.fullname;
} else if (b->type == 1) {
- if (!b->dpname)
+ if (b->dpname == NULL)
return 0;
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
gens = a->name.fullname;
}
/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
- if (nm) {
+ if (nm != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
- if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
+ if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb) == 0)
return 1;
}
}
{
int i;
const X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+
/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
- if (!dp->CRLissuer)
- return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
+ if (dp->CRLissuer == NULL)
+ return (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
+
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
- if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
-
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
unsigned int *preasons)
{
int i;
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) != 0)
return 0;
- if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) {
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) != 0)
return 0;
} else {
- if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) != 0)
return 0;
}
*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+
if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
- if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
+ if (crl->idp == NULL
+ || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
return 1;
}
}
}
- if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
- && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
- return 1;
- return 0;
+ return (crl->idp == NULL || crl->idp->distpoint == NULL)
+ && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0;
}
/*
* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
* to find a delta CRL too
*/
-
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
{
goto done;
/* Lookup CRLs from store */
-
skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
- if (!skcrl && crl)
+ if (skcrl == NULL && crl != NULL)
goto done;
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
done:
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
- if (crl) {
+ if (crl != NULL) {
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
/* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
- if (ctx->current_issuer)
+ if (ctx->current_issuer != NULL) {
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
/*
* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
* certificate in chain.
*/
- else if (cnum < chnum)
+ } else if (cnum < chnum) {
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
- else {
+ } else {
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
/* If not self-issued, can't check signature */
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
/*
* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
*/
- if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
+ if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL) {
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
- if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
- !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 &&
+ (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
return 0;
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
+ if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
return 0;
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
+ if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 &&
check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
return 0;
- if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
+ if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
return 0;
}
- if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
+ if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 &&
!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
return 0;
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
-
- if (!ikey &&
+ if (ikey == NULL &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
return 0;
- if (ikey) {
+ if (ikey != NULL) {
int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
* was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
* change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
- if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
- && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0
+ && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
return 0;
/*
* was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
* X509_policy_check() call.
*/
- if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
- X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL))
+ goto memerr;
ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
(void)sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
- if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
- X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL)
+ goto memerr;
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
int i;
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- CHECK_CB((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
- ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
+ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0,
+ ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION);
}
return 1;
}
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
- X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) != 0) {
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
/*
* Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
}
return 1;
+
+ memerr:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ return -1;
}
/*-
*
* Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
-int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
+int ossl_x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
- else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
+ else if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) != 0)
return 1;
else
ptime = NULL;
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
return 0;
- CHECK_CB(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD);
- CHECK_CB(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID);
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
return 0;
- CHECK_CB(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD);
- CHECK_CB(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i == 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(i < 0, ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED);
return 1;
}
-/* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */
+/*
+ * Verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain.
+ * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error.
+ */
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
- X509 *xs;
+ X509 *xs = xi;
- /*
- * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
- * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
- * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
- */
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
- xs = xi;
+ /*
+ * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures,
+ * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps.
+ * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key.
+ */
xi = NULL;
- goto check_cert_time;
- }
-
- if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
- xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */
- else {
- if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
- xs = xi;
- goto check_cert_time;
- }
- if (n <= 0) {
- CHECK_CB(1, ctx, xi, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
-
- xs = xi;
- goto check_cert_time;
+ } else if (ossl_x509_likely_issued(xi, xi) != X509_V_OK
+ /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */
+ && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) {
+ if (n > 0) {
+ n--;
+ ctx->error_depth = n;
+ xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ } else {
+ CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
}
-
- n--;
- ctx->error_depth = n;
- xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+ /*
+ * The below code will certainly not do a
+ * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued.
+ */
}
/*
- * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
- * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
+ * Do not clear error (by ctx->error = X509_V_OK), it must be "sticky",
+ * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
*/
while (n >= 0) {
- /*
+ /*-
* For each iteration of this loop:
* n is the subject depth
* xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
- * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
+ * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures
+ * else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
* Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
- *
- * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly
+ */
+ /*
+ * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly
* asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
*/
- if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)
- && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) {
+ if (xi != NULL
+ && (xs != xi
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) != 0
+ && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0))) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
/*
* If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
* step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
* when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
* According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
- * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the
- * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
+ * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of
+ * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
* In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
* not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
* xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
* we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
*/
int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
- ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
+ ? X509_V_OK : ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs);
- CHECK_CB(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret);
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
- CHECK_CB(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth,
- X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth,
+ X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY);
} else {
- CHECK_CB(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0,
- ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0,
+ ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
}
}
- check_cert_time:
+ /* In addition to RFC 5280 requirements do also for trust anchor cert */
/* Calls verify callback as needed */
- if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
+ if (!ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
return 0;
/*
#else
const char upper_z = 'Z';
#endif
- /*
+
+ /*-
* Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
* In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
* Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
- if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
+ if (!ossl_ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
return 0;
}
if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z)
asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
goto err;
- if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
+ if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time) == 0)
goto err;
/*
else
time(&t);
- if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
+ if (s != NULL && (s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING) == 0) {
if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
}
+/* Copy any missing public key parameters up the chain towards pkey */
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
int i, j;
- if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
+ if (pkey != NULL && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
if (ktmp == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
- X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
break;
+ ktmp = NULL;
}
if (ktmp == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
- X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
return 0;
}
/* first, populate the other certs */
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp))
+ return 0;
}
if (pkey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
+ return EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
return 1;
}
-/* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
-
+/*
+ * Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs.
+ * Sadly, returns NULL also on internal error.
+ */
X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
int i;
+
STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
/* CRLs can't be delta already */
- if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
+ if (base->base_crl_number != NULL || newer->base_crl_number != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
return NULL;
}
/* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
- if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
+ if (base->crl_number == NULL || newer->crl_number == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
return NULL;
}
/* Issuer names must match */
- if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
+ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
+ X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) != 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
/* AKID and IDP must match */
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
return NULL;
}
/* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
return NULL;
}
/* CRLs must verify */
- if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
- X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
+ if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
+ X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
/* Create new CRL */
- crl = X509_CRL_new();
- if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
+ crl = X509_CRL_new_ex(base->libctx, base->propq);
+ if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, X509_CRL_VERSION_2))
goto memerr;
/* Set issuer name */
if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
goto memerr;
/* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
-
if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
goto memerr;
* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
* number to correct value too.
*/
-
for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
- X509_EXTENSION *ext;
- ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+ X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
+
if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
goto memerr;
}
/* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
-
revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
+
rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
/*
- * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
- * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
+ * Add only if not also in base.
+ * Need something cleverer here for some more complex CRLs covering
+ * multiple CAs.
*/
if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
- if (!rvtmp)
+ if (rvtmp == NULL)
goto memerr;
if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
}
}
}
- /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
- if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
+ if (skey != NULL && md != NULL && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
goto memerr;
return crl;
memerr:
- X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
X509_CRL_free(crl);
return NULL;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (!ctx->chain)
+ if (ctx->chain == NULL)
return NULL;
return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
}
* application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
* client/server.
*/
-
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
int purpose, int trust)
{
int idx;
+
/* If purpose not set use default */
if (purpose == 0)
purpose = def_purpose;
/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
if (purpose != 0) {
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
+
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
if (idx == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
* X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
*/
if (idx == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
}
/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
- if (!trust)
+ if (trust == 0)
trust = ptmp->trust;
}
- if (trust) {
+ if (trust != 0) {
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
if (idx == -1) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
- X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
return 0;
}
}
- if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
+ if (ctx->param->purpose == 0 && purpose != 0)
ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
- if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
+ if (ctx->param->trust == 0 && trust != 0)
ctx->param->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL) {
- X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
ctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq);
if (ctx->propq == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
- X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
}
return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL, NULL);
}
-
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
/* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
OPENSSL_free(ctx->propq);
-
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
{
int ret = 1;
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+
ctx->store = store;
ctx->cert = x509;
ctx->untrusted = chain;
ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
ctx->valid = 0;
ctx->chain = NULL;
- ctx->error = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
/* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
- if (store)
+ if (store != NULL)
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
else
- ctx->cleanup = 0;
+ ctx->cleanup = NULL;
- if (store && store->check_issued)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_issued != NULL)
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
else
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
- if (store && store->get_issuer)
+ if (store != NULL && store->get_issuer != NULL)
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
else
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
- if (store && store->verify_cb)
+ if (store != NULL && store->verify_cb != NULL)
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
else
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
- if (store && store->verify)
+ if (store != NULL && store->verify != NULL)
ctx->verify = store->verify;
else
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
- if (store && store->check_revocation)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_revocation != NULL)
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
else
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
- if (store && store->get_crl)
+ if (store != NULL && store->get_crl != NULL)
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
else
ctx->get_crl = NULL;
- if (store && store->check_crl)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_crl != NULL)
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
else
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
- if (store && store->cert_crl)
+ if (store != NULL && store->cert_crl != NULL)
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
else
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
- if (store && store->check_policy)
+ if (store != NULL && store->check_policy != NULL)
ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
else
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
- if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ if (store != NULL && store->lookup_certs != NULL)
ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
else
ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
- if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ if (store != NULL && store->lookup_crls != NULL)
ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
else
ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (ctx->param == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
- */
- if (store)
+ /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */
+ if (store != NULL)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
if (ret == 0) {
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
&ctx->ex_data))
return 1;
- X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
/*
}
/*
- * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
- * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+ * Set alternative get_issuer method: just from a STACK of trusted certificates.
+ * This avoids the complexity of X509_STORE where it is not needed.
*/
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
* calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
* pointers below after they're freed!
*/
- /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
+ /* Seems to always be NULL in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
ctx->cleanup(ctx);
ctx->cleanup = NULL;
}
X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
ctx->tree = NULL;
- sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx->chain);
ctx->chain = NULL;
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
- sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(ctx->chain);
ctx->chain = sk;
}
return ctx->verify;
}
-X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->get_issuer;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_issued;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_revocation;
}
return ctx->get_crl;
}
-X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_crl;
}
-X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->cert_crl;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_policy;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->lookup_certs;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
- X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->lookup_crls;
}
ctx->dane = dane;
}
-static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
- X509 *cert,
- uint8_t selector,
- unsigned int *i2dlen)
+static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509 *cert, uint8_t selector,
+ unsigned int *i2dlen)
{
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
int len;
len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
break;
default:
- X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
return NULL;
}
if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
return buf;
}
-#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
+#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
+/* Returns -1 on internal error */
static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
- /*
- * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
- */
+ /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */
if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
* exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
* sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
*/
- recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
+ recnum = (dane->umask & mask) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
*/
if (t->mtype != mtype) {
const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
+
cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
cmplen = i2dlen;
return matched;
}
+/* Returns -1 on internal error */
static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
X509 *cert;
if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
/*
* Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
*/
cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
- return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ return matched;
if (matched > 0) {
ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
- return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
- return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
{
- /*
- * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
- */
+ /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */
X509_free(dane->mcert);
dane->mcert = NULL;
dane->mtlsa = NULL;
{
int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
- CHECK_CB(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, cert, 0, err);
return 1;
}
+/* Returns -1 on internal error */
static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
- if (done)
- X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
+ if (done && !X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain))
+ return -1;
if (matched > 0) {
/* Callback invoked as needed */
return verify_chain(ctx);
}
-/* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
-static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+/*
+ * Get trusted issuer, without duplicate suppression
+ * Returns -1 on internal error.
+ */
+static int get1_trusted_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
int ok;
return ok;
}
+/* Returns -1 on internal error */
static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
- int self_signed;
- STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk_untrusted = NULL;
unsigned int search;
int may_trusted = 0;
int may_alternate = 0;
int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
int alt_untrusted = 0;
- int depth;
+ int max_depth;
int ok = 0;
+ int prev_error = ctx->error;
int i;
/* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
- if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) {
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
- }
-
- self_signed = X509_self_signed(cert, 0);
- if (self_signed < 0) {
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num))
+ goto int_err;
-#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
-#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
-#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
+#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
+#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
+#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
/*
- * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
+ * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled,
+ * which is the default.
* If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
* trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
* and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
* if no luck with untrusted first.
*/
- search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
+ search = ctx->untrusted != NULL ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
- if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
+ if (search == 0 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) != 0)
search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
may_alternate = 1;
may_trusted = 1;
}
+ /* Initialize empty untrusted stack. */
+ if ((sk_untrusted = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+ goto memerr;
+
/*
- * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
- * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
- * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
+ * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, *prepend* them
+ * to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack.
*/
- if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL
+ && !X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT))
+ goto memerr;
/*
- * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, add
- * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
- * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
- * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
- * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
- * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
- * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
- * this to change. ]
+ * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
+ * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so we can make
+ * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
*/
- if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
- if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!X509_add_certs(sktmp, dane->certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT)) {
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ if (!X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted, ctx->untrusted, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT))
+ goto memerr;
/*
* Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
* might be reasonable.
*/
- if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
- ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
+ if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX / 2)
+ ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX / 2;
/*
* Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
* Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
* with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
*/
- depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
+ max_depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
while (search != 0) {
- X509 *x;
- X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+ X509 *curr, *issuer = NULL;
+ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
/*
* Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
* out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
* would be a-priori too long.
*/
if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
- i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+ i = num;
if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
/*
* As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
*/
i = alt_untrusted;
}
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
+ curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
- ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
+ /* Note: get1_trusted_issuer() must be used even if self-signed. */
+ ok = num > max_depth ? 0 : get1_trusted_issuer(&issuer, ctx, curr);
if (ok < 0) {
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+ trust = -1;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
- search = 0;
- continue;
+ break;
}
if (ok > 0) {
+ int self_signed = X509_self_signed(curr, 0);
+
+ if (self_signed < 0) {
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ goto int_err;
+ }
/*
* Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
* Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
*/
if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && !self_signed)) {
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- X509_free(xtmp);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ goto int_err;
}
search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
for (; num > i; --num)
* trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
*/
if (!self_signed) {
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
- X509_free(xtmp);
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
- self_signed = X509_self_signed(x, 0);
- if (self_signed < 0) {
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
+ if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, issuer)) {
+ X509_free(issuer);
+ goto memerr;
}
- } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
+ if ((self_signed = X509_self_signed(issuer, 0)) < 0)
+ goto int_err;
+ } else {
/*
* We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
* subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
* a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
* possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
*/
- if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
+ if (X509_cmp(curr, issuer) != 0) {
/* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
- X509_free(xtmp);
+ X509_free(issuer);
ok = 0;
- } else {
- X509_free(x);
+ } else { /* curr "==" issuer */
+ X509_free(curr);
ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
- (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, issuer);
}
}
/*
- * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
+ * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check
* trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
* Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
* look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
* certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
*/
if (ok) {
- if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) {
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num))
+ goto int_err;
search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
- switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
- case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
- case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
+ if (trust != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)
+ break;
if (!self_signed)
continue;
}
/* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
- self_signed = 0;
}
}
/*
- * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
+ * Extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificates
*/
if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) {
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
- x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
-
- /*
- * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
- * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
- */
- xtmp = (self_signed || depth < num) ? NULL
- : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
- if (xtmp == NULL) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted))
+ goto int_err;
+ curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+ issuer = (X509_self_signed(curr, 0) > 0 || num > max_depth) ?
+ NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sk_untrusted, curr);
+ if (issuer == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num > max_depth
+ * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking
+ * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
+ */
search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
if (may_trusted)
search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
}
/* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
- (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
+ (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted, issuer);
- if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) {
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ if (!X509_add_cert(ctx->chain, issuer, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF))
+ goto int_err;
- if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
- X509_free(xtmp);
- X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
-
- x = xtmp;
++ctx->num_untrusted;
- self_signed = X509_self_signed(xtmp, 0);
- if (self_signed < 0) {
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
- */
- switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
- case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
- case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
- search = 0;
- continue;
- }
+ /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */
+ trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1);
+ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED || trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
+ break;
}
}
- sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+ sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
+
+ if (trust < 0) /* internal error */
+ return trust;
/*
* Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
* signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
*/
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- if (num <= depth) {
+ if (num <= max_depth) {
if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
switch (trust) {
case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
+ /* Must restore any previous error value for backward compatibility */
+ ctx->error = prev_error;
return 1;
case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
/* Callback already issued */
return 0;
case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
default:
- num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
- CHECK_CB(num > depth, ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
- CHECK_CB(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)
- && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0),
- ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
- if (self_signed)
- return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
- sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1
+ switch (ctx->error) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ return 0; /* Callback already issued by ossl_x509_check_cert_time() */
+ default: /* A preliminary error has become final */
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, ctx->error);
+ case X509_V_OK:
+ break;
+ }
+ CB_FAIL_IF(num > max_depth,
+ ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
+ CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)
+ && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0),
+ ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
+ if (X509_self_signed(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1), 0) > 0)
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1,
+ num == 1
? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
: X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
- return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
+ return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1,
ctx->num_untrusted < num
? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
: X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
}
+
+ int_err:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+ sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
+ return -1;
+
+ memerr:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted);
+ return -1;
}
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_build_chain(X509 *target, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
+ X509_STORE *store, int with_self_signed,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
+{
+ int finish_chain = store != NULL;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+ int flags = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *result = NULL;
+
+ if (target == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(libctx, propq)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, target, finish_chain ? certs : NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!finish_chain)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, certs);
+ if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx->chain, target, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF)) {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
+
+ if (!build_chain(ctx) && finish_chain)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* result list to store the up_ref'ed certificates */
+ if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) > 1 && !with_self_signed)
+ flags |= X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS;
+ if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&result, ctx->chain, flags)) {
+ sk_X509_free(result);
+ result = NULL;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table in ssl/ssl_cert.c
+ * in ssl_get_security_level_bits that's used for selection of DH parameters
+ */
static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
-/*
- * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
- * ``ctx``.
- *
+/*-
+ * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
- return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
+ return EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
}
-/*
+/*-
* Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
* for an elliptic curve.
*
*/
static int check_curve(X509 *cert)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
/* Unsupported or malformed key */
if (pkey == NULL)
return -1;
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- int ret;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ int ret, val;
- ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
- return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret;
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pkey,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS,
+ &val);
+ return ret < 0 ? ret : !val;
}
-#endif
return 1;
}
-/*
+/*-
* Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
* level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
* self-signed or otherwise).
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff