Include TA in checks/callback with partial chains.

[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index 5f6687e609802ea3a944d65079b3b5482bdefb63..869a4f29e8573aeba6181eaba4d95c7e15d34438 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "vpm_int.h"
 
 /* CRL score values */
 
@@ -480,6 +481,8 @@ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 {
        int ret;
+       if (x == issuer)
+               return cert_self_signed(x);
        ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
        if (ret == X509_V_OK)
                {
@@ -736,18 +739,19 @@ static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+       X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
        X509 *x = ctx->cert;
-       if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
+       if (id->host && !X509_check_host(x, id->host, id->hostlen, 0))
                {
                if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
                        return 0;
                }
-       if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
+       if (id->email && !X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0))
                {
                if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
                        return 0;
                }
-       if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
+       if (id->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0))
                {
                if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
                        return 0;
@@ -787,20 +791,17 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
         */
        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
                {
+               X509 *mx;
                if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
                        return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-               if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+               x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+               mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+               if (mx)
                        {
-                       X509 *mx;
-                       x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
-                       mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
-                       if (mx)
-                               {
-                               (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
-                               X509_free(x);
-                               ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
-                               return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-                               }
+                       (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+                       X509_free(x);
+                       ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+                       return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
                        }
                }
 
@@ -838,6 +839,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
        X509 *x;
        int ok, cnum;
+       unsigned int last_reasons;
        cnum = ctx->error_depth;
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
        ctx->current_cert = x;
@@ -846,6 +848,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        ctx->current_reasons = 0;
        while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
                {
+               last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
                /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
                if (ctx->get_crl)
                        ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
@@ -889,6 +892,15 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
                crl = NULL;
                dcrl = NULL;
+               /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
+                * another iteration, so exit loop.
+                */
+               if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
+                       {
+                       ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+                       ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
                }
        err:
        X509_CRL_free(crl);
@@ -1604,10 +1616,9 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
         * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
         * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
         */
-       if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
+       if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+               && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
                {
-               if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
-                       return 1;
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if(!ok)
@@ -1744,8 +1755,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
                xs=xi;
        else
                {
-               if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
-                       return check_cert_time(ctx, xi);
+               if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+                       {
+                       xs = xi;
+                       goto check_cert;
+                       }
                if (n <= 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
@@ -1796,6 +1810,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 
                xs->valid = 1;
 
+               check_cert:
                ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
                if (!ok)
                        goto end;