static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid);
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn;
+ int bad_chain = 0;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth,i,ok=0;
int num;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
-
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
- depth=ctx->depth;
+ depth=param->depth;
for (;;)
goto end;
}
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
+ (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
ctx->last_untrusted++;
x=xtmp;
num++;
ctx->current_cert=x;
ctx->error_depth=i-1;
if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
+ bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
*/
X509_free(x);
x = xtmp;
- sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+ (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
}
}
}
ctx->error_depth=num-1;
+ bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
- if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
+ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
- if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
+ if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
- /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
+ /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
else
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
+ /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
+ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+#endif
+
+ /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
+ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
+ ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto end;
if (0)
{
end:
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
- if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
return 0;
ctx->error = ret;
* with the supplied purpose
*/
-static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
- int i, ok=0;
+ int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
X509 *x;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
+ int proxy_path_length = 0;
+ int allow_proxy_certs =
+ !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
+
+ /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+ -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+ use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+ 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
+ used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+ 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
+ all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+ */
+ must_be_ca = -1;
+
+ /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
+ happy */
+ if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
+ allow_proxy_certs = 1;
+
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
{
+ int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
- if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
+ if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ ret = X509_check_ca(x);
+ switch(must_be_ca)
{
- if (i)
+ case -1:
+ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
+ {
+ ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ }
else
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1)))
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+ }
+ else
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
+ if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
+ {
+ ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
+ must_be_ca > 0);
+ if ((ret == 0)
+ || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
+ && (ret != 1)))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ }
/* Check pathlen */
if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
- && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
+ && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
+ /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
+ certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
+ certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
+ CA certificate. */
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
+ {
+ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
+ {
+ ctx->error =
+ X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+ ctx->error_depth = i;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ok=cb(0,ctx);
+ if (!ok) goto end;
+ }
+ proxy_path_length++;
+ must_be_ca = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ must_be_ca = 1;
}
ok = 1;
end:
#else
int i, ok;
X509 *x;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
- ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
+ ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
return 1;
ctx->error_depth = i;
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, last, ok;
- if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
+ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
return 1;
- if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
else
last = 0;
}
-/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
- * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
- * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
+/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
+
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
+ {
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+ ctx->current_crl = crl;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
+ {
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Based on a set of possible CRLs decide which one is best suited
+ * to handle the current certificate. This is determined by a number
+ * of criteria. If any of the "must" criteria is not satisfied then
+ * the candidate CRL is rejected. If all "must" and all "should" are
+ * satisfied the CRL is accepted. If no CRL satisfies all criteria then
+ * a "best CRL" is used to provide some meaningful error information.
+ *
+ * CRL issuer name must match "nm" if not NULL.
+ * If IDP is present:
+ * a. it must be consistent.
+ * b. onlyuser, onlyCA, onlyAA should match certificate being checked.
+ * c. indirectCRL must be FALSE.
+ * d. onlysomereason must be absent.
+ * e. if name present a DP in certificate CRLDP must match.
+ * If AKID present it should match certificate AKID.
+ * Check time should fall between lastUpdate and nextUpdate.
*/
-static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
+
+/* IDP name field matches CRLDP or IDP name not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 4
+/* AKID present and matches cert, or AKID not present */
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 2
+/* times OK */
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 1
+
+#define CRL_SCORE_ALL 7
+
+/* IDP flags which cause a CRL to be rejected */
+
+#define IDP_REJECT (IDP_INVALID|IDP_INDIRECT|IDP_REASONS)
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
+ X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
+ {
+ int i, crl_score, best_score = -1;
+ X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
+ {
+ crl_score = 0;
+ crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+ if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
+ continue;
+ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REJECT)
+ continue;
+ if (idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+
+ if (crl->akid)
+ {
+ if (crl_akid_check(ctx, crl->akid))
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+ }
+ else
+ crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
+
+ if (crl_score == CRL_SCORE_ALL)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (crl_score > best_score)
+ {
+ best_crl = crl;
+ best_score = crl_score;
+ }
+ }
+ if (best_crl)
+ {
+ *pcrl = best_crl;
+ CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
+ {
+ int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+ if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
+ cidx++;
+ if (X509_check_akid(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx), akid) == X509_V_OK)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+
+/* Check IDP name matches at least one CRLDP name */
+
+static int idp_check_scope(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl)
+ {
+ int i, j, k;
+ GENERAL_NAMES *inames, *dnames;
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
+ return 0;
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!crl->idp->distpoint)
+ return 1;
+ if (crl->idp->distpoint->type != 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!x->crldp)
+ return 0;
+ inames = crl->idp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(inames); i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *igen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(inames, i);
+ for (j = 0; j < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); j++)
+ {
+ DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, j);
+ /* We don't handle these at present */
+ if (dp->reasons || dp->CRLissuer)
+ continue;
+ if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 0))
+ continue;
+ dnames = dp->distpoint->name.fullname;
+ for (k = 0; k < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dnames); k++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME *cgen =
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dnames, k);
+ if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(igen, cgen))
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. Currently only
+ * one CRL is retrieved. Multiple CRLs may be needed if we handle
+ * CRLs partitioned on reason code later.
+ */
+
+static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
- X509_OBJECT xobj;
- ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
- if (!ok) return 0;
- *crl = xobj.data.crl;
- return 1;
+ X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+ ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Lookup CRLs from store */
+
+ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
+
+ /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
+ if (!skcrl)
+ {
+ if (crl)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, NULL, skcrl);
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+ /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
+ if (crl)
+ {
+ *pcrl = crl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/* Check CRL validity */
{
X509 *issuer = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
- int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
- time_t *ptime;
+ int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
/* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
if(issuer)
{
+ /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
+ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+ !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_PRESENT)
+ {
+ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_REASONS|IDP_INDIRECT))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ if (!idp_check_scope(ctx->current_cert, crl))
+ {
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+ ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
+ if(!ok) goto err;
+ }
+ }
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
}
}
- /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
- if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
- ptime = &ctx->check_time;
- else
- ptime = NULL;
+ ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto err;
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
+ ok = 1;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+/* Check certificate against CRL */
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int ok;
+ /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
+ * If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
+ * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
+ */
+ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(crl, NULL, X509_get_serialNumber(x)) > 0)
{
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) goto err;
+ if (!ok)
+ return 0;
}
- if (i > 0)
+ if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
{
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
+ return 1;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) goto err;
+ if(!ok)
+ return 0;
}
- if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
- {
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
-
- if (i == 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) goto err;
- }
+ return 1;
+ }
- if (i < 0)
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
+ ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
+ if (ret == -1)
+ {
+ /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
+ * callback.
+ */
+ X509 *x;
+ int i;
+ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
{
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- if (!ok) goto err;
+ x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+ if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
+ continue;
+ ctx->current_cert = x;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
+ ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret == -2)
+ {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
- ok = 1;
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
+ {
+ ctx->current_cert = NULL;
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
- return ok;
+ return 1;
}
-/* Check certificate against CRL */
-static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
+static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
- int idx, ok;
- X509_REVOKED rtmp;
- /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
- rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
- idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
- /* Not found: OK */
- if(idx == -1) return 1;
- /* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than
- * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
- */
- ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
- ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
- return ok;
+ time_t *ptime;
+ int i;
+
+ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
+ ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
+ else
+ ptime = NULL;
+
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+ if (i == 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i < 0)
+ {
+ ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+ ctx->current_cert=x;
+ if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- int i,ok=0,n;
+ int ok=0,n;
X509 *xs,*xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- time_t *ptime;
- int (*cb)();
+ int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
n--;
xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
- if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
- ptime = &ctx->check_time;
- else
- ptime = NULL;
+
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs=xi;
else
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
- if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+ else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
/* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
* this is a waste of time. That check should
* optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey=NULL;
-
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- if (i > 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
- xs->valid=1;
}
- i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
- if (i == 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
+ xs->valid = 1;
- if (i < 0)
- {
- ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
- ctx->current_cert=xs;
- ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
- if (!ok) goto end;
- }
+ ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
+ if (!ok)
+ goto end;
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+ ctx->current_issuer=xi;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
return ok;
}
-int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}
-int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
char *str;
ASN1_TIME atm;
offset=0;
else
{
- if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
+ if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
- X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
+ if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
+ return 0;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
ctx->untrusted=sk;
}
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
+ {
+ ctx->crls=sk;
+ }
+
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
{
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
}
}
- if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
- if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
+ if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+ if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
+ int ret = 1;
ctx->ctx=store;
ctx->current_method=0;
ctx->cert=x509;
ctx->untrusted=chain;
+ ctx->crls = NULL;
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
- ctx->check_time=0;
ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
ctx->valid=0;
ctx->chain=NULL;
- ctx->depth=9;
ctx->error=0;
+ ctx->explicit_policy=0;
ctx->error_depth=0;
ctx->current_cert=NULL;
ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
+ ctx->tree = NULL;
+
+ ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+
+ if (!ctx->param)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
* use defaults.
*/
+ if (store)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
+ else
+ ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
+
if (store)
{
- ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
- ctx->trust=store->trust;
- ctx->flags = store->flags;
+ ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
}
else
- {
- ctx->purpose = 0;
- ctx->trust = 0;
- ctx->flags = 0;
ctx->cleanup = 0;
+
+ if (ret)
+ ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ {
+ X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
if (store && store->check_issued)
else
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
+ if (store && store->lookup_certs)
+ ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
+
+ if (store && store->lookup_crls)
+ ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
+ else
+ ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
+
+ ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
+
/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
* X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
+ if (ctx->param != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param=NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctx->tree != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
+ ctx->tree=NULL;
+ }
if (ctx->chain != NULL)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+ {
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+ }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
{
- ctx->flags |= flags;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
}
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
{
- ctx->check_time = t;
- ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
}
+X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->tree;
+ }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->explicit_policy;
+ }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
+ {
+ const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+ if (!param)
+ return 0;
+ return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+ }
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ return ctx->param;
+ }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
+ {
+ if (ctx->param)
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+ ctx->param = param;
+ }
+
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)